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The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff
Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-
Plus" Rule in Employment
Discrimination Cases
by
CATHERINE J. LANCTOT*
Consider the following employment discrimination case: A black
male with a degree in accounting from a prestigious university applies for
an entry-level position with an accounting firm. The firm's hiring part-
ner reviews his resume, which reflects that the applicant graduated
magna cum laude with a perfect grade point average in his major. The
resume does not reflect the applicant's race. The hiring partner tele-
phones the applicant and enthusiastically encourages him to come to the
office for an interview the following week.
At the interview, however, the applicant detects a distinct shift in
the partner's tone toward him. The partner now seems far less enthusias-
tic about the applicant's academic credentials. In fact, he tells the appli-
cant that he may be "overqualified" for the available entry-level position
and that he is likely to find the work "too tedious." The applicant as-
sures the partner that he remains quite interested in an entry-level job
because he wants to start at the bottom and work his way up through the
firm. Nevertheless, the interview lasts only fifteen minutes. Three days
later, the applicant receives a form letter rejecting him.1
* Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. A.B. 1978, Brown
University; J.D. 1981, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Anthony W. Norwood,
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Anne Bowen Poulin, Jennifer L. Rosato, and Michael J. Yelnosky for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Special thanks to Robert Babcock,
Kimberly Butler, Janeen Olsen, and Maria Santucci for their excellent research assistance.
1. This hypothetical is loosely based on the factual setting in Griffin v. George B. Buck
Consulting Actuaries, 551 F. Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Griffin, a black male who was a
magna cum laude graduate of the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business,
with a perfect 4.0 grade-point average in his majors of accounting and actuarial science, ap-
plied for a position at an actuarial firm. Id at 1385-86. The plaintiff testified at trial that his
interview with the firm's recruiter lasted only ten to fifteen minutes, and focused on neither his
qualifications nor his substantive expertise. Id at 1386. His interview with the personnel di-
rector lasted twenty to thirty minutes. I Three weeks later, he received a letter of rejection
from the firm. Id at 1386-87.
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The unsuccessful applicant now sues the accounting firm under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 claiming that the firm intentionally
discriminated against him because of his race when it failed to hire him.
3
In response to the applicant's complaint, the firm files a motion for sum-
mary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, asserting that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that
the firm .is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 In a supporting
affidavit, the hiring partner states that he had two legitimate, nondiscrim-
inatory reasons for failing to hire the plaintiff.5 First, the partner ex-
plains that the plaintiff demanded a higher salary than that demanded by
the white male who the firm ultimately hired. Second, the partner asserts
that the plaintiff was overqualified for this entry-level job.6
As required under Rule 56, the plaintiff responds to the motion with
his own affidavit in which he sets forth his race and his excellent aca-
demic qualifications.7 He further asserts that no one in the accounting
firm ever discussed salary with him;8 indeed, he contends that he would
have accepted the job at the salary paid to the white male had it been
offered to him. In his affidavit, the plaintiff also asserts that he discussed
his resume with the hiring partner in the initial telephone conversation
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2002e-17 (1988).
3. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (Summary judgment may be granted if "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.").
5. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) ("Of course, a party seeking
summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion .... ").
6. See Griffin v. George B. Buck Consulting Actuaries, 551 F. Supp. 1385, 1387
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (personnel director testified that plaintiff expected unrealistically high salary
and did not appear to be interested in mundane duties of actuarial trainee position).
7. Rule 56(e) provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the ad-
verse party's pleadings, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
8. See Griffin, 551 F. Supp. at 1386-87 (plaintiff testified that he had briefly discussed
salary with recruiter but had never discussed it with personnel director, and that personnel
director had later told him that salary issue had not been the reason for failing to hire him
because the personnel director "had not taken his thinking process that far").
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
and at that time the partner never mentioned the possibility that he
might be overqualified for the position. Finally, the plaintiff contends
that he specifically stated during his interview that he would be happy to
perform whatever menial tasks were involved in the entry-level job.9
Although the plaintiff's affidavit provides evidence to rebut defend-
ant's proffered reasons for not hiring him, it lacks specific evidence that
the firm took his race into account when making its hiring decision. No
one at the firm ever mentioned race during the interview, and the plaintiff
has been unable to obtain any evidence that the firm has treated black
applicants unfavorably in the past. 10 In short, all the plaintiff has to de-
feat the motion for summary judgment is evidence raising an issue of fact
as to the truth of the accounting firm's reasons for its employment deci-
sion. Can the plaintiff avoid summary judgment on this record?
Surprisingly, the answer to this basic question remains shrouded in
controversy. The true reason for the firm's failure to hire the plaintiff is
clearly a factual issue, raised by the contradictory affidavits of the appli-
cant and the hiring partner. The more difficult question, however, is
whether this factual dispute is material to the ultimate determination of
whether the firm made its hiring decision because of the applicant's
race." The factual dispute is "material" only if resolution of the dispute
might affect the outcome in the case.' 2 As this Article will show, there is
9. In Griffin, the plaintiff testified that the personnel director never discussed the details
of the trainee position with him. IM at 1387. He stated that when he asked about his rejection,
the personnel director said that the plaintiff had not "warmed up" to him during the interview,
that other applicants would be better at working with the other actuaries, and that he did not
have the kind of personality necessary for the job. Id The personnel director also commented
that the plaintiff did not seem to be interested in the "nitty-gritty" aspects of the trainee pro-
gram. It
10. Cf. Id. at 1391 n.13 (limited statistical evidence on hiring of minorities by actuarial
firm lacked probative value).
11. The ultimate issue of whether or not the plaintiff was the victim of intentional dis-
crimination is a question of fact. See, eg., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 566, 576
(1985) (reversing court of appeals for reviewing evidence of discriminatory intent de novo
rather than deferring to judgment of trial court that plaintiff had been victim of sex discrimina-
tion: "a District Court's finding of discriminatory intent in an action brought under Title VII
... is a factual finding that may be overturned on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous");
Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982) (reversing court of appeals and reinstat-
ing trial court's factual finding that there had been no discrimination).
12. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the facts in
the fight most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 157 (1970); 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2727, at 124-25 (2d ed. 1983); Linda S. Mulieaix, Summary Judgment: Taming the
Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 433, 441 (1987). Nevertheless, there is no exact
method for determining whether a "genuine issue as to any material fact" exists under Rule
56. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, 388
F.2d 272, 279 (2d Cir. 1967), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972) ("law provides no magical
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a significant split among the federal courts as to whether a plaintiff may
prove discrimination merely by proving that the defendant's proffered
explanation is untrue, or whether a plaintiff must have additional evi-
dence of discrimination in order to succeed.
A brief review of the analytical framework for employment discrimi-
nation cases will illustrate this controversy. A district court faced with
the accounting firm's motion for summary judgment will look to the fa-
miliar three-part model for disparate treatment cases first established by
the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green 13 and later substantially refined by its unanimous opinion in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 14 Under Burdine, in order
to prove intentional discrimination, the plaintiff first must establish a
prima facie case that raises an inference of discriminatory intent.15 In
the hypothetical case, assume that the district court decides that the
plaintiff will be able to establish at trial that he is a black male who ap-
plied for the position in question, that he had at least the minimum quali-
fications sought by the employer, and that after his rejection the
employer ultimately hired a white male for the position. 16 This meets the
plaintiff's burden of proving a prima facie case. 17 Upon establishing a
talisman or compass that will serve as an unerring guide to determine when a material issue of
fact is presented"). The Supreme Court, however, has defined a material fact as one that
affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
("[S]ubstantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment."). See generally 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra § 2725, at 93-95 ("[Flacts
are material if they constitute a legal defense, or if their existence or nonexistence might affect
the result of the action, or if the resolution of the issue they raise is so essential that the party
against whom it is decided cannot prevail.") (footnotes omitted).
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
14. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Employment discrimination claims arise not only under Title
VII, but also under a variety of other federal statutes, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967); the antidiscrimination provision of
the Employee Retirement Investment Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974); and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1866). Although both McDonnell Douglas Corp.
and Burdine were Title VII cases, the McDonnell Douglas Corp.-Burdine model has been
adapted for use in resolving claims under these statutes as well. See, eg., Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-87 (1989) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); Dister v. Continental Group,
859 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1988) (ERISA); Williams v. Edward Apffiels Coffee Co., 792 F.2d
1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1986) (ADEA).
15. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
16. In the Griffin case, after rejecting the plaintiff, the actuarial firm immediately hired a
white applicant who had not passed any actuarial examinations, in contrast to the seven exami-
nations the plaintiff had passed. The defendant did not attempt to argue that this applicant
was more qualified than the plaintiff. Griffin v. George B. Buck Consulting Actuaries, 551 F.
Supp. 1385, 1388 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
17. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. In McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., the Court explained that to establish a prima facie case a plaintiff claiming
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prima facie case, the plaintiff enjoys a presumption that the defendant
discriminated against him. The rationale for this presumption is that the
plaintiff has eliminated the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for
rejection-failure to apply and lack of minimal qualifications-thereby
raising an inference that the true reason for his rejection is
discrimination. 18
Under Burdine, the second step is for the defendant to articulate a
"legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its action. 19 The defendant
need not prove that the reasons offered are true; the burden is one of
production only.20 Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained: "It is suf-
ficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff."' 21 In the hypothetical, as-
sume that the district court determines that the defendant will be able to
satisfy this intermediate burden at trial. In fact, the firm has offered two
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its failure to hire the plaintiff.
his excessive salary demands and his inappropriate qualifications. Under
Burdine, upon articulation of these two reasons, the presumption of dis-
crimination created by establishment of the prima facie case will be re-
butted, and thereby destroyed.22 The court no longer presumes that the
discriminatory failure to hire need only show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2)
he had the minimal qualifications required for the position for which he applied; (3) he was not
hired; and (4) the employer continued to seek additional applicants. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The Court further noted: "The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII
cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from [plaintiff] is not neces-
sarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13; see
also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (McDonnell
Douglas Corp. "did not purport to create an inflexible formulation").
18. In Burdine, the Court noted:
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the
plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the
case.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. Cf Griffln, 551 F. Supp. at 1388-89 (Plaintiff proved prima facie
case by showing that he had skills and qualifications necessary for entry-level position, and
that after his rejection defendant continued to seek and hire actuarial trainees who had passed
fewer examinations than had plaintiff, who had no experience in actuarial field, and the vast
majority of whom were white.).
19. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
20. Id. ("The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proffered reasons.").
21. Id. at 254-55.
22. See id. at 255 n.10 ("A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the legally
mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence."). In Grif-
fin, the court conceded that the defendant had met this intermediate burden, stating: "If these
perceptions actually motivated the decision not to hire Griffin, [the defendant]'s action had a
nondiscriminatory basis." 551 F. Supp. at 1389.
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plaintiff is the victim of discrimination and must turn to the last step of
the model.
The third and final step of the Burdine model is the "pretext" stage.
The plaintiff now has "an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not
its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. '23 In the hypo-
thetical case, the district court has before it both the plaintiff's claim of
discrimination and the defendant's articulated justifications for not hiring
the plaintiff. At trial, the court would have to decide whether the justifi-
cations offered by the defendant are pretexts for discrimination.24
In deciding a summary judgment motion, however, the district
court should not decide what the true reason for the employment action
was, because that determination rests largely upon the credibility of the
parties.25 Rather, the court simply must decide whether there is suffi-
cient evidence from which a factfinder could infer that the stated justifi-
cations for rejecting the plaintiff were "pretextual. ' ' 26 The problem here,
as in many employment discrimination cases, is the absence of evidence
that directly reflects employer bias. Can the plaintiff prove "pretext"
23. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
24. See id. at 256; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989)
(White, J., concurring) ("In pretext cases, 'the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives,
but not both, were the "true" motives behind the decision' .. ") (quoting NLRB v. Transpor-
tation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1983)).
25. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) ("[A]t the summary
judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.").
26. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) ("Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.").
The factfinder in Title VII trials is ordinarily the court, because relief under the statute
has been construed to be equitable in nature. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) ("[Ihe court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, [including] reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees, with or without back pay.., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate."); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S 405, 418 (1975). See generally Stephen F.
Lazor, Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases-Constitutionally Mandated?, 53 TEx.
L. REv. 483, 487 (1975). Some recent cases have suggested, however, that Title VII plaintiffs
are entitled to jury trials. See Walton v. Cowin Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 327, 339 (N.D. Ala.
1990); Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 635, 642 (N.D. Ala. 1989). ERISA
claims also have been construed to be equitable in nature and the weight of authority is that
there is no right to a jury trial under that statute. See RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 8.13, at 8.50 (1991). In contrast, plaintiffs in discrimination cases brought
under the ADEA and § 1981 are entitled to jury trials. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988) (right
to jury trial under ADEA); Harris v. Richards Mfg. Co., 675 F.2d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 1982)
(right to jury trial under § 1981).
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without such evidence? In Burdine, the Supreme Court gave specific gui-
dance to courts wrestling with this issue:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered ex-
planation is unworthy of credence27
Burdine seems to indicate that in the hypothetical the plaintiff's evidence
rebutting the firm's stated reasons for not hiring him could prove pretext,
and thereby prove intentional discrimination, by "showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. '28
Nevertheless, as this Article will show, Burdine has not conclusively
resolved this issue. Instead, the outcome of a factual scenario like the
hypothetical case hinges largely on the federal circuit in which the case
has been brought. Most of the courts of appeals that have considered the
question have followed Burdine and have held that a plaintiff may prove
pretext, and thus prove intentional discrimination, by showing that the
reasons the defendant offered for the employment decision are untrue.29
Under this rule, which will be termed the "pretext-only" rule, the plain-
tiff does not need any other direct or indirect evidence of discriminatory
animus, because the court may infer discriminatory intent from the fact
that the defendant lied about its motivations. Thus, if this hypothetical
race discrimination case had been brought in a "pretext-only" circuit, the
plaintiff could win at trial simply by persuading the court that the ac-
counting firm's proffered reasons for not hiring him were untrue.30
27. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).
28. Id. In United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983),
Justice Blackmun reiterated this rule in his concurrence: "[Tihe McDonnell Douglas frame-
work requires that a plaintiff prevail when at the third stage of a Title VII trial he demon-
strates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not the
true reason for the employment decision." Id at 718 (Blackmun, J., with Brennan, J.,
concurring).
29. See infra Part I.A. The inability of the courts to arrive at a common understanding
of how a plaintiff proves a disparate treatment case belies the Supreme Court's optimistic ob-
servation in 1977 that disparate treatment "is the most easily understood type of discrimina-
tion." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
30. For example, in the Griffin case, the district court ultimately determined that the
plaintiff had proved his case "by showing that the explanations presented by [defendant] are
not worthy of credence." Griffin v. George B. Buck Consulting Actuaries, 551 F. Supp. 1385,
1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). According to the court, the defendant's purported reliance on plain-
tiff's salary demands was not credible because the accounting firm had not raised this reason
until two years after plaintiff's rejection and because salary had not even been discussed during
plaintiff's initial interview with the personnel director. Id. at 1389-90. As to defendant's as-
November 1991]
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Under the "pretext-only" rule, the factual dispute over the employer's
asserted justifications plainly is material to the outcome, and summary
judgment would be denied on this record.31
For a significant minority of courts, however, including at least two
federal circuits, the rule is quite different. This Article will show that in
these jurisdictions, a plaintiff who can prove only that the defendant's
articulated reasons were untrue will not prevail in an employment dis-
crimination action. 32 These courts reason that the plaintiff must produce
some additional evidence to show not only that the employer has con-
cealed some other reason by its pretextual explanation, but also that the
reason concealed by the employer was intentional discrimination. This
rule, which will be termed the "pretext-plus" rule,33 in effect defines the
pretext stage of the Burdine model to require a dual showing by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must both negate the defendant's proffered reason
and affirmatively demonstrate that the real reason was discriminatory
intent. If the hypothetical case had been brought in a "pretext-plus" ju-
risdiction, the plaintiff would be unable to survive the accounting firm's
summary judgment motion, because he lacks any direct, comparative, or
statistical evidence that shows an intent to discriminate on the basis of
sertion that plaintiff appeared reluctant to perform the mundane tasks required of an entry-
level employee because of his outstanding academic record, the court found that the firm ac-
tively sought applicants with excellent educational credentials, that it had identified no other
applicants who had been rejected as overqualified, and that the personnel director had never
asked plaintiff whether he would be willing to perform these required tasks. Ia at 1390. The
court thus concluded:
In light of the credibility of [plaintiff's] testimony, the various reasons that we find to
question the dependability of [the Personnel Director's] testimony, and the evidence
as a whole, we conclude that [plaintiff] has carried his burden of discrediting the
reasons [the employer] offers for his rejection, and thus in establishing intentional
discrimination under Title VII.
Id at 1391.
31. Indeed, until the recent emergence of the "pretext-plus" rule, summary judgment
traditionally had been disfavored in employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Hillebrand v.
M-Tron Indus., 827 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment should seldom be used
in employment discrimination cases and prima facie case may be sufficient to avoid entry of
summary judgment), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989); Thornbrough v. Columbus & G. R.R.,
760 F.2d 633, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1985) (summary judgment generally inappropriate in discrimi-
nation suits because of "nebulous questions of motivation and intent"); Lewis v. AT&T Tech-
nologies, 691 F. Supp. 915, 918 (D. Md. 1988) ("When the validity of a complaint turns on
questions of an employer's motive and intent, a court must be especially cautious in granting
summary judgment.").
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. This descriptive term has been used by at least one court. See Valdez v. Church's
Fried Chicken, 683 F. Supp. 596, 631 (W.D. Tex. 1988) ("Put another way, the legal question
at issue is whether an indirect showing of pretext alone is sufficient for plaintiff to prevail in the
third stage, or whether plaintiff must make a showing of 'pretext-plus.' ").
[Vol. 43
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race. In other words, the plaintiff could show that the defendant lied
about the reasons for not hiring him, but the plaintiff would still lose his
case.
Only one of these two rules can be correct as a matter of law. Either
the plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent merely by proving that the
defendant's reason is untrue, or he may not. Most disparate treatment
cases are won or lost on the issue of pretext.34 Thus, resolution of this
fundamental issue is critical to establishing consistency within the federal
courts in employment discrimination cases. Today, not only are the cir-
cuits split on this issue, but in some jurisdictions both the "pretext-only"
and the "pretext-plus" rules seem to exist side by side.35 Indeed, in the
last four years the Supreme Court has twice granted certiorari to con-
sider the "pretext-plus" question, but both times it failed to reach a final
decision on the merits.36 Moreover, at least one Supreme Court Justice,
Justice Scalia, indicated some support for the "pretext-plus" rule when
he was a member of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit,3 7 suggesting that there may be some support for this minority
rule within the Supreme Court should the issue arise again.
This Article undertakes to review the analytical underpinnings of
the "pretext-plus" rule, and to show that the rule is fundamentally incon-
sistent with traditional principles of employment discrimination law and
of evidence. 38 Part I explains the competing rules governing proof of
34. See Hannah A. Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme
Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J.
353, 357-58 (1984) ("disparate treatment cases are won or lost on the pretext issue, unless
defendants are unable to produce any evidence of a legitimate reason for their behavior")
(footnotes omitted).
35. See infra notes 48-49, 96-97 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 76, 84-90 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
38. The controversy over the "pretext-plus" rule has emerged primarily in motions for
summary judgment, perhaps because summary judgment has become the principal procedural
battleground for employers seeking to avoid discrimination trials. See Visser v. Packer Eng'g
Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum, J., with Bauer & Cudahy, JJ., dissent-
ing) ("Put simply, employers and their counsel may well conclude that ADEA cases are won
or lost on summary judgment, because jurors find it difficult to close their hearts to the plight
of the terminated older employee but easy to open the purse strings of his employers."). Nev-
ertheless, it has also arisen in other procedural contexts, such as defendants' motions for di-
rected verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. In some instances, application of
the "pretext-plus" rule has resulted in appellate reversal of verdicts for plaintiffs. Pollard v.
Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 558-59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); Nix
v. WCLY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (l1th Cir. 1984); Brooks v.
Ashtabula County Welfare Dep't, 717 F.2d 263,267 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 907
(1984); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983); Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019-20 (1st Cir. 1979); Gries v. Zimmer, Inc., 742 F. Supp.
1309, 1315 (W.D.N.C. 1990). It should be noted, however, that the legal issue implicated is a
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intentional discrimination. After briefly discussing the "pretext-only"
rule, this Part then reviews the rationale offered by "pretext-plus" courts
to justify their contrary approach. The principal justification advanced
for the "pretext-plus" rule is that it is unfair to defendants for a court or
jury to assume that the motive concealed by an untrue reason is a dis-
criminatory motive. The "pretext-plus" courts insist that the plaintiff,
who retains the burden of proof at all times, must produce some addi-
tional evidence of discrimination in order to prevail once the presump-
tion arising from the prima facie case has been rebutted. Any other rule,
claim these courts, will improperly shift the burden of proof to the de-
fendants and will involve federal courts in the inappropriate exercise of
second-guessing the business judgments of countless employers.
Part II demonstrates why the "pretext-plus" rule is fundamentally
unsound. In effect, the "pretext-plus" rule holds plaintiffs in employ-
ment discrimination cases to a higher standard than that imposed on
plaintiffs in other civil cases by effectively denying them the opportunity
to prove their cases by circumstantial evidence. The Article explains
that, even after defendant rebuts the Burdine presumption of discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff still can prove discrimination because the evidence from
the prima facie case retains its probative value. The inference of discrim-
ination from that evidence, coupled with proof that the defendant lied
about its reasons for the employment action, suffices to prove discrimina-
tion. As the Supreme Court specifically stated in Burdine: "[T]here may
be some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effec-
tive cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the de-
fendant's explanation."'3 9
The "pretext-only" rule avoids the dangerous ramifications of the
"pretext-plus" rule-the insulation of the employer's articulated reason
from any kind of meaningful scrutiny. In fact, as this Article concludes
in Part III, the "pretext-only" rule requires entry of judgment for a
plaintiff as a matter of law when that plaintiff proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant's reason is false. As a corollary to that
rule, this Article asserts that courts should explicitly recognize as legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reasons any genuine reasons advanced by de-
fendants, regardless of whether they are unseemly or lack some
matter of substantive law-what a plaintiff must ultimately prove to show intentional discrimi-
nation-and not a matter of procedure-what quantum of evidence a plaintiff must produce to
survive a dispositive motion against him. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986) ("[W]hile the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the sub-
stantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that
governs.").
39. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981).
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relationship to business purposes. By so doing, the expressed concern of
some "pretext-plus" courts that defendants might be held liable for con-
duct that is somehow inappropriate but not discriminatory would
thereby be alleviated.
Without question, the "pretext-plus" rule makes proving employ-
ment discrimination cases substantially more difficult for plaintiffs.
Moreover, it permits employers to avoid trial on the merits of an employ-
ment decision even when there are disputed issues of fact. The absence
of any firm theoretical foundation for the "pretext-plus" rule suggests
that other unspoken motivations may have led to its adoption by some
courts. After reviewing the weaknesses in the various rationales ad-
vanced to support the rule, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
many of the courts that have advanced the "pretext-plus" rule have done
so largely out of skepticism about the prevalence of bias in the workplace
or out of deep-rooted hostility to what they perceive as the proliferation
of nonmeritorious discrimination claims.4°
Some "pretext-plus" opinions have explicitly admitted that impos-
ing this additional evidentiary burden on plaintiffs is motivated, at least
in part, by a desire to reduce the number of employment discrimination
cases tried in the federal courts. Judge Bruce Selya of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals explained in one case that the "pretext-plus" rule is
"crucial" to "'insure that [Title VII] does not become a cloak which is
nonchalantly spread across the record' in every instance where one em-
ployee (or prospective employee) loses out to a rival of contrary race or
gender."'41 A Seventh Circuit opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner
asserted that the
workload crisis of the federal courts, and realization that Title VII is
occasionally or perhaps more than occasionally used by plaintiffs as a
substitute for principles ofjob protection that do not yet exist in Amer-
ican law, have led the courts to take a critical look at efforts to with-
stand defendants' motions for summary judgment.42
40. See generally Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases:
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1209-10 (1981) (Burdens of
proof are the battleground for substantive theories of discrimination; "[o]ne such procedural
device that courts often use to limit the reach of substantive theories is to allocate the burdens
of pleading and proof on the various elements of a claim for relief in a way that will favor a
desired outcome.").
41. Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (lst Cir. 1988) (Selya, J.) (quot-
ing Hoseman v. Technical Materials, 554 F. Supp. 659, 667 (D.R.I. 1982) (Selya, J.)); see also
Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (lst Cir. 1990) (Selya, J.) ("Be-
cause courts should not encourage long, expensive trials merely to discover whether any evi-
dence exists to support a claim, we decline to disturb the entry of summary judgment.").
42. Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.).
Judge Posner also expressed some general skepticism about age discrimination cases in his
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Yet another opinion, authored by Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, rejected the "pretext-only" rule, asserting that "[t]here
must be some proof that age motivated the employer's action, otherwise
the law has been converted from one preventing discrimination because
of age to one ensuring dismissals only for 'just cause' to all people over
40.143
Justice Scalia offered what may be the most specific articulation of
this view in a dissenting opinion authored when he was a member of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:
[W]ithout careful and conscientious fact-finding the anti-discrimina-
tion laws can either be frustrated by, or be converted into instruments
of, the very evil they are designed to prevent. The court's decision
facilitates the latter development, permitting juries to render awards
where no solid evidence exists .... If this case did not call for a di-
rected verdict, it is difficult to imagine any small business hiring a mi-
nority employee which does not, in doing so, commit its economic
welfare and its good name to the unpredictable speculations of some yet
unnamed jury.44
At best, these assorted comments reflect a striking disregard for the
strong national policy against employment discrimination that is embod-
ied in federal law. Justice Scalia's comments are even more startling be-
cause of the open suggestion that small businesses would be economically
wise not to hire minority employees due to potential liability for civil
rights violations. These remarks may well reflect the increasing conser-
vatism of the federal courts.45 Although they may not necessarily typify
opinion in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1991), which somewhat reluc-
tantly reversed entry of summary judgment for the defendant while disavowing any intent to
impose personal views on the law:
So we must reverse. We are not entirely happy in doing so, being perplexed that the
middle-aged should be thought an oppressed minority requiring the protection of
federal law. But that is none of our business as judges. We are also sympathetic to
the view that [if the employer discriminated, the employer] will pay a price in the
competitive marketplace, and that the threat of such market sanctions deters age
discrimination at lower cost than the law can do with its cumbersome and expensive
machinery, its gross delays, its frequent errors, and its potential for rigidifying the
labor market. But this sanguine view of the power of the marketplace was not shared
by the framers and supporters of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and
we shall not subvert the Act by upholding precipitate grants of summary judgment to
defendants.
Shager, 913 F.2d at 406-07.
43. Bienkowski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 n.6 (5th Cir. 1988) (Jones, J.).
44. Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 case).
45. Cf William E. Kovacic, The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental Policy: The Im-
pact of Appointments to the Federal Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. R v. 669, 678-
80 (1991) (review of recent environmental cases in courts of appeals provides "qualified sup-
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the rationales of all "pretext-plus" courts, these comments strongly sug-
gest that the substantive rule these courts have advanced merits careful
examination. Too many civil rights plaintiffs have run aground on the
"pretext-plus" rule to permit that rule to continue to stand unchallenged.
As this Article shows, this rule has no foundation in law and runs
counter to the policies underlying employment discrimination statutes.
I. The Competing Rules Governing Proof of Intentional
Discrimination at the "Pretext" Stage
Courts have developed two opposing rules to guide them in deter-
mining whether the employment discrimination plaintiffs have proven
their causes: the "pretext-only" rule and the "pretext-plus" rule. Before
undertaking a critical examination of these rules, a brief review of how
each rule operates is in order.
A. The "Pretext-Only" Rule
Most courts of appeals that have considered the plaintiff's burden at
the pretext stage have correctly concluded that the plaintiff may prevail
simply by showing that the defendant's justification is untrue, without
introducing any additional evidence of discrimination. This rule has
been advanced by the Courts of Appeals for the Second,46 Third,47
port" for notion that virtually all Reagan judicial appointees brought conservative policy pref-
erences to the bench).
46. The leading case in the Second Circuit is Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d
1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Burdine made it plain that in addition to directly proving a dis-
criminatory motive for firing, a plaintiff may prevail upon a showing that the employer's given
legitimate reason is unworthy of credence. .. ."); see also, Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1991) ("It is enough for the plaintiff to show that the articulated
reasons were not the true reasons for the defendant's actions."); Ibrahim v. New York State
Dep't of Health, 904 F.2d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 1990) (reaffirming Dister standard); Gibson v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 892 F.2d 1128, 1132 (2d Cir. 1989) ("evidence [of discrimina-
tion] may be established... indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence"); Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir. 1989)
("A showing that a proffered justification is pretextual is itself sufficient to support an inference
that the employer intentionally discriminated."). But see Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d
85, 94 (2d Cir. 1984) (to prove discrimination in denial of tenure, plaintiff must show more
than disagreement about scholarly merits of candidate's academic work or teaching abilities;
"[a]bsent evidence sufficient to support a finding that such disagreements or doubts are influ-
enced by forbidden considerations such as sex or race, universities are free to establish depart-
mental priorities, to set their own required levels of academic potential and achievement and to
act upon the good faith judgments of their departmental faculties or reviewing authorities.");
Graham v. Renbrook School, 692 F. Supp. 102, 107 n.7 (D. Conn. 1988) ("Disbelief of testi-
mony, however, does not alone establish that the opposite of that testimony is in fact the
truth.... It cannot, therefore, be considered as constituting evidence that is substantial.")
(citation omitted).
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Fifth,48 Sixth,49 Eighth,50 Ninth,51 Tenth,52 and District of Columbia
47. The leading case in the Third Circuit is Chipolini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d
893, 899 (3d Cir.) (en banc) ("If the plaintiff [shows] that it is more likely than not that the
employer did not act for its proffered reason, then the employer's decision remains unexplained
and the inferences from the evidence produced by the plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the
ultimate fact of discriminatory intent .... "), cert dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); see also,
Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir.) (plaintiff is only required to show that
employer's proffered explanation is false and not that employer acted for discriminatory rea-
sons), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990); Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d 184,
192 (3d Cir. 1990) (Mansmann, J., dissenting) ("[N]ot only is 'smoking gun' evidence not
required, but a specially tailored burden-shifting mechanism is available to a plaintiff who
cannot produce direct evidence.") White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir.
1988) (plaintiff's indirect evidence that he was fired before pension benefits increased raised
genuine issue of material fact as to pretext); Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 726 (3d
Cir. 1988) ("[If the plaintiff [proves] that the asserted reasons for the tenure denial were not
the actual reasons, then the jury may infer that the employer actually was motivated in its
decision by race; plaintiff is not required to provide independent, direct evidence of racial
discrimination."); Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1987)
("[Tihe inferences from the plaintiffs' prima facie case, together with the testimony provided
by the plaintiffs' expert which rebuts the proffered explanation by the defendant, may support
a verdict in their behalf."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989); Jackson v. University of Pitts-
burgh, 826 F.2d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 1987) (sufficient evidence that criticisms of plaintiff's per-
formance were "post hoc concoctions" to preclude entry of summary judgment); Sorba v.
Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[A]n ADEA plaintiff can pre-
vail by means of indirect proof that the employer's reasons are pretextual without presenting
evidence specifically relating to age."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1019 (1988); Duffy v. Wheeling
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir.) ("a showing that a proffered justification
is pretextual is itself equivalent to a finding that the employer intentionally discriminated")
(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984); Brieck v. Harbison-Walker
Refractories, 624 F. Supp. 363 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (reaffirming Chipollini standard), opinion
amended upon denial of reconsideration, 705 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Pa. 1986), and aff'd in part
and rev'd and remanded in part, 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1527 (3d Cir. 1987), and
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 488 U.S. 226 (1988).
48. The leading case in the Fifth Circuit is Thorbrough v. Columbus & G. R.R., 760
F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[Plaintiff] is not required to prove that the [defendant] was
motivated by bad reasons; he need only persuade the factfinder that the [defendant]'s pur-
ported good reasons were untrue."); see also, Norris v. Hartmarx Specialty Stores, 913 F.2d
253, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff's proof that the reasons for her discharge were pretextual
entitled her to judgment under Title VII); Merrill v. Southern Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600,
605 n.6 (5th Cir. 1986) ("If the employer meets this burden of production, plaintiff can resur-
rect his prima facie case, and proceed to victory, by showing that the employer's justifications
were pretextual."); Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir. 1986) (sufficient
evidence for jury to believe that reasons given for plaintiff's discharge were pretextual and find
for plaintiff); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, 683 F. Supp. 596, 632 (W.D. Tex. 1988)
(plaintiff may prevail upon a showing of simple pretext, rather than a showing of pretext for
discrimination).
Although Thornbrough is the leading case in the Fifth Circuit, at least one recent decision
has indicated skepticism about Thornbrough's continued vitality. In Bienkowski v. American
Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1988), the court reversed entry of summary judgment for a
defendant in an ADEA case. Nevertheless, Judge Jones cautioned:
Even if the trier of fact chose to believe an employee's assessment of his performance
rather than the employer's, that choice alone would not lead to a conclusion that the
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employer's version is a pretext for age discrimination. More is required, such as
'direct' evidence of age discrimination, information about the ages of other employees
in plaintiff's position, the treatment and evaluation of other employees, or the em-
ployer's variation from standard evaluation practices.
Id. at 1508 (footnote omitted). This opinion appears to advocate the "pretext-plus" rule.
Moreover, the Bienkowski court qualified Thornbrough by claiming the Thornbrough plaintiff
had such "plus" evidence, and by noting that "the Thornbrough court admitted that its deci-
sion stretches the ADEA to its limit." Id. Bienkowski specifically disapproved of the Third
Circuit's rationale in Chipollini arguing that there must be "some proof that age motivated the
employer's action, otherwise the law has been converted from one preventing discrimination
because of age to one ensuring dismissals only for 'just cause' to all people over 40." Id at
1508 n.6. In addition to Bienkowsk4 there appears to be some older precedent in the Fifth
Circuit for the "pretext-plus" rule. See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 523 (5th
Cir. 1982) ("It was incumbent upon [plaintiff] to introduce substantial evidence to show that
[defendant]'s articulated reasons were pretextual and that he had been discriminated against
because of aga") (emphasis in original).
49. The Sixth Circuit appears to follow the "pretext-only" rule, although there is some
older precedent for the "pretext-plus" rule. The leading "pretext-only" case is Tye v. Board of
Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir.) ("[P]laintiff may indirectly prove intentional discrimi-
nation by showing that the defendants' justifications are untrue and therefore must be a pre-
text."), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); see also Fite v. First Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861
F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Tye standard); Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777
F.2d 1155, 1157 (6th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff proved by preponderance of evidence that defend-
ant's nondiscriminatory reason was not worthy of belief); Lenz v. Erdmann Corp., 773 F.2d
62, 65 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (trial court erred in finding insufficient evidence of pretext
to avoid summary judgment); cf Miller v. WFLI Radio, 687 F.2d 136, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1982)
(reversing entry of judgment for defendant in Title VII case, reasoning that although lower
court disbelieved defendant's articulated reason, case must be remanded to determine whether
alternative reason offered by lower court but never raised by defendant in first trial might
actually have motivated defendant).
At least one older decision in the Sixth Circuit reflects the "pretext-plus" rule. In Brooks
v. Ashtabula County Welfare Dep't, 717 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 907
(1984), the court reversed a judgment for plaintiff in a Title VII case, claiming that the district
court had improperly found the defendant's reasons unworthy of belief when the plaintiff had
not offered "affirmative evidence" that defendant's reasons were pretextual. Id at 266. The
court of appeals claimed that the district court had improperly "tested the justification for its
credibility, veracity, and persuasiveness" when it considered the defendant's inability to sup-
port its reasons with documentation. Id at 267. In essence, rather than treating the plaintiff's
attack on the defendant's reasons as meeting the plaintiff's burden of disproving those reasons,
the court asserted instead that the district court's consideration of evidentiary weaknesses in
defendant's case improperly shifted the burden of proof. This analysis is incorrect. See infra
notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
50. The leading case in the Eighth Circuit is MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054,
1059 (8th Cir. 1988) ("As a matter of both common sense and federal law, an employer's
submission of a discredited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself evi-
dence which may persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful discrimination actually oc-
curred."); see also Goetz v. Farm Credit Serv., 927 F.2d 398, 400-01 (8th Cir. 1991)
(reaffirming MacDissi standard); Ingram v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 897 F.2d 1450, 1455 (8th Cir.
1990) (defendant held to have discriminatory intent after asserted reasons were shown to be
untrue; record showed that some factor other than defendant's articulated reason operated to
result in negative recommendation for plaintiff); Morgan v. Arkansas Gazette, 897 F.2d 945,
951-52 (8th Cir. 1990) (factfinder was permitted to use all available inferences and assess credi-
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bility of witnesses to determine existence of intentional discrimination); Washburn v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 831 F.2d 1404, 1408 (8th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff not required to present addi-
tional rebuttal testimony after defendant articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reason;
plaintiff's case-in-chief presented evidence on which jury could decide that defendant's reasons
for discharge were pretextual); Dace v. ACF Indus., 722 F.2d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 1983) (inquiry
in pretext phase "is not one of weighing the quality and quantity of the defendant's evidence
against that of the plaintiff, but of determining whether the plaintiff's evidence supports a
reasonable inference that [plaintiff] was not demoted for the reasons given"); cf Wells v. Got-
fredson Motor Co., 709 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1983) (although district court improperly
determined that plaintiff had not proven her prima facie case, judgment for defendant in Title
VII case was affirmed because defendant's justification was supported by preponderance of
evidence).
At least one recent decision in the Eighth Circuit appears to have edged away from the
"pretext-only" rule. In Gray v. University of Ark., 883 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1989), the court
affirmed entry ofjudgment for defendant in a Title VII case, noting that although "some of the
reasons given... appear to be less than weighty, if not almost laughable," the district court
had not found them to be false or unworthy of credence. Ia at 1402.
51. Although the law in the Ninth Circuit is not well developed on this issue, the leading
case appears to be Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985) modified, 784 F.2d
1407 (1986). In Lowe, the court suggested that evidence of the prima facie case alone suffices
to raise a genuine issue of material fact that will avoid entry of summary judgment. Id. at 1009
("[W]hen a plaintiff has established a prima facie inference of disparate treatment through
direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, he will necessarily have raised a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the legitimacy or bona fides of the employer's
articulated reason for its employment decision."). The most recent case in the Ninth Circuit,
however, suggests that more than the prima facie case is required. See Lindahl v. Air France,
930 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1991) (Plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment "simply by
restating the prima facie case and expressing an intent to challenge the credibility of the em-
ployer's witnesses on cross-examination. She must produce specific facts either directly evi-
dencing a discriminatory motive or showing that the employer's explanation is not credible.").
Other cases in the Ninth Circuit appear to have adopted the "pretext-only" rule. See, eg.,
Perez v. Curcio, 841 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Pretext is established by showing either
that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the employer or that the em-
ployer's explanation is unworthy of credence."); Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 575 (9th
Cir. 1987) (genuine issue of material fact found to exist in case brought under Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988), because defendant's reasons were discredited by indirect evidence
of discrimination); Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 797 F.2d 727, 732-33 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Courts
have recognized that in discrimination cases, an employer's true motivations are particularly
difficult to ascertain... thereby making such factual determinations generally unsuitable for
disposition at the summary judgment stage.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524
(1990); Williams v. Edward Apffels Coffee Co., 792 F.2d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986) (if there is
sufficient evidence to cast doubt on credibility of defendant's reason, plaintiff need not produce
evidence in addition to that needed to prove prima facie case).
52. The law in the Tenth Circuit is not well developed on this issue. Although several
opinions have suggested approval of the "pretext-only" rule, no opinion to date appears to
have confronted the issue squarely. See, eg., Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156,
1160 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The burden then shifts back to plaintiff, who must then show that the
defendants' reasons are a pretext for discrimination, Le., the proffered reasons were not the
true reasons for the hiring decision."); Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1266 (10th
Cir. 1988) (allowing plaintiff to prove discrimination indirectly by showing that defendant's
reason was unworthy of credence); Furr v. AT&T Technologies, 824 F.2d 1537, 1549 (10th
Cir. 1987) ("The critical question for the jury is whether it believes the defendant's proffered
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Circuits.53 The federal government has also taken this position in recent
litigation.54 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit offered one of
the most cogent explanations of the "pretext-only" rule in Chipollini v.
Spencer Gifts, Inc.,55 the only en banc decision to date advocating this
rule, and later reaffirmed its holding in an unreported decision, Brieck v.
Harbison-Walker Refractories.56 As the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in both cases, they merit closer attention as illustrations of how the
"pretext-only" rule operates.
Both Chipollini and Brieck were age discrimination cases. The
plaintiff in Chipollini was a construction manager for a chain of stores.
At age fifty-eight, after ten years of service, the company fired him, in-
forming him that the reason for his discharge was a reduction in expenses
reasons for the employment decision, rather than the plaintiff's assertion of impermissible dis-
crimination."), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1238 (1988); Carey v. United States Postal Serv., 812
F.2d 621, 626 (10th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff did not prove pretext either by direct evidence or by
evidence that defendant's reason was not worthy of credence); Beck v. QuickTrip Corp., 708
F.2d 532, 535 (10th Cir. 1983) (district court found that defendant's reasons were "insubstan-
tial and unreasonable" and that plaintiff "had indirectly met her burden of persuasion under
Burdine").
53. Although there are relatively few cases on this issue in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, the leading case appears to be Bishopp v. District of Columbia,
788 F.2d 781, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs had shown that defendant's reason was "unwor-
thy of credence as a matter of law" and "[s]uch a blatantly pretextual defense carries the seeds
of its own destruction"); see also King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Bur-
dine makes it absolutely clear that a plaintiff who establishes aprimafacie case of intentional
discrimination and who discredits the defendants' rebuttal should prevail, even if he or she has
offered no direct evidence of discrimination."); Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d
1225, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (permitting indirect evidence that defendant's reasons were un-
worthy of credence because "[a]bsent a 'smoking gun' or other direct evidence of racial ani-
mus, a court would be hard-pressed to ever discern discrimination"); Lanphear v. Prokop, 703
F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("If... [plaintiff] shows [defendant's] reason to be specious,
then in conjunction with his prima facie case [plaintiffl has carried his burden of proving dis-
crimination by a preponderance of the evidence."); Townsend v. Washington Metro. Areas
Transit Auth., 746 F. Supp. 178, 184 (D.D.C. 1990) ("[Tjhis record contains so many unex-
plained inconsistencies, irregularities, and holes that the Court simply cannot believe [defend-
ant's] proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons."); cf Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701,
707-08 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("We are ... not squarely presented with the question of
whether a discrimination plaintiff can prevail solely on the strength of his or her prima facie
case coupled with an effective rebuttal of the employer's explanation.").
54. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9-10, Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck,
47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1527 (3d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-271), microformed on U.S.
Supreme Court Records and Briefs 1988/89 FO, Card 6 of 7 (Congressional Info. Serv.), cert
dismissed as improvidently granted, 488 U.S. 226 (1988).
55. 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
56. 624 F. Supp. 363 (W.D. Pa. 1985), opinion amended upon denial of reconsideration,
705 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Pa. 1986), and aff'd in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 47 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1527 (3d Cir. 1987), and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 488
U.S. 226 (1988).
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and a moratorium on new store construction.57 A younger employee as-
sumed Chipollini's duties and later his job title.58 Chipollini sued his
employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
claiming that age had been a determining factor in his termination. The
employer then fied a motion for summary judgment. 59
In support of its motion, the employer contended that Chipollini
had been terminated "because of a reduction in force of executives neces-
sitated by a virtual cessation of store construction and remodeling and
because of his indifferent, uncooperative, and ineffective attitude regard-
ing certain special projects." 60 The defendant submitted portions of dep-
ositions that supported its evaluation of Chipollini's performance and
submitted an affidavit from the president of the company, attesting to the
need for a reduction in force of construction management personnel.61
In response, the plaintiff introduced specific evidence that challenged the
defendant's articulated justifications. As in the hypothetical case, how-
ever, he had no evidence directly showing that the employer based its
decision on age.62
The district court concluded that the plaintiff had introduced no evi-
dence that "necessarily" showed that the true reason for his discharge
was age discrimination.63 The court acknowledged that Burdine permits
proving pretext "indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered ex-
planation is unworthy of credence."6' Nevertheless, the court asserted
that "on a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff who relies on the
'indirect' method of proof must at least present the court with some basis
for doubting the credence of the proffered explanation. '65 Here, the
court asserted, "plaintiff must show that the explanation is a pretext for
57. ChipoiinI. 814 F.2d at 895.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id at 895. The defendant further explained that the replacement employee "seemed
more flexible and easy-going, while the latter had become less effective as a worker, in addition
to being less cooperative." Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (D.N.J.
1985).
61. Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 896.
62. Id. at 900-01. The plaintiff submitted his own affidavit, portions of deposition testi-
mony, and letters of recommendation written after his termination that cast doubt on the
credibility of the defendant's reasons. Id
63. Id at 896. The district court conceded that the reasons given for firing Chipollini
were "subjective ones, but that is sufficient, particularly when the job in question is an execu-
tive position involving discretion and personal relations rather than more objective productiv-
ity factors." Chipollini, 613 F. Supp. at 1160.
64. Chipollini 613 F. Supp. at 1160 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
65. Id.
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discrimination."' 66 The court found plaintiff's evidence insufficient to
make such a showing because it simply challenged the employer's justifi-
cations for firing him, but did not also raise an inference of age discrimi-
nation.67 The court concluded:
[N]othing the plaintiff has proffered raises an issue of age as a factor
that was considered along with the other intangibles. No statements
made to plaintiff, no memos among defendant's decision-making em-
ployees have been submitted; no statistics have been compiled; no pat-
tern or practice of discrimination has been suggested. To allow a jury
to infer age discrimination would simply be to invite speculation. 68
The court therefore granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.69
Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the district court's judgment. Judge Mansmann's opinion, on behalf of
nine of the ten judges participating, explained that the appropriate test
on summary judgment was "whether evidence of inconsistencies and im-
plausibilities in the employer's proffered reasons for discharge reasonably
could support an inference that the employer did not act for non-discrim-
inatory reasons, not whether the evidence necessarily leads to that [sic]
conclusion that the employer did act for discriminatory reasons." 70
Here, "[b]ecause Chipollini offered no direct evidence of a discriminatory
motive, questions regarding intent and its manifestations are, at this
point, subsumed under the inquiry into employer pretext."' 71 Indeed, the
court of appeals rejected any requirement of additional evidence, noting
that, under Burdine, once all legitimate reasons have been eliminated, it
is more likely than not that the defendant acted with impermissible mo-
tives. The court explained:
If the plaintiff convinces the trier of fact that it is more likely than not
that the employer did not act for its proffered reason, then the em-
ployer's decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the evi-
dence produced by the plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the ultimate
fact of discriminatory intent .... 72
The Chipollini court concluded that "the plaintiff is entitled to show
that the employer's explanation was pretextual by proffering evidence
which is circumstantial or indirect as well as that which directly shows
66. Id (emphasis in original).
67. Id at 1160-61.
68. Id. at 1161.
69. Id.
70. Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 900 (emphasis in original).
71. Id at 898.
72. Id. at 899.
November 1991I] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
discriminatory animus ('smoking gun' evidence)."' 73 Thus, "a plaintiff
can prevail by means of indirect proof that the employer's reasons are
pretextual without presenting evidence specifically relating to age."74 In
announcing this rule, the court cautioned: "A defendant which is less
than honest in proffering its reason for discharge risks an unnecessary
age discrimination verdict."' 75 Although the Supreme Court granted a
writ of certiorari in Chipollini, it ultimately dismissed the writ pursuant
to agreement of the parties. 76
The Third Circuit soon reaffirmed Chipollini in Brieck In Brieck,
an employer laid off a fifty-five-year-old installation specialist after seven-
teen years of service.77 Of the four installation specialists the company
laid off, the only one ultimately recalled was the youngest, a thirty-nine-
year-old worker who had substantially less experience as an installation
specialist than plaintiff. The company claimed that the replacement
worker had broader experience than the plaintiff, and that the job now
required such broad experience. 78 Like the plaintiff in Chipollini, Brieck
introduced evidence to show that the company's justification was pretex-
tual, arguing in particular that the employer was not even using the re-
placement worker's allegedly broader experience. 79 In granting the
73. Id at 895.
74. Id. at 898 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 899. The lone dissenting judge, Judge Hunter, argued that the "pretext-plus"
rule required afirmance of the district court's judgment in this case. Id. at 902-04; see infra
notes 215, 258 and accompanying text.
76. The parties in Chipollini apparently settled the case before briefing began and thus the
Supreme Court dismissed it pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 53 (now Rule 46) without ever
hearing argument. See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 483 U.S. at 1052 (dismissing certiorari
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 53). As of 1987, Rule 53 provided:
Whenever the parties thereto, at any stage of the proceedings, file with the Clerk an
agreement in writing that any cause be dismissed, specifying the terms with respect
to costs, and pay to the Clerk any fees that may be due, the Clerk, without further
reference to the Court, shall enter an order of dismissal.
Sup. Ct. R. 53, quoted in 13 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 846.01 (2d
ed. 1991).
77. The job of "installation specialist" entailed supervising installation of refractory
materials in steel-making furnaces, training customers' employees in operation and mainte-
nance, and trouble-shooting to resolve complaints. Brieck v. Harbison-Walker Refractories,
624 F. Supp. 363, 364 (W.D. Pa. 1985), opinion amended upon denial of reconsideration, 705 F.
Supp. 269 (W.D. Pa. 1986), and aff'd in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 47 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1527 (3d Cir. 1987), and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 488 U.S.
226 (1988).
78. Id. at 365-66.
79. The plaintiff produced evidence from his own deposition and the deposition of the
replacement worker to suggest that the additional skills that the replacement worker possessed
were not being utilized on the job. From this, plaintiff argued that the employer's articulated
reason for retaining the younger worker instead of rehiring him was a pretext. Id.
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employer's motion for summary judgment, however, the district court
appeared to make factual findings as to the relative experience of the
plaintiff and his replacement.80 The court concluded that it could not
find that the plaintiff's age was a determinative factor in his discharge,
citing the "absence of proof that defendant's justification for his layoff is
a pretext for age discrimination." 8'
Again, the court of appeals reversed the entry of summary judgment
and remanded the case for trial. In an unpublished opinion by Judge
Mansmann, the court stated: "The district court erred in resolving this
factual dispute. The question is not whether the employer's asserted rea-
son is plausible, but whether there is also evidence of record which, if
credited, could render the reason implausible."'82 Here, as in Chipollini,
"[t]he district court incorrectly required that the ADEA plaintiff's evi-
dence establish a direct inference that the employer discharged him be-
cause of his age."'83 In both cases, the theory underlying the court's
analysis was that such evidence would cast doubt on the credibility of the
defendant's articulated explanation.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Brieck and heard argu-
ment in October of 1987. Six weeks later, however, the Court dismissed
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Although the Court's
reasons for dismissing the writ in Brieck remain unexplained, a review of
the record indicates that the Court's determination rested less on its view
of the merits and more on the view that the lower court's decision to
reverse the grant of summary judgment was too fact-bound to generate a
rule of law.84 The legal issue as framed by the employer in the petition
80. Id. at 366 ("Without considering age, we find that [plaintiff], in comparison to [the
replacement worker], has 1. slightly more seniority; 2. slightly poorer performance evalua-
tions; 3. little experience in areas related to installation specialist."); see Brieck, 47 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1528.
81. Brieck, 624 F. Supp. at 366. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that his replace-
ment's additional experience was not being utilized on the job, explaining: "Any question
about the appropriateness of how [the replacement] now spends his time edges into the area of
judicial scrutiny of business decisions, which is not part of our function." Id The court reaf-
firmed its conclusion in a motion for reconsideration, stating that plaintiff's affidavits were
"conclusory and refer to no corroborating evidence." Brieck, 705 F. Supp. 269, 269 (W.D. Pa.
1986).
82. Brieck, 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1529.
83. Id at 1528.
84. Accord Jana E. Cuellar, Comment, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act" Han-
dling the Element of Intent in Summary Judgment Motions, 38 EMORY L.J. 523, 532-33 n.64
(1989) (Supreme Court briefs in Brieck suggest that plaintiff may have raised other factual
issues); see generally The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, 359 U.S. 180, 184 (1959) ("Exami-
nation of a case on the merits, on oral argument, may bring into 'proper focus' a consideration
which, though present in the record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates that
the grant was improvident."). Dismissal of a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, how-
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for writ of certiorari was "[w]hether a plaintiff who alleges intentional
discrimination can survive summary judgment merely by questioning his
employer's business judgment, without presenting any evidence, direct or
indirect, that his employer's judgment was in fact motivated by an intent
to discriminate. ' 85 Thus, the "pretext-only" rule advanced by the Third
Circuit in Chipollini and Brieck appears to have been clearly raised in the
initial petition.86 Much of the briefing also focused on the "pretext-only"
rule. In particular, the Solicitor General's amicus brief filed in support of
plaintiff's position contended that the case itself was "unexceptional" but
that the employer's advocacy of the "pretext-plus" rule reflected a
"double-barreled attack on established Title VII doctrine and on the
court of appeals' assessment of the facts of record in light of the doc-
trine."'8 7 Nevertheless, briefing in the Supreme Court also reflected sub-
stantial focus on the lower courts' assessment of the factual record rather
than on the "pretext-only" rule. 88 Similarly, although the oral argument
focused on the Third Circuit's "pretext-only" rule, the parties also spent
considerable time discussing the particular facts of Brieck 89 This focus
ever, occurs for a variety of reasons. See generally ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 286-93 (6th ed. 1986); James F. Blumstein, The Supreme Court's Jurisdic-
tion-Reform Proposals, Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. REv. 895,
921-38 (1973). In the absence of an explanatory opinion, one is left to speculate on the Court's
motivations in taking such action in both these cases. See STERN ET AL., supra, at 289 ("It is
difficult to ascertain the reasons for a dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted when the
Court's order expresses none."); cf Blumstein, supra, at 929 (Supreme Court should write
opinions to justify and explain dismissals of certiorari).
85. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit at i, Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck, 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1527
(3d. Cir. 1987) (No. 87-271), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1988/
89 FO, Card I of 7 (Congressional Info. Serv.), cert dismissed as improvidently granted, 488
U.S. 226 (1988).
86. The plaintiff phrased the question as follows:
Whether a plaintiff in an action brought pursuant to the [ADEA] must present direct
evidence of discrimination or indirect evidence of discrimination in the form of statis-
tical evidence, in order to survive an employer's motion for summary judgment, or
may such a plaintiff produce only indirect evidence that the employer's proffered
reasons are a pretext for discrimination.
Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit at i, Brieck (No. 87-271).
87. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission As
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7-8, Brieck (No. 87-271).
88. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at 1-4, Brieck (No. 87-271); Brief for Respondent at 16-55, Brieck (No. 87-
271).
89. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-53, Brieck (No. 87-271), microformed on Oral
Arguments of the Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Fiche 12 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
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may well have prompted the Court to dismiss the writ after oral argu-
ment, with only Justice White dissenting.90
Chipollini and Brieck nevertheless represent the general approach of
the "pretext-only" courts. Under this majority rule, the courts follow the
language of Burdine that permits a plaintiff to show pretext "indirectly
by showing that the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of
credence." 91 For these courts, once the plaintiff proves the defendant's
articulated justification to be untrue, this proof is strong evidence that
the defendant is concealing a discriminatory motive. The court will pre-
sume that if the defendant truly had a lawful motive, the defendant
would have advanced it. In the hypothetical case, the plaintiff's evidence
rebutting the accounting firm's reasons for refusing to hire him would
suffice to avoid summary judgment. If the plaintiff succeeded in persuad-
ing the court at trial that the defendant's articulated reasons were untrue,
the court would have an ample basis to find that the plaintiff had been
discriminated against on the basis of race.
B. The "Pretext-Plus" Rule
Despite the prevalence of the "pretext-only" rule, a substantial mi-
nority of the federal courts that have considered the issue have adopted
the "pretext-plus" rule. The leading proponent of the rule has been the
90. The exchange at the close of oral argument appears to support the Solicitor General's
assertion that the case hinged largely on an assessment of the factual record. The following
colloquy occurred between the defendant's lawyer and an unnamed Justice:
Counsel: [T]he issue here is whether a reasonable jury could conclude that there
was age discrimination.
Counsel: [The case involves] two important principles. The court below said you
could look at one piece of evidence and not the entire record as a
whole.... [T]hat was inconsistent with this Court's opinion in Anderson
and in Celotex. Number two, the standard that the Court would apply
into the AD[E]A is one which really does not deal with the ultimate ques-
tion of discrimination, but simply whether or not you can raise a sufficient
question of the judgment itself so as to allow a jury then to infer
discrimination.
Question: I'm sorry that that wasn't the question you presented to us when you
asked us to take this case. The question presented is set forth in your
petition is whether a plaintiff who alleges intentional discrimination can
survive summary judgment merely - merely by questioning his em-
ployer's business judgment without presenting any evidence, direct or in-
direct, that his employer's judgment was, in fact, motivated by an intent
to discriminate. That's an interesting question. What you've just been
talking about isn't.
Id. at 52-53. The writ of certiorari was dismissed six weeks later. 488 U.S. 266.
91. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
November 1991] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,92 although there recently has been
increasing debate within that court over the rule.93 In addition, opinions
92. Until recently, the First Circuit's adherence to the "pretext-plus" rule seemed to be
well settled. The leading case in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit appears to be White
v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (lst Cir.) ("Merely casting doubt on the employer's ar-
ticulated reason does not suffice to meet the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating discriminatory
intent .... "), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); see also Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
901 F.2d 186, 191 (1st Cir. 1990) ("the appellant cannot prove pretext solely by contesting the
objective veracity of appellee's action."); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896
F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) ('[W]hen ... the employer has articulated a presumptively legitimate
reason for discharging an employee, the latter must elucidate specific facts which would enable
a jury to find that the reason given was not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the
employer's real motive: age discrimination."); Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331,
1336 (1st Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's burden on rebuttal "required persuasion in two respects"-to
prove that the reasons are false, and to prove that they were pretexts aimed at masking age
discrimination); Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988) ("it was
plaintiff's burden not only to show that the defendants' proffered reasons for hiring someone
else were apocryphal, but that those reasons were pretexts aimed at masking sex or race dis-
crimination.") (emphasis in original); Menzel v. Western Auto Supply Co., 848 F.2d 327, 330
(1st Cir. 1988) ("[E]ven if Menzel had succeeded in creating some doubt about the objective
correctness of [defendant]'s decision to fire him, that would not be enough to sustain plaintiff's
appeal."); Menard v. First Sec. Servs. Corp., 848 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's
evidence that he was performing well, introduced to counter defendant's argument that he was
performing poorly, was found to do "little but dispute the objective correctness of [defend-
ant]'s decision."); Dea v. Look, 810 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[E]vidence contesting the
factual underpinnings of the reason for the discharge proffered by the employer is insufficient,
without more, to present a jury question."); Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d
251, 255 (1st Cir. 1986) ("although [the plaintiff] did present evidence contesting the factual
underpinnings of the reasons proffered by [the defendant]... , these, without more are insuffi-
cient in this case to present a jury question."); cf Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012
n.6 (1st Cir. 1979) (Plaintiff must prove pretext for discrimination, but "[t]he reasonableness of
the employer's reasons may of course be probative of whether they are pretexts.").
93. Recently, the First Circuit's "pretext-plus" rule has come under criticism from Judge
Bownes, prompting some debate among other First Circuit judges. In Connell v. Bank of
Boston, 924 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir. 1991), cert denied, Ill S. Ct. 2828 (1991), the court affirmed
entry of summary judgment for defendant in an ADEA case. The court reaffirmed the "pre-
text-plus" rule that the plaintiff must do more than cast doubt on the employer's rationale, but
must also show discriminatory intent. Id. at 1172. The court claimed, however, that this rule
does not require "plus" evidence, stating:
We do not suggest that the plaintiff must, necessarily, offer affirmative evidence of
age animus in addition to rebutting the employer's evidence. Rather, the evidence as
a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to
infer that the employer's decision was motivated by age animus.
Ii at 1172 n.3. The court emphasized, however, that "in some factual settings, the mere
showing of the falsity of the employer's stated reasons may, along with the other facts and
circumstances in the case, give rise to a reasonable inference of age discrimination." Id. at 1175
(emphasis added). This statement strongly suggests that the "plus" requirement remains in-
tact in the First Circuit. Judge Bownes, concurring in part and dissenting in part, claimed that
"[tihe requirement that a plaintiff rebut an employer's articulated reasons and also directly
prove age discrimination is contrary to the express teaching of the Supreme Court .... I
believe our precedent is contrary to the explicit teaching of [Burdine.]" Id. at 1182 (Bownes,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Olivera v. Nestle P.R., Inc., 922 F.2d
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supporting the rule can be found in the Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth,94 Seventh, 95 and Eleventh Circuits,96 as well as some scattered
43, 48 (1st Cir. 1990) (Bownes, J.) (noting that at least nine other circuits construe Burdine to
permit a plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of fact merely by proving a prima facie case and
offering proof that the defendant's reason is false, but "[i]n this circuit,... a plaintiff has the
burden not only of proving that the articulated reasons of the employer were pretextual but
also of adducing additional evidence that the articulated reasons were a pretext for age dis-
crimination."). Perhaps because of this controversy, some recent decisions in the First Circuit
have simultaneously asserted the "pretext-plus" rule and claimed that the burden may be met
without additional evidence, a position that seems to be internally contradictory. See Vil-
lanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127-28 (1st Cir.) (To show pretext, "the plaintiff
must introduce evidence that the real reason for the employer's action was discrimination ....
[but need not necessarily] adduce evidence in addition to that comprising the prima facie case
and the rebuttal of defendant's justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment
stage or at trial."), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1991); Campiano v. Banco
Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 158 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Once so glaring a pretext was unmasked,
an important underpinning to a finding of discrimination clicked into place;" proof of pretext,
when considered in light of surrounding circumstances, was sufficient to prove discrimination).
94. The law in the Fourth Circuit on this point is somewhat unclear, although there
appears to be a strong preference for the "pretext-plus" approach in recent opinions. See, e.g.,
Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1417 (4th Cir. 1991) ("the plaintiff must then prove
that the reason given was a mere pretext for discrimination and that age was a more likely
reason for the employment action"); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir.
1990) ("If the presumption is rebutted, the burden of production returns to the plaintiff to
show that the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual and that the em-
ployment decision was based on a sexually-discriminatory criterion."); Goldberg v. B. Green &
Co., 836 F.2d 845, 849 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[plaintiff] cannot avoid summary judgment in this
case simply by refuting [defendant]'s non-age-related reasons for firing him"); Lovelace v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 243 (4th Cir. 1982) (Circumstantial evidence produced
by plaintiff to show pretext was insufficient; "Without benefit of the presumption [of discrimi-
nation], age simply exists on this evidence as one of any number of possible reasons-including
poor business judgment by the employer... for the demotion.") (citations omitted); Gries v.
Zimmer, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (W.D.N.C. 1990) ("To successfully prove pretext, the
plaintiff must establish, first, that the stated reason... was not the true reason and, second,
that the real reason for the employment action was discrimination."); see also Collins v. Allied-
Signal, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 643, 646 (E.D. Va.) ("The Fourth Circuit has placed the burden upon
plaintiffs asserting ADEA claims to show that age was a determining factor in the termina-
tion."), aff'd, 889 F.2d 1084 (4th Cir. 1989).
Although it did not clearly embrace the "pretext-plus" rule, one en banc decision by the
Fourth Circuit reinstated a judgment for a defendant in a Title VII sex discrimination case,
where a panel of that court earlier had reversed the district court's judgment as clearly errone-
ous. Beatty v. Chesapeake Ctr., Inc., 835 F.2d 71, 73 (4th Cir.) (en banc), rev'g 818 F.2d 318
(4th Cir. 1987). In Beatty, the plaintiff claimed that she had been rejected for a job after being
hired because she was pregnant when she first reported for work. Beatty, 818 F.2d at 320. The
employer claimed that it had rejected the plaintiff because a supervisor had understood her to
refuse to take a particular medical test required for employment because of her pregnancy,
although testimony at trial appears to have established that she actually never refused to take
the test. Id. The district court concluded that the defendant could have misunderstood the
plaintiff's comments about the test and that she had not been the victim of discrimination. Id.
On appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, claiming that the employer's story was
inherently implausible for several reasons. Id. at 321. First, no reasonable person would have
construed plaintiff's comments as a refusal to take the medical test. Second, the employer
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persisted in refusing to hire the plaintiff once the confusion was clarified. Finally, there was
evidence that the employer had asked plaintiff when she had learned of her pregnancy, sug-
gesting that the employer may have taken her pregnancy into account when making its deci-
sion. Id. The panel therefore concluded, with one member dissenting, that the defendant's
explanation was "inherently incredible as a matter of law and must, therefore, be regarded as a
pretext for discrimination." Id at 322. Upon rehearing en banc, the court of appeals reversed
the panel and reinstated the judgment of the district court, asserting that the defendant's ar-
ticulated rationale was "neither so internally inconsistent nor so implausible as to possess no
believability." Beatty, 835 F.2d at 73. It is unclear from the opinion, however, whether this
result reflects adherence to the "pretext-plus" rule or whether it simply reflects deference to a
district court's finding that the articulated reason had not been disproven.
There are a few cases in the Fourth Circuit that appear to follow the "pretext-only" rule.
See Monroe v. Burlington Indus., 784 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff proved that
defendant's reason was not credible and thus successfully proved discrimination); cf Lewis v.
AT&T Technologies, 691 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Md. 1988). In Lewis, the court held:
Once a court has determined that there is sufficient evidence to make out a prima
facie case of employment discrimination, then evidence of a nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the discharge does no more than pose a factual issue for the factfinder to
resolve after having the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses
through first-hand observation of their demeanor at trial.
Id
95. There is some ambiguity in the precedent in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, although there appears to be a preference for the "pretext-plus" rule. See, eg., North
v. Madison Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens-Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 401, 406
(7th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's burden not met simply by showing pretext- he must also show that
"but for" discrimination he would not have been discharged); Beard v. Whitley County
REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1988) ("We have held previously that pretext in this
context means 'pretext for discrimination.' "); Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965, 975
(7th Cir. 1987) ("Plaintiffs must allege and support not only pretext, but also that the [defend-
ant's] actions were pretext for discrimination based on a prohibited characteristic .... ") (em-
phasis in original); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities,
810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.) (approving district court's holding that plaintiff" 'has the ulti-
mate burden of persuading the court that the reasons advanced... are a pretext and that a
substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's decision was discrimination and but for that
discrimination, the plaintiff would have been appointed.' ") (emphasis in original), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Samuelson v. Durkee/French/Airwick, 760 F. Supp. 729, 738 (N.D.
Ind. 1991) ("disproving the employer's articulated nondiscriminatory reason is among the
methods of proving pretext.., but a Title VII claimant also must show that the articulated
reason was a pretext for discrimination.") (citations omitted).
Other decisions in the Seventh Circuit appear to advance a version of the "pretext-only"
rule in which proof that the defendant's reason is untrue permits, but does not compel, an
inference of discrimination. As this Article will show, like the "pretext-plus" rule, this version
of the "pretext-only" rule is also inconsistent with Burdine. See infra Part II.B(2)a. One
recent Seventh Circuit case to take this position is Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401
(7th Cir. 1990) In Shager, the court found: "If the only reason an employer offers for firing an
employee is a lie, the inference that the real reason was a forbidden one, such as age, may
rationally be drawn. . . . It is important to understand however that the inference is not
compelled." Id. The Shager court also noted that a case where the plaintiff has evidence only
of a prima facie case and of the falsity of the defendant's justification "would be the kind of
case that just barely survives the employer's motion for summary judgment: a case where the
evidence of discrimination is entirely circumstantial, indirect." Id. at 402. See also Visser v.
Packer Eng'g Co., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("If the employer offers a
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pretext-a phony reason-for why it fired the employee, then the trier of fact is permitted,
although not compelled, to infer that the real reason was age."); Holzman v. Jaymar-Ruby,
Inc., 916 F.2d 1298, 1302 (7th Cir. 1990) ('The fact that [defendant's] witnesses may have
appeared less than truthful about at least two key factors... raised the reasonable inference
that [defendant] was trying to hide some factor in its decision to fire [plaintiff]."); Benzies, 810
F.2d at 148 (although apparently requiring plaintiff to prove both pretext and discriminatory
intent, the court concedes that "[a] demonstration that the employer has offered a spurious
explanation is strong evidence of discriminatory intent, but it does not compel such an infer-
ence as a matter of law."); Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 834 F.2d 1373, 1377 (7th Cir.
1987) ("employee thus bears the burden not only of persuading the trier of fact that the em-
ployer dissembled, but also that the employer's pretextual reason hides an unlawful one"; nev-
ertheless, if plaintiff successfully shows that employer's reason is unworthy of credence,
"[s]uch a showing permits, but does not compel, an inference of discrimination"); Graefenhain
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 18 (7th Cir. 1987) ("if a plaintiff convinces the trier of fact
that it is more likely than not that the employer did not act for its proffered reasons, the
employer's decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the evidence produced by the
plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the ultimate fact of discriminatory intent"), overruled on
other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir.), and cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1007 (1988); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir.) ("If the employer is
trying to hide its real reason, that effort-coupled with the evidence making up the employee's
prima facie case-may convince the trier of fact that the real reason needed to be hidden and
therefore probably was discriminatory."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); Smith v. BJ's
Wholesale Club, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 690 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("A finding of pretext
will lead to the determination that the real reason was discrimination... but that determina-
tion is not an inevitable consequence of a finding of pretext."); cf La Montagne v. American
Convenience Prods., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409-10 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[t]he special virtue of the indi-
rect method of proof is that it allows victims of age discrimination to prevail without present-
ing any evidence that age was a determining factor in the employer's motivation").
The confusion created in the Seventh Circuit by these two contradictory lines of authority
is reflected in Veatch v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 730 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Ill. 1990). In
Veatch, the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on all but one count of a
Title VII complaint, noting that a plaintiff may prove the "ultimate issue" of intentional dis-
crimination "indirectly by establishing that the non-discriminatory explanation proffered by
the employer is not credible." Id. at 816. This appears to be a statement of the "pretext-only"
rule. The court then rejected, however, what it termed the "mechanical approach" advocated
by Chipollin which "recognizes that an employer may be held liable simply for lying about
the real reason for discharging a member of a class protected by federal discrimination laws."
Id. at 818, 819. The court claimed that this approach
requires employers to face a trial whenever they have not advanced their real reasons
for firing a protected employee who can assert adequate job performance. It is
doubtful that Congress intended that Title VII require employers to produce, at the
risk of a full-fledged trial and civil liability, their true reasons for firing employees
when those true reasons have nothing to do with race or sex discrimination.
Id at 819. This is the rationale ordinarily advanced to support the "pretext-plus" rule. The
court then concluded: "Although the prima facie cases raise an inference of discrimination,
the factfinder is not compelled to award victory to the plaintiff simply because the employer
has not been candid about the real reason for the firing." Id. at 819. This appears to be a
statement of the Seventh Circuit's variation of the "pretext-only" rule.
96. The Eleventh Circuit has two contradictory lines of authority on this issue. The lead-
ing Eleventh Circuit case advancing the "pretext-plus" rule is Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of
Educ., 717 F.2d 525 (1 1th Cir. 1983). The Clark court reversed a verdict for plaintiff in a Title
VII case, stating:
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opinions and dissents in the "pretext-only" circuits. 97
The "pretext-plus" courts reject the widely held notion that a plain-
tiff can prevail in an employment discrimination case merely by disprov-
ing the defendant's articulated justification. These courts purport to
accept the traditional Burdine model of proving intentional discrimina-
tion, and thus must acknowledge that one component of that model is
proof that the defendant's proffered reason is untrue. Nevertheless, the
"pretext-plus" courts disagree sharply with the "pretext-only" courts
over the evidentiary significance of this showing.
The court thus may not circumvent the intent requirement of the plaintiff's ultimate
burden of persuasion by couching its conclusions in terms of pretext; a simple finding
that the defendant did not truly rely on its proffered reason, without a further finding
that the defendant relied instead on race, will not suffice to establish Title VII
liability.
Id. at 529. A number of cases appear to follow this approach. See, ag., Hawkins v. Ceco
Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 981 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("[Merely establishing pretext, without more, is
insufficient to support a finding of racial discrimination"), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 2180 (1990);
Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) ("In the
absence of evidence pointing to race as the explanation for the employer's conduct, we must
hold that [the plaintiff] has failed to meet his burden of proof."); Robertson v. Georgia Dep't
of Corrections, 725 F. Supp. 533, 536 (S.D. Ga. 1989) (plaintiff must show "that the reasons
given by the employer are pretextual, and that the employer's actions were in fact motivated by
discriminatory intent").
The leading Eleventh Circuit case advancing the "pretext-only" rule is Sparks v. Pilot
Freight Carriers, 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987). In Sparks, the court reversed the entry of
summary judgment for an employer in a Title VII case because there was a genuine issue of
fact as to whether the articulated reason was the real reason for the employer's action. Id at
1563-64. The employer claimed that it fired the plaintiff because when her supervisor's secre-
tary called her for another purpose, she informed the secretary that she would be out sick that
evening. The employer took the position that "under its unwritten work rule an employee is
required not only to notify the employer of her intention to be out sick, but also to initiate the
call in which the notice is given." Id at 1563. The court stated that "[t]he implausibility of
the alleged justification is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the
defendant's] articulated reason is pretextual." Id at 1564. A number of cases in the Eleventh
Circuit have followed Sparks. See Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 885 F.2d 804, 810-11
(lth Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs may show pretext by showing that employer's reason is untrue);
Roberts v. Gadsen Memorial Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 798-99 (1 1th Cir.) (defendant's proffered
reason was not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason because it was not credible), modified on
other grounds, 850 F.2d 1549 (1Ith Cir. 1988); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 550 F. Supp.
662, 666-67 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (plaintiff showed that defendant's proffered reasons were un-
true), aff'd, 742 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1984), and cerL denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985).
97. See, e.g., Bienkowski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 (5th Cir. 1988); Chi-
pollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir.) (en bane) (Hunter, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1233
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Dep't, 717 F.2d
263 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 907 (1984); Graham v. Renbrook School, 692 F.
Supp. 102, 107 (D. Conn. 1988); Gray v. University of Ark., 658 F. Supp. 709, 725 (W.D. Ark.
1987), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1989).
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According to proponents of the "pretext-plus" rule, a plaintiff "can-
not meet his burden of proving 'pretext' simply by refuting or question-
ing the defendant's articulated reason." 98 Under the "pretext-plus" rule,
the word "pretext" in the Burdine model means more than simply a
"fabricated explanation." 99 Rather, these courts treat the term "pretext"
as if it were synonymous with "pretext for discrimination.'"l ° Merely
disproving the defendant's reason may demonstrate that the reason is a
"pretext," but it does not demonstrate that the reason is a pretext for
discrimination. 101 Thus, under the "pretext-plus" rule, the plaintiff must
98. White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984).
99. See Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir.) ("It is easy to
confuse 'pretext for discrimination' with 'pretext' in the more common sense (meaning any
fabricated explanation for an action)."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); EEOC v. Clay
County Rural Tel., 694 F. Supp. 563, 575 (S.D. Ind. 1988) ("[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of
not only persuading the court that the defendant dissembled, but also that the defendant's
pretextual reason hides an unlawful one."); Gray, 658 F. Supp. at 723 ("[IThe court is con-
vinced that plaintiff does not necessarily win even if the court is not convinced of the sound-
ness of the reasons given or even if the reasons given are false.... Pretext doesn't simply mean
that the reasons given are wrong or false."); Holly v. City of Naperville, 603 F. Supp. 220, 230
n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (" 'Pretext' for the purposes of the McDonnell test is not the equivalent of
false.... While falsity may prove a pretext for something, 'pretext' for McDonnell purposes
means pretext of non-discrimination.") (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
100. See Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988) (plaintiff
must show not only pretext, but also "that those reasons were pretexts aimed at masking sex or
race discrimination.") (emphasis in original); Menzel v. Western Auto Supply Co., 848 F.2d
327, 328-29 (1st Cir. 1988) (plaintiff must prove that "reasons proferred are but a pretext, a
'coverup' for the wrong reasons"); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health and Develop-
mental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff must show both pretext and "that a
substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's decision was discrimination."), cert denied,
483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1018 (1st Cir. 1979) (pretext
means coverup for age discrimination); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1286 (E.D.N.C.
1987) ("[P]laintiff must show that an illegal motive influenced the decision, for only when
defendant's articulated reason is a pretext for accomplishing a discriminatory purpose will the
plaintiff be entitled to recover. . . ."); Grabb v. Bendix Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (N.D.
Ind. 1986) ("lIt is not enough to show that the employer's reasons were not the real reasons,
were false or were merely a pretext. The plaintiff must show that they were a pretext for
discrimination.") (citation omitted).
101. See Hawkins v. CECO Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 981 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Of course,
merely establishing pretext, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of racial discrimi-
nation .... The plaintiff must show he suffered intentional discrimination because of his
race.") (citation omitted), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2180 (1990); Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1570 (7th Cir. 1989) ("But it does not follow.., that if the plaintiff does
rebut the employer's rebuttal - not in the sense of demolishing it but in the sense of contesting
it with his own, contrary evidence - he automatically defeats summary judgment and secures
his right to a trial."); Menzel v. Western Auto Supply Co., 848 F.2d 327, 330 (1st Cir. 1988)
("[W]e should emphasize that, even if [plaintiff] had succeeded in creating some doubt about
the objective correctness of [defendantl's decision to fire him, that would not be enough to
sustain plaintiff's appeal."); Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 849 (4th Cir. 1988)
("While [the] evidence may tend to demonstrate that [defendant]'s termination of [plaintiff]
was arbitrary, it does not reflect any intent to discriminate on the basis of age. [Plaintiff]
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produce some additional evidence other than the evidence supporting the
prima facie case and other than the fact of the defendant's deception.102
The typical approach of the "pretext-plus" courts may be illustrated
by examining the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Menard v. First Security Services Corp. 103 In that case, the employer, a
large security company, discharged plaintiff from his management posi-
tion when he was fifty-five years old. 104 The plaintiff had been hired at
age fifty-two and had been assigned to oversee security operations for a
large account. During his first sixteen months on the job, he received
praise for his outstanding performance. 10 5 The employer claimed that
his performance then deteriorated because of poor communication with
the customer, and the company transferred the plaintiff to another posi-
tion in sales and marketing. 10 6 Defendant conceded that the plaintiff's
performance in this position and in his next promotion as Assistant Area
Manager was at least adequate. 0 7 The company then promoted plaintiff
to a position as Area Manager, but claimed that it again received numer-
ous complaints from the most important client in that area about poor
communications, understaffing, and poor service. When the client
cannot avoid summary judgment in this case simply by refuting [defendant]'s non-age-related
reasons for firing him.") (emphasis in original); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications,
738 F.2d 1181, 1184-85 (l1th Cir. 1984) (finding that defendant did not rely on proffered
reason, without more, is insufficient to support finding of discrimination); Clark v. Huntsville
City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (1lth Cir. 1983) ("(A] simple finding that the defendant
did not truly rely on its proffered reason, without a further finding that the defendant relied
instead on race, will not suffice to establish Title VII liability."). As Justice Scalia asked in oral
argument in Brieck: "You can prove that the excuse I give is a pretext without proving that
it's a pretext for discrimination. Why must one conclude that the real reason is discrimination
simply because I come up with a phony reason that you don't believe?" Transcript of Oral
Argument at 18-19, Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck, 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1527 (3d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-271), microformed on Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court,
1988 Term, Fiche 12 (Congressional Info. Serv.), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 488
U.S. 226 (1988).
102. See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Hunter,
J., dissenting) (not enough for plaintiff to show pretext; plaintiff "must go further, and show
that the proferred explanation is a pretext specifically for age discrimination"), cert dismissed,
483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Richi v. Fruehauf Corp., 724 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (W.D.N.C. 1989)
("An additional requirement to the McDonnell Douglas elements is that the plaintiff in an
ADEA case must also introduce some evidence that the employer's conduct was actually based
on age.") (emphasis in original).
103. 848 F.2d 281 (lst Cir. 1988).
104. Id. at 283.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 283-84.
107. Id. at 284.
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threatened to terminate the account, the defendant decided to fire the
plaintiff. The company replaced him with a thirty-year-old man. 08
On this record, the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendant, and the court of appeals affirmed. Although the court ex-
pressed some doubts as to whether the plaintiff had established a prima
facie case, 109 it nevertheless assumed that he had and proceeded to con-
sider whether the plaintiff could rebut the defendant's legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason-that he had been fired "as a result of criticisms
received from two of [defendant]'s largest clients." 110 The plaintiff con-
tended that this reason was pretextual in light of his favorable job evalua-
tions during the early part of his career, the company's promotion of him
to various positions even after the first set of complaints, his supervisor's
testimony that the clients' problems could not be attributed to his per-
formance, and his own testimony.'
The court found the plaintiff's evidence to be inadequate to avoid
summary judgment. The court asserted that the plaintiff had the burden
"of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant's articu-
lated reason was pretextual, and that the real reason for the discharge
was age discrimination."' 1 2 According to the opinion, the plaintiff's evi-
dence merely challenged the business judgment of his employer, and
could not show discriminatory intent. "The issue in this ADEA action,"
the court asserted, "is not whether [defendant] made a wise decision in
determining that its problems with [its client] reflected adversely upon
[plaintiff]. The issue is whether [defendant] fired [plaintiff] because of his
108. Id
109. The court quoted language in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (lst Cir.
1979), which suggests that a plaintiff who challenges a termination must show as part of his
prima facie case "that he was doing his job well enough to rule out the possibility that he was
fired for inadequate job performance, absolute or relative." Menard, 848 F.2d at 285. The
defendant had introduced evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment to show
that customers had serious communication problems with the company during the plaintiff's
tenure. Id at 285-86. In response, the plaintiff argued that he was not the cause of these
problems, and he submitted the affidavit of his supervisor during this time period that stated
the problems the customers had encountered did not stem from plaintiff's performance. Id at
286. The court of appeals discounted the significance of this evidence because the supervisor
had not been involved in discussions between the disgruntled client and higher-level company
officials. Id at 286-87. On a motion for summary judgment, however, the court is required to
consider the submissions in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See supra note
12. It is questionable whether the court did so in this case.
110. Menard, 848 F.2d at 287.
111. Id.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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age." ' 1 3 The court then concluded that the plaintiff had insufficient evi-
dence of age discrimination:
[Plaintiffl's proffered evidence does little but dispute the objective cor-
rectness of [defendant]'s decision. That is, while not disputing that
[defendant]'s two clients were indeed unhappy at the times he was
Manager, [plaintiff] insists that he was not to blame. But even assum-
ing it could be shown that [defendant] was wrong to blame him, this
would be insufficient to prove pretext or discriminatory intent. The
evidence suggests no other reason for his discharge other than [client
dissatisfaction with his performance]. 114
Thus, the court upheld summary judgment for the employer.
This case illustrates both the rationale of the "pretext-plus" rule and
its fundamental flaw. Plaintiff introduced evidence that cast substantial
doubt on his employer's reasons for firing him. Taking the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, there are at least two explanations
available on this record for the factual conflict. One is the explanation
offered by the court of appeals: that if the plaintiff in fact was not re-
sponsible for the various problems with the clients, then the defendant
merely made an error in business judgment when it fired him. But there
is another possible explanation for the dispute. The defendant may not
have been mistaken. Rather, the employer may have known that the
plaintiff was not at fault, but may have used the complaints as an excuse
to fire him because it actually considered the plaintiff to be too old for the
job. If a jury believed the testimony of the plaintiff and his supervisor,
and drew inferences favorable to the plaintiff from the testimony, the jury
easily could conclude that the defendant did not err, but rather that the
113. Ia
114. Id. The court also discounted plaintiff's claims that he had additional evidence show-
ing age discrimination. First, plaintiff asserted that when the company fired him, he asked the
vice president for Security Services if it was because of his age, and the vice president did not
respond. Plaintiff claimed that this should be treated as an admission, but the court asserted
that, in context, the vice president's silence had limited probative force because the vice presi-
dent had not made the final decision to fire him. Id Second, plaintiff sought to rely upon a
company vice president's admission that the reason plaintiff's predecessor as arer manager, a
twenty-five-year-old male, had not been fired when he had encountered similar problems was
that "[h]e was young, it was his first job. He had learned a lot we felt and it hadn't cost us the
ultimate. He deserved another chance, which we'd have done for anybody else." Id. at 288.
The court discounted the significance of this remark as well, claiming that this comment did
not show disparate treatment of plaintiff because he himself had not been fired when he bad
encountered problems in his first assignment. Id at 289. These findings by the court usurped
the role of the factfinder in determining the appropriate weight to be given to these comments.
In particular, the court of appeals appears to have ignored the significance of the use of the
word "young" by the vice president as a justification for disparate treatment in an ADEA case.
Instead, the court took the position that the fact that the plaintiff was hired at age fifty-two
made it seem "less likely that his discharge three years later was based on company prejudice
against older people." Id at 289 n.4.
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defendant lied. As this Article demonstrates, the logical inference from
the lie is that the defendant lied to conceal its discriminatory purpose.
The Menard court, like other "pretext-plus" courts, erred in discounting
the possibility that the employer lied and in deciding without a trial that
the employer simply made a mistake.
Consider the dramatic effect the "pretext-plus" rule has on employ-
ment discrimination cases by returning to the hypothetical with which
this Article began. The defendant has articulated two legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for its failure to hire the plaintiff. his excessive sal-
ary demands and his overqualification for the job. The plaintiff's
evidence strongly suggests that neither reason is true. Nevertheless,
under the "pretext-plus" rule, the defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion will be granted. The plaintiff has shown only that he may be able to
refute the defendant's explanation, but has no additional evidence to
prove that the false explanation conceals discriminatory animus. The
"pretext-plus" rule effectively prevents the plaintiff from presenting live
testimony and having the factual question of "mistake" versus "intent"
resolved at trial. Although the rule may ease congestion in the federal
courts, it deprives a plaintiff who may have been the victim of discrimina-
tion of the opportunity to prove it.
C. How Much "Plus" Evidence Do the "Pretext-Plus" Courts Require?
Having shown that the "pretext-plus" courts require some addi-
tional evidence for plaintiffs to prevail, the next step before undertaking a
detailed critique of the rule is to identify the "plus" evidence that would
suffice to meet this burden. As this brief review will show, a plaintiff in a
"pretext-plus" jurisdiction may be hard-pressed to generate additional
evidence that will satisfy these courts.
For example, reliance solely on the evidence supporting the prima
facie case ordinarily will not suffice for the "pretext-plus" courts,'1 5 even
though the Supreme Court has indicated that such evidence, when con-
sidered in conjunction with effective cross-examination of the defendant,
could suffice to show pretext.1 16 Other courts have objected that factual
assertions contained in the plaintiff's own affidavit, without additional
115. See Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 596 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[A] plain-
tiff may not in all cases merely rest on the laurels of her prima facie case in the face of powerful
justification evidence offered by the defendant."); Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792
F.2d 251, 254 (Ist Cir. 1986) (upon rebuttal, prima facie case dissolves and prima facie case
cannot be equivalent of a finding of discrimination); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003,
1015 (1st Cir. 1979) (prima facie case may suffice for finding of discrimination only if defend-
ant fails to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reason).
116. Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981).
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corroboration, also are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.117
Although a mere unsupported statement by a plaintiff that discrimina-
tion motivated the employer's decision probably would not suffice even
for "pretext-only" courts, the "pretext-plus" courts have not always dis-
tinguished such statements from other testimony offered by plaintiffs.
For example, in one case the plaintiff supported an assertion of discrimi-
nation with testimony that he had received regular promotions and pay
raises, including a pay raise six months before his discharge, that he had
received no complaints with respect to his performance, and that he had
been discharged shortly after reaching the company's mandatory retire-
ment age. 118 Nevertheless, the court treated this evidence as insufficient
to raise an inference of discrimination, claiming that the plaintiff "did
nothing more than state his conclusion that he was terminated because of
his age." 119
Some "pretext-plus" courts further insist that the plaintiff's addi-
tional evidence must be limited to that described in McDonnell Doug-
las-evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently
than plaintiff, or statistical evidence showing disparities relating to race,
age, or sex.' 20 This conflicts with the express assertion by the Supreme
117. See Sherrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 1312, 1316 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[plain-
tiff]'s subjective belief of age discrimination, however genuine, cannot alone be the basis of
judicial relief"); Hornsby v. Conoco, Inc., 777 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[W]e cannot
allow subjective belief to be the basis for judicial relief when an adequate nondiscriminatory
reason for the discharge has been presented."). But see Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh,
826 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 1987) ("There is simply no rule of law that provides that a discrimi-
nation plaintiff may not testify in his or her own behalf, or that such testimony, standing alone,
can never make out a case of discrimination that will survive a motion for summary judg-
ment."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).
118. See Locke v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 205, 206-07 (6th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (Jones, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 206. But cf Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1465,
1467 (5th Cir.) (permitting opinion of coworker in ADEA case that employer was engaged in
"youth movement"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 129 (1989).
120. For example, in Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.
1990), the court stated:
Particularly in a case like this one, where the employee's evidence of pretext is tenu-
ous, these fragmentary tendrils do not suffice, without more, to prove that (defend-
ant's] dismissal of [plaintiff] was motivated by age discrimination. Here, there is no
'more' - no statistical evidence, no demonstration of discriminatory corporate poli-
cies, no instances of disparate treatment, no invidious pattern of age-related dis-
charges or forced early retirements.
Id. at 10. See also Bienkowski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 (5th Cir. 1988)
("More is required, such as 'direct' evidence of age discrimination, information about the ages
of other employees in plaintiff's position, the treatment and evaluation of other employees, or
the employer's variation from standard evaluation practices."); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts,
Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 904 (3d Cir.) (en bane) (Hunter, 3., dissenting) (direct evidence is not
required, but plaintiff should have indirect evidence such as comparative or statistical data),
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Court in its recent decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 121 that
"[i]n [proving pretext, plaintiff] is not limited to presenting evidence of a
certain type.... The evidence which [plaintiff] can present in an attempt
to establish that [defendant's] stated reasons are pretextual may take a
variety of forms." 122
To meet this requirement in the hypothetical case, for example, in
addition to evidence undercutting the defendant's articulated justifica-
tions, the plaintiff might produce evidence that the firm has never hired a
black accountant despite the fact that one hundred black candidates had
applied. Similarly, he might have other black applicants testify that their
interviews were equally cursory and that the hiring partner expressed
doubts about their qualifications and interest in the job. Such evidence,
however, is not always readily available. More importantly, the absence
of such evidence does not negate the probability that discrimination oc-
curred in this case. The plaintiff could have been the only black appli-
cant for the job, or the employer might not have records reflecting the
race of past applicants. Nevertheless, in some "pretext-plus" courts,
even if the plaintiff could generate this type of circumstantial evidence, it
still might be treated as inconclusive. 123
Indeed, some "pretext-plus" courts seem unwilling to accept even
comparative evidence-evidence comparing the plaintiff's treatment to
that of another similarly situated employee-as enough of a "plus" to
prove discrimination. An example of how one "pretext-plus" court has
cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1057 (1987); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 558 (7th
Cir. 1987) (plaintiff had no direct evidence, and "none of the usual forms of indirect evidence,
such as statistics or comparable cases"); Aguayo v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 670 F. Supp.
1094, 1097 (D.P.R. 1987) ("Attacking the quality of the defendant's business decision is insuf-
ficient to prove pretext.... Furthermore, he presented no statistical evidence to show that this
firing conforms to a pattern of hiring or retaining younger managerial employees.") (citation
omitted); Holly v. City of Naperville, 603 F. Supp. 220, 231 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("[Pllaintiff in
an ADEA claim must produce some evidence, such as employer statements, statistics or a
pattern and practice of discrimination in order to survive a summary judgment motion.").
121. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
122. Ia at 187. Similarly, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the Court
explained:
We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that
would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.... Rule 56(e)
permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of
evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves, and
it is from this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving party to make the
showing to which we have referred.
Id. at 324.
123. White v. Vathally, 570 F. Supp. 1431, 1437 (D. Mass. 1983) (evidence of past practice
with respect to hiring women inconclusive because no evidence submitted on composition of
applicant pool), aff'd, 732 F.2d 1037 (1st Cir. 1984).
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treated comparative evidence is Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communi-
cations. 124 In Nix, a radio station fired a black radio announcer for alleg-
edly violating its "antimoonlighting" policy, which precluded its
employees from holding other jobs.1 25 The station learned about the al-
leged violation at the same time that it learned of a similar allegation
about a white coworker. Although neither employee had actually vio-
lated the antimoonlighting rule, the station retained the white employee
but refused to rehire the black employee. After the black employee filed
charges of discrimination, the station replaced him with another black
employee.126 The radio station asserted at trial that its justification for
firing the plaintiff was its original belief that he had violated the anti-
moonlighting rule, despite the fact that, according to the court, this belief
was mistaken.127 The district court found this articulated reason "in-
credible in light of the facts found herein" and held for the plaintiff.1 28
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took the unusual step
of reversing the district court's finding of discriminatory intent as clearly
erroneous.1 29 The court asserted that the lower court's ruling violated
the "pretext-plus" rule, explaining:
The court thus may not circumvent the intent requirement of the
plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion by couching its conclusion in
terms of pretext; a simple finding that the defendant did not truly rely
on its proffered reason, without a further finding that the defendant
relied instead on race, will not suffice to establish Title VII liability. 130
Here, although the court admitted that it found "some support for the
district court's conclusion that the articulated reason for Nix's firing was
124. 738 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1984).
125. Id. at 1183.
126. Nix filed a claim of discrimination with the EEOC in March of 1976. The radio
station hired a black replacement later that summer. Id.
127. Id at 1184.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1187. In most contexts, the "clearly erroneous" standard allows great defer-
ence to the trial court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings. of fact shall... not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses."). In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982),
the Supreme Court explained: "Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain cate-
gories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court's
findings unless clearly erroneous." Id. at 287. See also Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S.
564, 574 (1985) ("Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinders'
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.... This is so even when the district court's
findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or docu-
mentary evidence or inferences from other facts.") (citations omitted). Such reversals are
more common, however, when the "pretext-plus" rule is applied. See supra note 38.
130. Nix, 738 F.2d at 1184-85 (citing Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525,
529 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 907 (1984)).
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not the true reason," 13' it concluded that there was insufficient "plus"
evidence to support a finding of discriminatory intent.
The court conceded that Nix could have successfully proven a prima
facie case "based on differential application of work or disciplinary
rules," even though he had been replaced ultimately by another black
male. 132 Moreover, in Nix, the plaintiff seems to have had appropriate
"plus" evidence-both evidence that rebutted the defendant's articulated
justification by showing that he had not violated the station's antimoon-
lighting policy, and comparative evidence showing that the defendant
had treated a similarly situated white employee more favorably. The
court of appeals agreed that this evidence could have been sufficient to
support a finding that the articulated reason was pretextual. Neverthe-
less, the court reversed the district court's factual finding of
discrimination. 133
The purported reason offered by the Nix court for this conclusion
was that the plaintiff could not prove a prima facie case because the two
employees were not similarly situated. The white employee's alleged vio-
lation had occurred before his tenure with the radio station, and thus the
policy did not apply to him at all, while the black employee's alleged
violation had occurred while he was subject to the policy.134 This dis-
tinction seems specious at best, because in fact neither of the employees
actually violated the station's policy, and thus the timing of their nonvio-
lations could have no factual significance. Nevertheless, the court com-
131. Id. at 1185.
132. Id. The defendant had claimed that Nix had not proven a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas Corp. because he had been replaced by a member of the same protected
class. The court rejected this contention because there are alternative methods of proving the
prima facie case that do not focus on the race of the replacement worker. Id. It explained that
in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
an employer would violate Title VII if it fired black employees who stole cargo but did not fire
white employees who had committed the same offense. Similarly, here Nix alleged that he had
been treated differently from a similarly situated white employee. Thus, "[tihe prima facie
case is established even if the plaintiff's replacement is also a member of the protected class."
Nix, 738 F.2d at 1185. In this case, "Nix could therefore establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination by establishing that he was fired but [the white worker] was retained for 'nearly
identical' conduct." Id. at 1186. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
804 (1973) ("Especially relevant.., would be evidence that white employees involved in acts
against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were nevertheless retained or re-
hired."). The Nix court did note that the race of the plaintiff's replacement was not irrelevant
to the determination of pretext, although such evidence could support either Nix's allegation
that the defendant hired a black replacement to avoid liability for its discrimination, or defend-
ant's allegation that its hiring of a black replacement indicated that it had not acted with racial
animus in firing Nix. Nix, 738 F.2d at 1186 n.l.
133. Nix, 738 F.2d at 1187.
134. Id. at 1186.
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pounded its error by claiming that this comparative evidence had no
probative value on the issue of discriminatory intent. Thus, the court
asserted: "Although WLCY's decision to fire Nix, and its refusal to re-
consider that decision, might seem unfair or even 'incredible' to outside
observers, Nix cannot prevail in his Title VII action for he has not estab-
lished discriminatory intent. ' 135 The court concluded: "Nix may have
shown that he was fired for violating a rule that he did not violate. But
Title VII does not take away an employer's right to interpret its rules as
it chooses, and to make determinations as it sees fit under those rules."13 6
As in many "pretext-plus" decisions, the Nix court deprived the
plaintiff of the opportunity to prove his case circumstantially. Admitting
that the rationale offered by the defendant might seem unbelievable, the
court nevertheless determined that the only conclusion to be drawn from
the employer's conduct was that the employer was misguided. But there
is another conclusion that is at least equally available under these facts-
the conclusion that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff. The Nix decision is particularly troubling because the plaintiff
appears to have had precisely the type of evidence that the "pretext-plus"
courts claim to seek, and because the court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's factual finding of discrimination after a full trial on the
merits.
Before joining the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia also demonstrated
some skepticism about the value of comparative evidence in Carter v.
Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 137 a case decided while he was still a member of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In a strongly
worded dissent, then-Judge Scalia criticized a finding of discrimination in
a case where plaintiff, the only black employee in a small company, pro-
duced evidence at trial that she routinely had been treated differently
from white employees.1 38 The court of appeals upheld the jury finding of
discrimination, explaining that "[tjhe plaintiff demonstrated that she was
singled out for unique treatment in all aspects of her employment."'' 39
135. Id at 1187 ("He has produced neither direct nor circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support such a finding [of discriminatory intent]. In the absence of evidence pointing to race
as the explanation for the employer's conduct, we must hold that Nix has failed to meet his
burden of proof.").
136. Id.
137. 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
138. Id at 1239-47. Evidence at trial indicated that the plaintiff, the first and only black
employee, had been assigned a desk in the most isolated part of the defendant's showroom, had
been instructed not to answer the phone, and had been paid the lowest salary and bonuses of
any of the employees. Id. at 1230-31. There also was evidence that one of plaintiff's supervi-
sors had told a racially derogatory anecdote in her presence. Id. at 1230.
139. Id. at 1233.
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Then-Judge Scalia objected to any reliance on such testimony to support
a finding of intentional discrimination. He asserted: "The majority's
analysis of the evidence involves a basic error of law-that evidence of
differential treatment constitutes evidence of racial motivation for differ-
ential treatment." 140 He went on to state: "The 'numerous other pieces
of circumstantial evidence' the majority refers to-the 'many discrete in-
stances of disparate treatment and broken promises'--are not circum-
stantial evidence of racial motivation, but only (if they were established) of
an intent to disfavor [plaintiff. That is not against the law.' ' 141
In this narrow view, the term "discrimination" is not synonymous
with "discrimination on the basis of race," because even a black plaintiff
who proves with comparative evidence that she was treated differently
from similarly situated white employees has not produced any circum-
stantial evidence of racial motivation.1 42 In other words, under Justice
Scalia's extreme version of the "pretext-plus" rule, proof that the defend-
ant offered an untrue justification to conceal intentional unfavorable
treatment of the plaintiff would not suffice to prove impermissible dis-
crimination absent some specific evidence of illegal bias. This approach
is inconsistent with that expressed by the Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 143 in which the Court de-
scribed disparate treatment cases as follows: "The employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differ-
ences in treatment."144
If taken literally, Justice Scalia's view would virtually foreclose
plaintiffs' use of comparative evidence unless there was some direct evi-
dence of discriminatory intent. For example, in his dissent in Carter,
then-Judge Scalia further criticized the district court's finding of discrim-
140. Id. at 1239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1246 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 1246-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, then-Judge Scalia apparently relied on
the testimony of the defendant's witnesses that there was no intent to discriminate on the basis
of race, while rejecting plaintiff's testimony to the contrary as "conclusory." Id. at 1246.
143. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
144. Id. at 335 n.15 (emphasis added); see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989). In Patterson, the Court stated:
[Plaintiff] could seek to persuade the jury that [defendant] had not offered the true
reason for its promotion decision by presenting evidence of [defendant]'s past treat-
ment of [her] .... While we do not intend to say this evidence necessarily would be
sufficient to carry the day, it cannot be denied that it is one of the various ways in
which [plaintiff] might seek to prove intentional discrimination on the part of
[defendant].
Id. at 188.
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ination, based on plaintiff's rebuttal of defendant's articulated reasons,
because "in the entire trial there was only one fragment of attempted
proof of racial motivation [uncontroverted evidence of a racist joke told
by a supervisor] .... [t]he only shred of evidence, gathered from [plain-
tiff's] one-and-one-half years of employment.. . , that could conceivably
suggest any racial animus against her."' 145 Such a requirement, however,
would violate the clear admonition of the Supreme Court that it is error
for a court to require a plaintiff to produce direct evidence of
discrimination. 146
Nevertheless, even with direct evidence, some plaintiffs have failed
to persuade "pretext-plus" courts to permit them to reach a factfinder
with their discrimination claims. For example, one ADEA plaintiff who
had been fired produced not only evidence challenging the reasons given
for his dismissal, but also evidence that a security manager for the corpo-
ration told another employee that the plaintiff had "literally outlived his
usefulness, that it was time to make way for new people within the
ranks." 147 The security manager also stated that the plaintiff and his
supervisor did not get along: either the supervisor had "a difficult time
relating" to the plaintiff because the plaintiff was old enough to be her
145. Carter, 727 F.2d at 1245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3
(1983) ("As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evi-
dence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence, giving it whatever weight and
credence it deserves.... [T]he District Court should not have required [plaintiff] to submit
direct evidence of discriminatory intent."); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct
proof of discrimination. ."); cf Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)
("[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination."). The rule may be different in mixed motive cases. In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989), the Court proposed a new method of proof for mixed
motive cases, in which there is evidence of both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory motives
for the employer's decision. In such cases, the Court held that the burden of persuasion shifts
to the defendant to prove that the same employment decision would have been reached absent
the discriminatory motive. See id at 258 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens,
JJ.). Justice O'Connor concurred in this rule but indicated that before the burden would shift,
"a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was
a substantial factor in the decision."). Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
As Justice O'Connor appears to have been the fifth vote for this rule, it is unlikely that the
mixed motive rule will apply to any cases other than cases in which the plaintiff has presented
direct evidence of discrimination. Indeed, so-called mixed motive cases may actually be cases
in which the plaintiff has sufficient direct evidence of discrimination to raise an inference that
discrimination was at least one motivating factor in the decision. See Holland v. Jefferson
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1313 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989); Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting
Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568 (2d Cir. 1989). At least one commentator disagrees. See Charles
A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1157-61 (1991).
147. Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 253 (Ist Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 43HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
father, or the plaintiff had difficulty because the supervisor was young
enough to be his daughter.148 The security manager's two statements
appear to raise the age discrimination issue directly. The Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit nevertheless upheld the district court's refusal
to permit the case to go to the jury. The court claimed that there was
insufficient evidence to show that the security manager's views were re-
lied upon by the company in making its decision to fire the plaintiff.149
Moreover, the court took the position that evidence of age-related con-
flicts between plaintiff and his younger supervisor "could equally have
been discrimination on the part of [plaintiff]." 150 Once again, the court
usurped the role of the factfinder in determining the credibility and
weight of these statements, which at a minimum were admissions by an
employee of the defendant and thereby had some probative value. In
short, even under the "pretext-plus" rule, direct evidence of discrimina-
tory animus should suffice to permit a plaintiff to survive summary judg-
ment on the issue of intentional discrimination. That it does not always
do so casts substantial doubt on the rule's theoretical underpinning.
With the probative value of direct, comparative, and statistical evi-
dence in doubt in "pretext-plus" jurisdictions, the only method of proof
left would appear to be circumstantial proof--evidence that undercuts
the credibility of the defendant's articulated reason. This evidence, how-
ever, is precisely the type of evidence rejected by the "pretext-plus"
courts. Ironically, it is likely to be the easiest evidence for the plaintiff to
148. Id.
149. Id. at 255.
150. Id. The court continued: "[A]lthough [plaintiff] did present evidence contesting the
factual underpinnings of the reasons proffered by (defendant] for firing [plaintiff], these, with-
out more are insufficient in this case to present a jury question." Id. Judge Aldrich filed a
separate opinion, dubitante, in which he expressed concern that the court had improperly
deprived the plaintiff of his right to a jury determination of his age discrimination claim.
If a defendant has to give a reason, and offers one, can it be ruled as a matter of law
that the jury has to credit it? It may be that somehow this is so here because of
plaintiff's ultimate burden of showing pretext, but if, as it would seem, the court is
saying that plaintiff cannot make a case for the jury by affirmatively showing the
reason was untrue, I think the defendant has escaped too easily.
Id. at 260 (Aldrich, J., dubitante). See also Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896
F.2d 5, 9-10 (Ist Cir. 1990) (rejecting evidence in ADEA case that plaintiff's supervisor had
commented in a report that the defendant's sales force was "getting too old" as insufficient
"plus" evidence because the plaintiff was not a member of the sales force but rather a manager;
"It is too large a leap to apply the report's conclusions to managers - let alone to attempt to
draw an inference of discriminatory intent toward those in managerial positions."); Menard v.
First Sec. Serv. Corp., 848 F.2d 281, 288-89 (1st Cir. 1988) (employer explained that another
employee with work record similar to that of plaintiff had not been fired because he was
"young," but this evidence, coupled with evidence that employer's explanation was untrue,
insufficient to avoid entry of summary judgment for employer).
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obtain, because it frequently involves evidence of the plaintiff's own qual-
ifications or work performance. The question is whether rejection of the
probative value of such evidence has any principled basis. Part II of this
Article answers this question.
II. The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule
The question underlying the "pretext-plus" debate is simple. Can
an employment discrimination plaintiff prevail simply by catching the
defendant in a lie? In order to resolve this issue, two questions must be
answered. First, is the presumption of discrimination rebutted if the de-
fendant's articulated justification is found to be untrue? On this initial
point, the "pretext-plus" courts are correct in answering yes. As the next
section will show, under Burdine and traditional evidentiary principles,
the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason rebuts the presump-
tion of discrimination regardless of whether the reason later proves to be
false, and the presumption may not be revived once it has been rebutted.
Contrary to the conclusion of many "pretext-plus" courts, however, the
destruction of the presumption does not end the inquiry.
The second question to be considered is whether the plaintiff can
prevail, even in the absence of the presumption, by disproving the de-
fendant's articulated reason and then relying on the defendant's lie as
evidence of discriminatory intent. As to this question, both Burdine and
traditional evidentiary principles clearly support the "pretext-only" rule.
The following section shows that the evidence supporting the prima facie
case, taken in conjunction with the evidentiary inference that may be
drawn from the defendant's lie, suffices to prove intentional discrimina-
tion. After showing the analytical framework for the "pretext-plus" rule
to be fallacious, the Article considers some of the practical arguments
that have been advanced in its support.
A. Can the Defendant Rebut the Presumption of Discrimination with a
Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason That Later Proves to Be
Untrue?
The first issue to be considered is whether an untrue reason suffices
to rebut the presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie
case. As will be shown, both the Supreme Court's opinion in Burdine
and the law of evidence indicate that even a false justification is sufficient
to rebut the presumption.
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(1) The Supreme Court's Analysis in Burdine
Return to the hypothetical case, in which the plaintiff has proven his
prima facie case, thereby entitling him to a presumption of discrimina-
tion. Assume first that the accounting firm failed to articulate any reason
for its decision, and instead simply stood silent in the face of the pre-
sumption. Under Burdine, the defendant would lose as a matter of law,
because, as the Court explicitly stated: "If the trier of fact believes the
plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the pre-
sumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue
of fact remains in the case."' 51 The Court has explained that a defendant
who offers no justification for his conduct will be presumed to have dis-
criminated because "these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors."' 52 Once
the accounting firm did articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its conduct, however, that evidence destroyed the presumption of dis-
crimination. Nevertheless, permissible inferences that could be derived
from the evidence supporting the prima facie case survive and may be
considered by the trier of fact.' 53
The issue is how to treat a defendant's reason that the plaintiff later
proves to be untrue. Is such a reason the equivalent of the defendant's
standing silent, in which case the presumption would not be rebutted?
Or does such a reason meet the requirement in Burdine of "articulating"
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, thereby destroying the plaintiff's
principal advantage in an employment discrimination case?
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not explicitly resolved this
point. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Burdine permits the presumption
of discrimination to be rebutted by a false reason for the employment
action. First, in Burdine, the Court explicitly stated that "[tihe defend-
ant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons,"' 154 suggesting that the truthfulness or falsity of the
defendant's articulated reason is irrelevant at this stage. As will be seen,
some "pretext-plus" courts have construed this statement to mean that
drawing an inference of discrimination from the defendant's false reason
would shift the burden of proof. A more logical explanation of this state-
ment is that the Court simply sought to re-emphasize that the defend-
151. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (emphasis
added).
152. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
153. See Burdine, 450 U:S. at 255 n.10.
154. Id. at 254.
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ant's burden is one of production, not persuasion.1 55 The statement,
however, does not conclusively determine whether a defendant may meet
its burden of production with evidence that later proves to be untrue.
Logically, the answer must be yes because if Burdine were read to require
that the truth or falsity of the defendant's reason be determined before
the presumption of discrimination is destroyed, then the step of proving
pretext would be redundant. Rather, under Burdine, the purpose of re-
quiring the defendant to justify its conduct is simply to "raise[ ] a genu-
ine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff."1 56
Indeed, it is not until the third stage of the model-the pretext stage-
that the court must decide which version of the facts it believes.1 57
Second, the Court never suggested in Burdine that the reason of-
fered by the employer must be believed to satisfy the employer's bur-
den.158 It merely insisted that the justification be supported by
"admissible evidence" and be "legally sufficient to justify a judgment for
the defendant."'' 59 As the next section shows, there is an analytical dis-
tinction between evidence that is credible, and thus legally sufficient to
support a judgment, and evidence that ultimately is credited by the finder
of fact. In fact, the Burdine Court explicitly recognized the possibility
that defendants might fabricate reasons in order to destroy the plaintiff's
presumption of discrimination, but it nevertheless asserted that this pos-
sibility would not undermine the three-part model it had developed.' 60
155. See id at 255 n.8.
156. lId at 254-55.
157. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16
(1983) ("[A]t the close of the evidence, the District Court in this case should have proceeded to
this specific question directly, just as district courts decide disputed questions of fact in other
civil litigation. . . . [T]he district court must decide which party's explanation of the em-
ployer's motivation it believes.") (footnote omitted).
158. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
159. Id. at 255.
160. Id at 258. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court considered the contrary
approach that the Fifth Circuit took in Burdine. The court of appeals had required defendants
to prove rather than to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment
decision, following a rule it had established in Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d
1251 (5th Cir. 1977). See Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567
(5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The reason for adopting this rule was the fear
that "[i]f an employer need only articulate - not prove - a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legitimate, reasons for his actions." Tur-
ner, 555 F.2d at 1255. The court explained:
For example, an employer could articulate as his reason for dismissal that an em-
ployee had a poor attendance record when in fact the employee had a good attend-
ance record. The employee's attendance record would be presumed to be poor, and
the employee would have to show that his poor attendance record was not the real
reason for his dismissal.
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Third, allowing a reason that later proves to be false to rebut the
presumption serves the policies underlying imposition on defendant of a
burden of producing, but not proving, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason. These policies, articulated by the Court in Burdine, suggest that
the truth or falsity of the reason simply is not at issue at this stage. Ac-
cording to the Court in Burdine, the defendant's legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason serves two functions: presenting a legitimate reason for
the employment action, and "fram[ing] the factual issue with sufficient
clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demon-
strate pretext."'161 Moreover, the Court stated that "[t]he sufficiency of
the defendant's evidence should be evaluated by the extent to which it
fulfills these functions."' 62 Both these functions are fulfilled by a defend-
ant's articulated justification that is later proven to be false. First, such a
reason presents an arguably legitimate basis for the employment action at
issue. Second, it frames the factual issue so that the plaintiff knows what
the defendant's justification is and then may attack its credibility.
Permitting the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination
by offering a reason that later proves to be false is fully consistent with
the Burdine formulation. 163 The next question to consider is whether
this conclusion is supported by the law governing presumptions gener-
ally. As the next subsection demonstrates, under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, presumptions are rebutted by contrary evidence even if the evi-
dence later proves to be untrue.
Nevertheless, in Burdine, the Supreme Court expressly rejected this rationale, explaining:
We do not believe, however, that limiting the defendant's evidentiary obligation to a
burden of production will unduly hinder the plaintiff. First, as noted above, the de-
fendant's explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably spe-
cific. . . . Second, although the defendant does not bear a formal burden of
persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of
fact that the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant normally will
attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation. Third, the liberal discovery
rules applicable to any civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit
by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's inves-
tigatory files concerning her complaint.... Given these factors, we are unpersuaded
that the plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation
lacking a factual basis is a pretext.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (citations omitted).
161. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
162. Id. at 256.
163. See Gray v. University of Ark., 883 F.2d 1394, 1401 (8th Cir. 1989) ("An employer
may meet its intermediate burden of production by articulating even an untrue reason for
terminating a member of a protected class."); Tye v. Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 319 (6th
Cir. 1987) ("It is clear that Burdine allows the defendant to satisfy his intermediate burden by
offering an untrue reason for the decision.").
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(2) Traditional Evidentiary Principles
In traditional evidentiary terms, the issue of what is needed to meet
the defendant's intermediate burden in Burdine hinges on defining the
quantum of evidence necessary to meet a burden of production and
thereby rebut a presumption. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, pre-
sumptions are governed by Rule 301, which provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act
of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which re-
mains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast. 164
Rule 301 reflects the so-called "bursting bubble" theory of presump-
tions. 165 Under this theory, once the opposing party meets its burden of
production, the presumption disappears from the case and no longer has
any evidentiary significance.1 66 In Burdine, for example, the Court ex-
plained that upon articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason,
the presumption of discrimination "drops from the case." 167
164. FED. R. EVID. 301.
165. See Hugh J. Beard, Jr., Title VII and Rule 301: An Analysis of the Watson and
Atonio Decisions, 23 AKRON L. REv. 105, 116-26 (1989) (tracing history of Rule 301); Mack
A. Player, The Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 49 Mo. L. REv. 17, 21 n.12 (1984) (asserting that Burdine Court adopted a modified
version of the "bursting bubble" theory, because "[o]nce the presumption is met by contradic-
tory evidence, it ceases to have any probative value."). Some commentators have suggested
that Rule 301 has done little to clarify the complex law of presumptions. See 1 JACK B. WEIN-
STEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 300-01 (1990) ("Despite the
thousands of pages that have been written since the days of Thayer describing, defining and
detailing the consequences of presumptions, the subject remains elusive and confusing. The
difficulty lies not so much in deciding what a presumption is, but in determining what a pre-
sumption does.") (footnotes omitted); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 5122, at 552 ("Rule
301 deals with one of the most complex topics in the law of evidence."); Edmund M. Morgan,
Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255, 255 (1937) ("Every writer of sufficient intelligence to
appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic of presumptions with
a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair.").
166. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at 300-04 ("[O]nce the applicable standard is
met, the presumption disappears and the case is decided as though there had never been a
presumption.").
167. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981).
See generally Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1286 n.131 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ("[T]he Court
in Burdine utilized a modified version of Professor Thayer's bursting bubble theory of pre-
sumptions, adopted by Fed. R. Evid. 301."); Askin v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F.
Supp. 751, 756 (E.D. Ky. 1985) (Burdine is a special application of Rule 301), aff'd, 785 F.2d
307 (6th Cir. 1986); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at 300-04 n.9 (Burdine reflects
Thayer's view of presumptions).
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Rule 301 does not define, however, what is meant by "going forward
with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption." 168 Rather, it merely
emphasizes that the burden that shifts to the opposing party-the em-
ployer in an employment discrimination case-is a burden of production,
not persuasion. The principal difference between a burden of production
and a burden of persuasion is that the party with the burden of persua-
sion must convince the factfinder that its version of the facts is more
likely than not to be true.169 The party with the burden of production
has no such requirement. 170 Rather, that party need only introduce evi-
dence that "is sufficient to support a finding contrary to the presumed
fact." 171
Under the "bursting bubble" theory, the truth of a defendant's evi-
dence is irrelevant to whether defendant has met its burden of rebutting a
presumption. 172 One of the leading commentators on the law of evidence
has stated that, under the bursting bubble theory, the presumption disap-
pears "whenever there is evidence in the case from which a jury could
reasonably find the non-existence of the presumed fact. It is immaterial
that neither judge nor jury believes the testimony."'1 73 Therefore, on the
threshold issue of whether the presumption has been rebutted, it appears
168. See FED. R. EVID. 301; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at 301-27.
169. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 at 947 (3d ed. 1984).
170. See id. § 338, at 953 ("The evidence must be such that a reasonable man could draw
from it the inference of the existence of the particular fact to be proved .... ").
171. See ia § 344, at 975; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 5126, at 608-09; Belton, supra
note 40, at 1216 ("The burden of producing evidence ... is the obligation imposed upon a
party during trial to present evidence on the element at issue. The evidence presented must be
of sufficient substance to permit the factfinder to act upon it.").
172. It is important to distinguish between evidence that is credible and evidence that is
truthful. In this context, credible evidence is evidence that is capable of being believed. Evi-
dence may be credible-that is, capable of being believed-but ultimately found to be untruth-
ful because the factfinder does not believe the testimony. See DAVID W. LOUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 69, at 555 (1977). According to these
authors, under the bursting bubble theory:
[T]he evidence introduced to controvert the presumed fact need only convince the
judge to the point of concluding that the jury could reasonably find in favor of the
party against whom the presumption is directed on the issue involved. Under this
view, the question whether the evidence is believed by the jury is extraneous to the
judge's function.
Id. See generally Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immatur-
ity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 18 (1959) (under the bursting bubble theory, "evidence to overcome a
presumption must be credible, substantial, sufficient to support a finding, or of like purport").
173. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at 300-03 (emphasis added) (citing EDMUND
W. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 34-36 (1962)); see Miguel A. Mendez, Presump-
tions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129,
1145 n.91 (1980) (test under bursting bubble theory is "one of sufficiency and not credibility").
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to be settled, both under Burdine and under traditional evidentiary prin-
ciples, that a presumption may be rebutted by a lie. 174
(3) Alternative Theories for Retaining the Presumption of Discrimination if
the Defendant's Reason Is Proven to Be Untrue
Although the analysis under Burdine and traditional evidentiary
principles appears to be straightforward, not all courts have been willing
to permit an employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination with a
reason that later proves to be untrue. Such a rule arguably gives the
employer a strong incentive to fabricate nondiscriminatory reasons for
the employment decision at issue. 175 Under this scenario, the lying de-
fendant is in a better position than the defendant who says nothing in
defense of its actions, because the presumption of discrimination has been
174. Nevertheless, this issue may be the most difficult one for the "bursting bubble" the-
ory. Cf Christopher B. Mueller, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions in Civil Cases: Com-
paring Federal Rule 301 with Uniform Rule 301, 12 LAND & WATER L. REv. 219, 243 (1977)
(The bursting bubble theory "runs into deep trouble in cases in which (i) only a presumption
can carry the issue to the jury, (ii) the opponent of the presumed fact introduces sufficient
evidence of its nonexistence to support a finding thereof, . . . but (iii) this counterproof is
disbelieved.") (emphasis in original).
175. Although no court appears to have yet addressed this issue, permitting a defendant to
improve its litigating position by lying at the intermediate stage of an employment discrimina-
tion trial may pose an ethical dilemma for the defense attorney as well. Under the ethical
rules, an attorney must not knowingly "fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a ... fraudulent act by the clients," MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(2) (1989), and must not knowingly "offer evidence
that the lawyer knows to be false." Id., Rule 3.3(a)(4). If the lawyer does offer false material
evidence "and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial meas-
ures." Id Such "reasonable remedial measures" in a civil proceeding may include, if neces-
sary, disclosure of the deception to the court. Id, Rule 3.3 cmt. In an employment
discrimination case, a defense attorney who presented false testimony as to the employer's
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, and later came to know of its falsity, would be obligated
to disclose the perjury to the court if lesser remedial measures failed. Furthermore, knowingly
presenting a false nondiscriminatory reason in a motion for summary judgment would also
violate Rule 3.1 of the ModelRules of Professional Conduct and would likely violate Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 3.1 (1989), which states: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law," and FED. R. Civ. P. 11, which states:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well-
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
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destroyed by the lie. 176 The plaintiff who once had a presumption in his
favor now holds a substantially weaker position. With the mandatory
presumption gone, the factfinder is free to infer the presumed fact from
the evidence that once supported the presumption but is not required to
do so.
In light of these concerns, at least two different rationales have been
advanced, primarily by "pretext-only" courts, for retaining the presump-
tion of discrimination. In addition to the concern about employer
fabrications, these rationales are motivated to a significant extent by the
notion that the presumption of discrimination is a necessary component
of plaintiff's proof. Before demonstrating the weakness in that analysis,
the two rationales for preserving the presumption will be addressed.
a. The "Resurrection" Rationale
The "resurrection" rationale holds that the presumption of discrimi-
nation, which disappears upon articulation of a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason, resurrects if the plaintiff later proves that reason to be
untrue. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit advanced this theory
in Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville Railroad Co., 17 7 a 1985 case
reversing entry of summary judgment for the employer in an ADEA
176. During oral argument in Brieck, two unidentified Justices raised this point with coun-
sel for the employer in the following colloquy:
Question: In your view is [sic] the summary judgment stage, is the defendant better
off if he puts in no evidence at all or if he puts in a false defense and it's
proven to be false? Would [sic] be in the same position in both or would
[sic] be better off under one rather than the other?
Question: Better than lying.
[Defense Counsel]: He would be better off actually in that scenario putting in a
false reason.
Question: I thought that was your position.
Question: Exactly.
Transcript of Argument at 27, Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck, 47 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1527 (3d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-271), microformed on Oral Arguments of the
Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Fiche 12 (Congressional Info. Serv.), cert. dismissed as improvi-
dently granted, 488 U.S. 226 (1988). In contrast, the Solicitor General and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission argued in Brieck that this was a fundamental weakness of the
"pretext-plus" rule, asserting that "if the plaintiff shows that the defendant's proffered expla-
nation is a pretext, he should be left, at the very least, in the same position he would be in if he
had established an unrebutted prima facie case." Brief for the United States and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 13,
Brieck (No. 87-271), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs 1988/89 FO
Card 6 of 7 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
177. 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985).
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case.178 In that case, the court adhered to the "pretext-only" rule and
permitted the plaintiff to prove discrimination indirectly, stating:
"Although [defendant] makes much of [plaintiffi's lack of affirmative
proof of discrimination, [plaintiff] is not required to prove that the [de-
fendant] was motivated by bad reasons; he need only persuade the
factfinder that the [defendant]'s purported good reasons were untrue."' 179
The Thornbrough court asserted that Burdine's provision for "indi-
rect" proof hinges on "the resurrection of the presumption initially cre-
ated by the plaintiff's prima facie case."' 180 The court explained that
under Burdine and the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Furnco Con-
struction Corp. v. Waters, 181 once all legitimate reasons have been elimi-
nated, the employer is presumed to have acted on the basis of
discriminatory animus. The Thornbrough court then argued:
By disproving the reasons offered by the employer to rebut the plain-
tiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff recreates the situation that obtained
when the prima facie case was initially established: in the absence of
any known reasons for the employer's decision, we presume that the
employer was motivated by discriminatory reasons. 182
The court therefore concluded: "Thus, in our view, unlike Humpty-
Dumpty, the employee's prima facie case can be put back together again,
through proof that the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual."' 8 3
The "resurrection" theory has been justifiably criticized by some
"pretext-plus" opinions. 184 To the extent that it suggests that the pre-
178. Id. at 646. In Thornbrough, a railroad company discharged plaintiff from his position
as vice president. He was fifty-six years old and had been employed by defendant for five
years. Upon his termination as part of a furlough for economic reasons, the company divided
his duties among three younger employees. The company did not terminate other younger
employees holding positions similar to that of plaintiff. Id. at 637. The plaintiff had no direct
evidence, statistical evidence, or evidence of a general pattern of disfavoring older employees.
Id. at 643. Nevertheless, the court held that evidence that the company discharged older
workers while retaining similarly situated younger employees sufficed to prove a prima facie
case. Id. at 645. Moreover, the plaintiff's dispute with the employer over the reasons for his
termination sufficed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 647.
179. Id. at 646-47.
180. Id. at 639.
181. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
182. Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 639-40.
183. Id. at 640. See also Merrill v. Southern Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 605 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1986) ("If the employer meets this burden of production, plaintiff can resurrect his prima
facie case, and proceed to victory, by showing that the employer's justifications were pretex-
tual."); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, 683 F. Supp. 596, 633 (W.D. Tex. 1988) ("mhis
Court believes it is appropriate to resurrect the presumption of discrimination after plaintiff
has shown pretext. This court does not find resurrection of the presumption of discrimination
to be an unwarranted departure from Burdine.").
184. See Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 128 (1st Cir.) (rejecting suggestion
that inference revives upon showing of pretext as "formalistic approach... not in keeping with
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sumption itself may be revived, the "resurrection" theory is inconsistent
both with Burdine and with Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Under Burdine and its progeny, the presumption of discrimination disap-
pears upon articulation of the employer's justification. 185 Nothing in
Burdine suggests that the presumption can later be restored if the articu-
lated justification proves to be untrue. Moreover, such a result would
violate Rule 301. Under Rule 301, the presumption disappears once the
opposing party has met its burden of production. Restoring the pre-
sumption would be inconsistent with the "bursting bubble" theory ad-
vanced by that Rule. 186 The "resurrection" rationale therefore provides
little support for plaintiffs seeking to retain the presumption of
discrimination.
b. The "Nonrebuttal" Theory
These same weaknesses are apparent in the "nonrebuttal" theory
advanced by some courts, which treats a presumption rebutted by a lie as
if it had never been rebutted at all. In Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 187
for example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
asserted that a false explanation offered by a defendant did not meet the
requirements of Burdine. The court explained:
Defendant's explanation for its decision was unworthy of credence as a
matter of law. Such a blatantly pretextual defense carries the seeds of
its own destruction. That is, it does not even satisfy the defendant's
"intermediate burden" of producing "admissible evidence which
would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employ-
ment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus."1lss
Other courts and commentators have also advanced the theory that an
untrue reason offered in justification by defendants will not rebut the pre-
sumption of discrimination.' 8 9
either Supreme Court doctrine or common sense"), cert denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Oct.
7, 1991); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 903 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting) (no Supreme Court authority to support notion that presumption may be resur-
rected if defendant's articulated reason is proven to be untrue), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1057
(1984); White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1043 (1st Cir. 1984) (permitting plaintiff to demon-
strate discriminatory intent by casting doubt on defendant's articulated reason would "im-
properly revive the presumption").
185. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981) (once
presumption is rebutted, it "drops from the case," but the evidence that supported presump-
tion may still be considered).
186. See Beard, supra note 165, at 163 n.270 ("[Ihe credibility of the rebuttal evidence,
even if totally destroyed, cannot revive the prima facie case to any degree whatsoever."); cf
LOUSELL & MUELLER, supra note 172, at 542 n.49; Player, supra note 165, at 34.
187. 788 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
188. Id. at 789 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257).
189. See Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Yet
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The "nonrebuttal" theory is inconsistent with Burdine's express
statement that "[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was
actually motivated by the proffered reasons." 190 Contrary to Bishopp, an
articulated justification that later proves to be untrue is "admissible evi-
dence" that would allow a conclusion that the employer's action was free
of discriminatory intent. That the factfinder may ultimately conclude
otherwise does not diminish the value of the evidence. It plainly meets
the burden of production imposed upon the defendant. Moreover, like
the "resurrection" theory, the "nonrebuttal" theory ignores the specific
provisions of Rule 301. As previously noted, Rule 301 requires only that
a defendant introduce admissible evidence to rebut the presumption. It
does not require that the factfinder conclude first that the evidence is
credible. 191
when the employer's nondiscriminatory reason is shown to be unworthy of belief, and could
not therefore have been the real cause, the employer has in substance failed to articulate a valid
explanation for discharging an employee and, moreover, has placed its credibility in ques-
tion."); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 18 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[I]f a plaintiff
convinces the trier of fact that it is more likely than not that the employer did not act for its
proffered reasons, the employer's decision remains unexplained ... ."), overruled on other
grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, 860 F.2d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1988), and cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1007 (1988); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1285 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ("Arbitrary
reasons leave the plaintiff's presumption of illegal motivation unrefuted."); Sullivan, supra
note 146, at 1116 n.42 ("If the defendant's proffered reason is disbelieved, there remains no
'legitimate nondiscriminatory reason' in evidence. Therefore, any inference of discrimination
from plaintiff's prima facie case remains unrebutted."); see also Marina C. Szteinbok, Note,
Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Claims After Aikens,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 1114, 1122 (1988) (If plaintiff proves defendant's reason to be false, "the
inference of discrimination arising from the prima facie case remains unrebutted."); Transcript
of Oral Argument, Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck, 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1527 (3d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-271), microformed on Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court,
1988 Term, Fiche 12 (Congressional Info. Serv.), cert dismissed as improvidently granted, 488
U.S. 226 (1988), where Justice White asked:
If this excuse that the employer gives is false, it is a non-existent - it's just non-
existent. Why aren't you back in the same position as you would have been had you
said nothing at all? The prima facie case is made out. You come out with a trumped
up charge - trumped up excuse which is really a nullity. Why aren't you back in
the same position as you were?
Ia at 23-24.
190. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
191. See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 830 F.2d 1554, 1563 n.17 (11th Cir. 1987)
("Lack of credibility is grounds for rebuttal; it is not, at least in the form asserted here, the
basis for a claim that the defendant has not met its burden of production."); Mueller, supra
note 174, at 253 (nonrebuttal approach presents "insuperable difficulties" and appears to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant, at least insofar as proving the facts offered in
counterproof).
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c. The Underlying Error
In some respects, the "resurrection" courts and the "nonrebuttal"
courts, which are "pretext-only" courts, and the "pretext-plus" courts
have fallen victim to the same error. All these courts apparently assume
that the presumption of discrimination is a necessary component of a
plaintiff's proof when the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discriminatory
intent. The "resurrection" and "nonrebuttal" courts strain to find some
theory to preserve the presumption. The "pretext-plus" courts recognize
that the presumption has been destroyed, but then erroneously conclude
that the plaintiff cannot prove discrimination without it.
To use the colorful analogy of the Thornbrough court, the "resurrec-
tion" courts insist that Humpty Dumpty-the presumption of discrimi-
nation--can be put back together again. The "pretext-plus" courts
adhere to Mother Goose's original intent, insisting that once Humpty
Dumpty has fallen, "all the King's horses, and all the King's men, can-
not put Humpty Dumpty together again." The "nonrebuttal" courts ar-
gue that Humpty Dumpty never fell off the wall in the first place. But
does the plaintiff really need Humpty Dumpty?192 Or, to return to the
more prosaic language of law review articles, must the plaintiff retain the
presumption of discrimination in order to prevail? As the next section
demonstrates, the presumption of discrimination is unnecessary for the
plaintiff to succeed.
B. Can the Plaintiff Prove Discrimination by Demonstrating That the
Defendant's Proffered Explanation Is Untrue?
Assume that the "resurrection" and "nonrebuttal" courts are
wrong, and that, under Burdine and Rule 301, the presumption of dis-
crimination evaporates forever upon defendant's articulation of a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Plaintiff's remaining evidence is the evidence that proved the prima facie
case and the evidence that undercuts the credibility of the defendant's
proffered justification. The first question to be considered is whether the
evidence supporting the prima facie case alone retains any probative
192. The variety of meanings given to the presumption may have been anticipated by
Lewis Carroll in the following well-known colloquy between Humpty Dumpty and Alice:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's all."
LEwis CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 238 (Gros-
set & Dunlap 1991) (1865).
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value. The second question is whether this evidence, in conjunction with
evidence rebutting the defendant's explanation, would suffice to prove
discrimination. Burdine strongly suggests that the answer to each of
these questions is yes.
(1) Does the Evidence Supporting the Prima Facie Case Retain Any Probative
Value Once the Presumption of Discrimination Has Been
Rebutted?
The easiest issue to resolve is the first one-whether the evidence
supporting the prima facie case retains any probative value once the pre-
sumption of discrimination has been rebutted. In Burdine, the Court an-
swered this question affirmatively:
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply
that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously intro-
duced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory
explanation by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference
of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonethe-
less, this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be con-
sidered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's
explanation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be some cases where the
plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of
the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation. 193
The evidence supporting the plaintiff's prima facie case, therefore, re-
tains vitality even though the presumption itself has been eliminated. 194
193. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10 (emphasis added).
194. In Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 784 F.2d 1407
(9th Cir. 1986), the court held:
Once aprimafacie case is established either by the introduction of actual evidence or
reliance on the McDonnell Douglas presumption, summary judgment for the defend-
ant will ordinarily not be appropriate on any ground relating to the merits because
the crux of a Title VII dispute is the 'elusive factual question of intentional discrimi-
nation.' Moreover, when a plaintiff has established a prima facie inference of dispa-
rate treatment through direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, he
will necessarily have raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the legiti-
macy or bona fides of the employer's articulated reason for its employment decision.
Id. at 1009 (citations omitted). When amended, the court further explained that: "The princi-
ples described above do not prevent the summary disposition of meritless suits but simply
ensure that when a genuine issue of material fact exists a civil rights litigant will not be denied
a trial on the merits." Lowe, 784 F.2d at 1407. See also Graham v. F.B. Leopold Co., 779
F.2d 170, 172 n.3 (3d Cir. 1985) (plaintiff may be able to show pretext and avoid summary
judgment even without any evidence other than the prima facie case); Wells v. Gotfredson
Motor Co., 709 F.2d 493, 496 n.1 (8th Cir. 1983) ("When the defendant produces evidence of
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, that mandatory presumption drops from
the case but the logical inference of discrimination arising from the prima facie evidence re-
mains."); Lewis v. AT&T Technologies, 691 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Md. 1988) (Defendant's
articulated reason "does no more than pose a factual issue for the factfinder to resolve after
having the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses through first-hand observa-
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This result is fully consistent with traditional evidentiary principles.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the evidence supporting a presump-
tion retains probative value even after the presumption has been
rebutted. 195
In light of the express language in Burdine, it is erroneous for "pre-
text-plus" courts to suggest that destruction of the presumption some-
how destroys all permissible inferences arising from the presumption.
196
It is true that the inference of discrimination is no longer mandatory, but
this does not mean that the evidence supporting the prima facie case can-
not support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Indeed, coupled with the
Court's endorsement of proving pretext "by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence,"' 197 Burdine appears to
tion of their demeanor at trial."); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 550 F. Supp. 662, 667
(M.D. Ala. 1982) (where reasons offered by defendant were subjective and left to unguided
discretion, initial evidence and effective cross-examination sufficed for a finding of
discrimination).
195. As one commentator explains:
Under Rule 301, the effect of rebutting evidence does not completely dissipate the
presumption. Unless no reasonable jury could disbelieve the rebuttal, the presump-
tion still suffices to carry the issue to the jury. However, the jury is no longer in-
structed that it may presume the existence of the presumed fact, but only that it may
infer it.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 5122, at 572. See also GREGORY P. JOSEPH ET AL., EvI-
DENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES ch. 8, at 5 ("Even if the presump-
tion does disappear following rebuttal, nothing in Article III [of the Federal Rules of
Evidence] precludes the trier of fact from drawing logical inferences from the evidence.").
196. See Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) ("So
long as the employer proffers such a reason, the inference raised by plaintiff's prima facie case
vanishes. In the final round of shifting burdens, it is up to plaintiff, unassisted by the original
presumption, to show that the employer's stated reason 'was but a pretext for age discrimina-
tion.' ") (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1336 (1st Cir. 1988)); Gray
v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 254 (1st Cir. 1986) (upon rebuttal, prima facie
case dissolves, and "establishment of a prima facie case could not be considered the equivalent
of an ultimate finding of discrimination"); White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1040 (1st Cir.
1984) (once presumption is rebutted, prima facie case alone will not compel judgment for
plaintiff); Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Dept., 717 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1983) (by
relying on prima facie case and admissions by defendant on cross-examination, district court
"placed on the defendants the impermissibly heavy burden of persuasion and relieved the
plaintiff of the burden of proof imposed by Burdine"), cerL denied, 466 U.S. 907 (1984); Loeb
v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Thus prima facie proof may entitle the
plaintiff to a directed verdict if the defendant fails to meet his burden of production, but not
otherwise."). But see Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir. 1991) (Torres,
J., concurring) ("[I]f the employee demonstrates that the proffered reason is pretextual, the
prima facie case is reinstated and its inference of a discriminatory purpose may be considered
along with any contrary evidence in determining whether the employer was motivated by an
intent to discriminate.").
197. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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support a finding of discrimination when plaintiff has nothing more than
his prima facie case and the defendant's lie.
(2) Is Proving "Pretext" the Same as Proving "Pretext for Discrimination"?
The "pretext-plus" courts argue that evidence of the defendant's lie
is not enough because proving "pretext" in this circumstantial way does
not prove "pretext for discrimination." It is on this pivotal question that
the remainder of the analysis rests. The next section demonstrates that
"pretext" is in fact synonymous with "pretext for discrimination." The
subsequent section then rebuts a number of the arguments advanced by
the "pretext-plus" courts for holding otherwise.
a. The Analysis of the "Pretext-Only" Courts
According to the "pretext-only" courts, proving "pretext" under
Burdine is the same as proving "pretext for discrimination." The "pre-
text-only" courts recognize that evidence showing the defendant's expla-
nation is pretextual raises an inference that the defendant lied to conceal
its discriminatory motive.198 As one court explained: "As a matter of
both common sense and federal law, an employer's submission of a dis-
credited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself evi-
dence which may persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful
discrimination actually occurred." 199
198. See Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (If plaintiff shows
employer's reason to be "specious, then in conjunction with his prima facie case [he] has car-
ried his burden of proving discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence."); Williams v.
City of Montgomery, 550 F. Supp. 662, 666 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 1982) ("The court is therefore of
the opinion that this third reason was clearly a fabricated afterthought which, if anything,
lends support to the conclusion that the other two proffered reasons were pretextual."). A
similar approach appears to be applied under the National Labor Relations Act. See NLRB v.
Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 670-71 (1st Cir. 1979) ("If an employer asserts
an obviously weak or implausible good reason, or one manifestly unequally applied, this may
support an inference that there was a bad reason."); cf NLRB v. Lakepark Indus., 919 F.2d
42,45 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming NLRB's finding that employer violated NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) where employer offered "shifting reasons" for discharge and thus failed to establish a
nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge). This was also the position taken by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the Solicitor General in Brieck See Brief for the
United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondent at 13-14, Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck, 47 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1527 (3d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-271), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records
and Briefs 1988/89 FO, Card 6 of 7 (Congressional Info. Serv.) (A showing of pretext "should,
if anything, strengthen his case, since a defendant who offers an unbelievable response to an
accusation of discrimination is likely to have something to hide-something that, in the con-
text of an ADEA action, is likely to be improper animus."), cert dismissed as improvidently
granted, 488 U.S. 226 (1988).
199. MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988).
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The logic behind this analysis may be best demonstrated in the case
of Tye v. Board of Education.2°° Plaintiff was a vocational guidance
counselor for the local school system. As part of a work force reduction,
the Board of Education did not renew her yearly contract. She claimed
that the school board based its decision to dismiss her rather than her
male coworker on sex.20 1 At trial, the school board introduced into evi-
dence a stipulation articulating ten purportedly legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for the plaintiff's dismissal.20 2 Later in the case, however,
when the school superintendent took the stand to defend his action in
discharging the plaintiff, he testified that none of the reasons contained in
the stipulation had motivated him in making the decision.20 3 Rather, he
contended that he had no reason for his action.2°4 Plaintiff had no addi-
tional evidence of discrimination other than the superintendent's admis-
sion that he had lied about the reasons for discharging her.20 5 Finding
that the superintendent had discharged plaintiff "without a thought pro-
cess" because he had not been required by state law to give any reason
for his decision,2°6 the district court entered judgment for the
defendant.207
Under the "pretext-plus" rule, the district court's judgment presum-
ably would have been upheld as correct, because the plaintiff had no evi-
dence of discrimination other than the evidence supporting her prima
facie case and the defendant's lie. But the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court's finding of no discrimination as clearly
erroneous and held that plaintiff had proven discrimination as a matter
of law. 20 8 First, the court noted that the presumption of discrimination
had been rebutted when the school board introduced its stipulated rea-
sons into evidence, even though those reasons later proved false. "It is
200. 811 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987).
201. Id. at 316-17.
202. Id. at 318-19. The reasons given were: 1) statutory right not to renew limited con-
tracts; 2) nonrenewal permitted by collective bargaining agreement; 3) declining enrollment; 4)
fiscal cutbacks; 5) multiple certification of staff; 6) staff diversity; 7) employee demeanor and
attitude; 8) employee interaction with other faculty; 9) program changes at the school; and 10)
school superintendent's "subjective feelings and impressions." Id at 318.
203. Id. at 319-20.
204. Id. at 319 n.2 ("[The superintendent] testified that he did not actually have a reason
for recommending [plaintiffl's nonrenewal in April 1982, and that the stipulated reasons were
'reconstructed' specifically for this litigation ....").
205. Id at 319-20 ("Since [the superintendent] had unilateral authority over recommenda-
tions for nonrenewal, it is obvious from his testimony that these stipulated reasons were in fact
untrue.").
206. Id at 320.
207. Id. at 316.
208. Id. at 320-21.
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clear," explained the court, "that Burdine allows the defendant to satisfy
his intermediate burden by offering an untrue reason for the decision. ' 20 9
Thus, the subsequent revelation that the reasons submitted by the de-
fendant were untrue "could only support the plaintiff's case on pretext,
and could not negate the burden of production which the defendant met
previously. '210
Of what significance, then, was the fact that the defendant's expla-
nation was untrue? The Tye court noted that, under Burdine, a plaintiff
may prove pretext by disproving the employer's reasons. Here, the plain-
tiff had done so. The court of appeals found it "impossible" for the se-
lecting official to have chosen one employee over the other "without any
reason whatever. '211 By failing to make any attempt to distinguish be-
tween the two employees, and by giving "evasive and contradictory testi-
mony regarding the choice," the defendant exposed itself to a finding of
pretext.212 The court of appeals held on this record that "[plaintiff] was
indeed the victim of impermissible discrimination" and took the unusual
step of reversing the district court's finding that there had been no dis-
crimination because it had a "'definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take had been committed.' "213
The Tye court reflects the more logical approach to analyzing "pre-
text" in the Burdine model. If the plaintiff can show that the defendant's
articulated reason is untrue, then the plaintiff has produced additional
evidence that permits the trier of fact to draw an inference of discrimina-
tion. This evidence, when taken in conjunction with the evidence
presented in support of the prima facie case, is sufficient to justify a ver-
dict for the plaintiff.214
Not only does such evidence suffice to merit a verdict for the plain-
tiff, but, as the Tye court held, such a finding is required as a matter of
law, if the factfinder believes the plaintiff's evidence. The factfinder in
Tye had before it two explanations for the employer's conduct: inten-
tional discrimination and the employer's own justification. Assume that
209. Id. at 319.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 320 ("[The superintendent] did not flip a coin or draw lots-he made a choice.
The comparison may have been subconscious and based on intangible factors, but it must have
occurred."), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1989).
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
214. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 718 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., with Brennan, J., concurring) ("The McDonnell Douglas framework requires
that a plaintiff prevail when at the third stage of a Title VII trial he demonstrates that the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not the true reason for
the employment decision.").
[Vol. 43HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
the factfinder believes the evidence supporting the prima facie case, as
well as the evidence showing the defendant's rationale is untrue. The
only remaining explanation is intentional discrimination. Indeed, the
only way for the factfinder to avoid this conclusion is to infer that some
third explanation, unarticulated by either party, was the true reason for
the employment action. As this Article will demonstrate shortly, such
an inference would be inconsistent with the Burdine model.
b. The Analysis of the "Pretext-Plus" Courts
Before considering the possibility of inferring some third reason for
the employment action, two claims by the "pretext-plus" courts must be
addressed. The first is the claim that equating proof of pretext with proof
of intentional discrimination somehow impermissibly shifts the burden of
proof from plaintiffs to defendants. The second is the claim that permit-
ting a plaintiff to prevail by undercutting an employer's credibility will
result in wholesale judicial review of discretionary business judgment.
As the next two subsections will show, neither of these contentions has
any merit. The final subsection under this heading will then address the
possibility of inferring an unarticulated, but nondiscriminatory, reason
for the employer's decision.
(i) Shifting the Burden of Proof
Many "pretext-plus" courts contend that permitting the plaintiff to
prevail by catching the defendant in a lie would effectively shift the bur-
den of proof from plaintiffs to defendants. This analysis is typified by the
late Judge Hunter's dissent in Chipollini:
The majority today shifts the burden of persuasion from the plaintiff to
the defendant in clear derogation of controlling precedent .... [I]t is
the plaintiff who must prove discrimination; the defendant is not re-
quired to prove the absence thereof.... Yet, by allowing [plaintiff] to
overcome [defendant]'s motion for summary judgment without intro-
ducing any evidence pointing to age discrimination, the majority has
effectively and impermissibly shifted the burden of persuasion from
[plaintiff] to [defendant]. While the majority does not frankly admit
that its decision today will provide such an unwarranted windfall to
ADEA plaintiffs, a careful examination of the doctrine shows this to be
the case.215
Under this analysis, holding a defendant liable for discrimination merely
because the trial court did not believe its explanation for its employment
action somehow transforms the defendant's burden of production into an
215. Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 902-03 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
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"almost impossible burden" of persuasion.216 According to the "pretext-
plus" courts, this result is inconsistent both with Burdine's express com-
mand that "[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actu-
ally motivated by the proffered reasons" 217 and the Court's assertion in
its later decision in United States Postal Board of Governors v. Aikens2 8
that the plaintiff retains the burden of proof at all times.
219
As an initial matter, this argument ignores the express language of
Burdine that permits a plaintiff to prove pretext "indirectly by showing
that the defendant's proffered reason is unworthy of credence. ' 220 To
the extent that the "pretext-plus" courts acknowledge this statement,
however, they either ignore it or dismiss it as dicta by the Supreme Court
that does not reflect a desire to "relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
persuasion on the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent. ' 221 For these
courts, Burdine's method of indirect proof is only one part of the plain-
tiff's dual burden of showing both pretext and discriminatory motive. In
particular, many "pretext-plus" courts rely upon additional language in
Burdine that states that plaintiff's burden of proving pretext "merges
with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the
victim of intentional discrimination"2 22 to support a dual burden on
plaintiffs.2 23
216. White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1043 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984);
see Bienkowski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 n.6 (5th Cir. 1988) (impermissible
to impose upon defendant the burden of proving absence of discriminatory motive); Brooks v.
Ashtabula County Welfare Dep't, 717 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court
for having "tested the [defendants'] justification for its credibility, veracity, and persuasiveness.
The court found itself unpersuaded by the defendants' explanation .... "), cerL denied, 466
U.S. 907 (1984); Gray v. University of Ark., 658 F. Supp. 709, 723 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (burden
of proof never shifts to defendant), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1989).
217. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
218. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
219. Id. at 716.
220. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
221. White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1043 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984);
see Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 903-04 (3d. Cir.) (en banc) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting), cerL dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Gray v. University of Ark., 658 F. Supp.
709, 722-23 (W.D. Ark. 1987); cf Graham v. Renbrook Sch., 692 F. Supp. 102, 107 n.10 (D.
Conn. 1988) (Burdine language permitting plaintiff to prove pretext by preponderance of evi-
dence rather than requiring clear and convincing evidence is "unelaborated dicta" that does
not reflect a "reasoned conclusion").
222. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
223. See, e.g., White, 732 F.2d at 1042-43 (because plaintiff's burden of proving proffered
reason untrue merges with ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination, merely prov-
ing pretext directly or indirectly does "not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of persuasion on
the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent"); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d
525, 529 (1 lth Cir. 1983) ("The issue of the proper intent standard and that of pretext overlap
because plaintiff's burden of showing pretext 'merges' with the ultimate burden of demonstrat-
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The claim that the "pretext-only" rule shifts the burden of proof
finds no support in the Burdine opinion, nor is it correct as a matter of
logic. As demonstrated above, Burdine anticipates that plaintiffs will be
able to prove discrimination by discrediting the defendant's explanation,
and the "pretext-plus" analysis fails on this point alone. Analytically,
the "pretext-plus" courts refuse to distinguish between requiring a de-
fendant to prove its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, which is pre-
cluded by Burdine, and permitting a plaintiff to disprove it.224 The fact
that the plaintiff has the burden of proof means that if the plaintiff cannot
convince the factfinder that the defendant has lied, the plaintiff will lose.
This is not the same as saying that if the defendant cannot convince the
trier of fact that it has not lied, the plaintiff will win. The distinction is
not one of semantics-it is the traditional difference between burdens of
production and burdens of proof. In short, the notion that drawing some
evidentiary conclusion when the plaintiff disproves the defendant's justi-
fication shifts the burden of proof "obscures the relatively straightfor-
ward duty of the trial court" to decide whether it believes plaintiff or
defendant.225
Reliance on the language in Burdine that indicates that the burden
of proving pretext "merges" with the burden of proving discrimination is
equally misplaced. It makes no sense for the "pretext-plus" courts to
ing unlawful discrimination. Only when defendants' articulated reason is pretext 'for accom-
plishing a racially discriminatory purpose' will the plaintiff recover.") (citations omitted);
EEOC v. Clay County Rural Tel., 694 F. Supp. 563, 575 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (burden on plaintiff
is to show pretext directly or indirectly: "This burden merges with the plaintiff's ultimate
burden of persuading the court that the defendant has intentionally discriminated against its
employee. Thus, the plaintiff bears the burden of not only persuading the court that the de-
fendant dissembled, but also that the defendant's pretextual reason hides an unlawful one.")
(citation omitted).
224. For an example of a court properly making this distinction, see Griffin v. George B.
Buck Consulting Actuaries, 551 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (questioning
whether the credibility of defendant's explanation shifts the burden of proof). In Griffin, the
court stated:
[A] defendant's demonstration that whites have been rejected for the reason relied on
in rejecting a black applicant might well persuade a court that the plaintiff has not
sustained his burden of proof; by the same token, the absence of such evidence may
contribute to the conclusion that the plaintiff has presented the stronger case and has
sustained his burden of proof.
225. See Mills v. Ford Motor Co., 800 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1986) (district court could
consider employer's failure to put on witnesses to buttress its articulated reason: "Any refer-
ences to the defendant's lack of proof were simply additional evidentiary factors considered in
evaluating whether that non-discriminatory reason was pretext."); Beck v. QuikTrip Corp.,
708 F.2d 532, 535 (10th Cir. 1983) ("That the trial court believed [plaintiff]'s explanation of
[defendant]'s motivation for her discharge does not mean that it improperly substituted its
business judgment for [defendant]'s or erroneously shifted the burden of persuasion.").
November 1991] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
assert that the Court intended this language to impose two separate bur-
dens on plaintiffs. The phrase "merges with" in Burdine cannot reason-
ably be understood to mean "is separate from." Rather, the term
"merge" should be given its ordinary meaning: "To cause to be absorbed
as to lose identity. '226 When read in this common sense way, Burdine
furnishes even more support for reading "pretext" as synonymous with
"pretext for discrimination."
Furthermore, the "pretext-plus" notion that drawing an inference of
discrimination from plaintiff's rebuttal of defendant's explanation some-
how shifts the burden of proof is contrary to traditional evidentiary prin-
ciples. The common evidentiary practice of drawing unfavorable
inferences against a party who lies in court has never been construed to
shift the burden of proof to that party.227 Similar is the well-known rule
treating destruction of evidence while under the control of a party as
creating an inference that the evidence would have been harmful to that
party.228 An analogous inference is the inference that a missing witness
in the control of a party would have testified unfavorably to that party.229
226. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 821 (W.
Morris ed. 1978).
227. This is reflected in the so-called "Falsus in Uno Falsus in Omnibus" instruction. See
12 EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN-
STRUCTIONS § 73.04, at 619 (3d ed. 1977) ("If a witness is shown knowingly to have testified
falsely concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust such witness's testimony in
other particulars; and you may reject all the testimony of that witness or give it such credibility
as you may think it deserves.").
228. 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 291, at 228 (James
H. Chadboum rev., 1979) ("The failure or refusal to produce a relevant document, or the
destruction of it, is evidence from which alone its contents may be inferred to be unfavorable to
the possessor . . . ." ); see Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir. 1985)
("The prevailing rule is that bad faith destruction of a document relevant to proof of an issue
at trial gives rise to a strong inference that production of the document would have been
unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction."); 1 SPENCER A. GARD, JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 3:90, at 320 (6th ed. 1972) ("The willful destruction, suppression, alteration, or
fabrication of documentary evidence properly gives rise to a presumption that the documents if
produced would be injurious to the party who thus hindered the investigation of the facts.").
See generally JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 31-64 (1989) (discuss-
ing inference).
229. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893) ("(I]f a party has it peculiarly
within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction, the
fact that he does not do it creates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be
unfavorable."). The traditional jury instruction appears in 2 DEVITT & BLACKMAR, supra
note 227, § 72.16:
If a party fails to call a person who possesses knowledge about the facts in issue, and
who is reasonably available to him, and who is not equally available to the other
party, then you may infer that the testimony of that witness is unfavorable to the
party who could have called him and did not.
Id. § 72.16; see also 3 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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These inferences are based on logic and common sense; they clearly do
not alter the traditional burdens of proof in civil cases. The same is true
of drawing an inference of discriminatory intent from the fact that an
employer lied to the court about its reasons for adverse action against the
plaintiff.230
Finally, simply because the employer might feel pressured to at-
tempt to establish the truth of its reason does not justify insulating that
reason from judicial scrutiny. In many civil cases, a defendant is likely to
present its own version of the facts involved, whether or not as a techni-
cal matter it has the burden of proof on any issue in the lawsuit. More-
over, in Burdine, the Supreme Court expressly anticipated that a
defendant in a disparate treatment case would have a strong incentive to
persuade the court that it had legitimate reasons for its actions.231
Rather than view this as an impermissible shift of the burden of proof,
the Court instead relied upon this contention to support its imposition of
the lesser burden of production, rather than persuasion, on
defendants. 232
The "pretext-plus" courts are simply wrong to insist that a plain-
tiff's retention of the burden of proof requires production of additional
evidence to prevail. Reliance by the plaintiff on proof that the defendant
§ 75.01, at 75-10 (1990) (explaining rationale for this inference: "If evidence within the party's
control would in fact strengthen his case, he can be expected to introduce it even if it is not
subpoenaed. Conversely, if such evidence is not introduced, it may be inferred that the evi-
dence is unfavorable to the party suppressing it.") (citing International Union (UAW) v.
NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
230. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), however, Justice White ap-
peared to be less eager to infer discriminatory intent from the employer's lack of credibility, at
least in mixed motive cases. He stated:
In a mixed motives case, where the legitimate motive found would have been ample
grounds for the action taken, and the employer credibly testifies that the action
would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof.
This would even more plainly be the case where the employer denies any illegitimate
motive in the first place but the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate,
factors motivated the adverse action.
Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring). Justice Brennan retorted: "Justice White's suggestion that
the employer's own testimony as to the probable decision in the absence of discrimination is
due special credence where the court has, contrary to the employer's testimony, found that an
illegitimate factor played a part in the decision, is baffling." Id at 252 n.14 (plurality decision)
(citation omitted).
231. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)
("[A]Ithough the defendant does not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant never-
theless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that the employment decision was
lawful. Thus, the defendant normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its
explanation.").
232. Id ("Given these factors, we are unpersuaded that the plaintiff will find it particu-
larly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext.").
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lied does not shift the burden of proof. Instead, the defendant properly
runs the risk that advancing a false version of the facts in an attempt to
prevent plaintiff from carrying the burden of persuasion will redound to
the plaintiff's benefit, just as in any other civil suit.
(ii) Scrutinizing the Exercise of Business Judgment by Employers
A second commonly expressed justification for the "pretext-plus"
rationale has been the concern that permitting plaintiffs to prevail when
they successfully challenge defendants' justifications will chill employers
from exercising business judgment about employees or potential employ-
ees. In fact, as has already been demonstrated, many "pretext-plus"
courts assert that evidence undercutting the defendant's articulated justi-
fication demonstrates only that the employer may have made an error in
assessing the qualifications or abilities of the plaintiff.233 A mistake is not
discrimination, say these courts, unless the error is shown to be a
"coverup for invidious discrimination. ' 234
The "pretext-plus" courts are initially correct in asserting that a de-
fendant should not be held liable for making a mistake; indeed, many
233. See, e.g., White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042 (1st Cir.) ("Our review does not
extend to the quality of business judgment reflected in this testimony, but only to the question
whether the testimony suffices to raise a genuine issue of fact as to defendants' intent, or,
otherwise stated, whether it suffices to support a finding of no discriminatory intent.") (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d
525, 528 (11th Cir. 1983) (error for district court to "find intentional discrimination by actions
inconsistent with a stated policy without a showing that defendants disregarded the policy for
discriminatory reasons rather than in a good faith effort to hire the best person available").
234. Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988). Pollard v. Rea
Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987), also makes this
point, stating:
It is easy to confuse 'pretext for discrimination' with 'pretext' in the more common
sense (meaning any fabricated explanation for an action), and to confound even this
watery use of 'pretext' with a mistake or irregularity.... If you honestly explain the
reasons behind your decision, but the decision was ill-informed or ill-considered,
your explanation is not a pretext.
Id at 559. Similarly, the court in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) asserts
that:
The reasonableness of the employer's reasons may of course be probative of whether
they are pretexts. The more idiosyncratic or questionable the employer's reason, the
easier it will be to expose it as a pretext, if indeed it is one. The jury must understand
that its focus is to be on the employer's motivation, however, and not on its business
judgment.
Id at 1012 n.6. See also Nieves v. Metropolitan Dade County, 598 F. Supp. 955, 963 (S.D.
Fla. 1984) ("It is not the defendants' obligation to prove that its assessment of the plaintiff's
qualifications was correct, because mere mistakes in judgment do not constitute unlawful
discrimination.").
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"pretext-only" courts have said precisely the same thing.235 But the
"pretext-plus" courts take this point one step further and assume that
any evidence questioning the credibility of the defendant's reason serves
only to prove mistake. By so doing, they ignore the very real possibility
that the employer's "error" instead may be a deliberate coverup for dis-
crimination. According to these courts, proving that the basis for the
defendant's decision was erroneous or nonexistent simply cannot prove
that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff.236 As one court
explained:
It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that the employer made an
unwise business decision, or an unnecessary personnel move. Nor is it
enough to show that the employer acted arbitrarily or with ill will.
These facts, even if demonstrated, do not necessarily show that age was
a motivating factor.237
Because the "pretext-plus" courts refuse to acknowledge the possibility
that the "mistake" actually may have been intentional, they frequently
construe plaintiffs' challenges to employers' justifications as mere attacks
on business judgment, and thus accord them little weight.238 In the first
235. For example, the court in Dister v. Continental Group, 859 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1988)
states that:
[I]t is not the function of a fact-finder to second-guess business decisions or to ques-
tion a corporation's means to achieve a legitimate goal.... Evidence that an em-
ployer made a poor business judgment in discharging an employee generally is
insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact as to the credibility of the employer's
reasons. Thus, the reasons tendered need not be well-advised, but merely truthful.
Id. at 1116 (citations omitted). See also Grabb v. Bendix Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (N.D.
Ind. 1986) ("[Wit is not the court's duty to determine the validity of a defendant's employment
decision as long as the decision was made in good faith, and, the company's reason is not a
pretext if in the exercise of its business judgment it made a good faith evaluation").
236. See Keyes, 853 F.2d at 1026 ("Neither the defendants' managerial judgment nor their
recruiting acumen is on trial in this case."); Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405,
411-12 (7th Cir. 1988) (showing of error or poor business judgment insufficient to prove pre-
text); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 ("[IThe ultimate question is not whether defendants' decision to
fire or discipline plaintiff reflected an objective factfinder's judgment of plaintiff's abilities, but
whether it was unlawfully motivated.").
237. Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (Ist Cir. 1986).
238. See Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1341 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[TMhe
claimant needed to show more than that his employer miscalculated in deciding that he had
outlived his corporate usefulness: good-faith errors in an employer's business judgment are not
the stuff of ADEA transgressions."); Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 834 F.2d 1373,
1380-81 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part) (evidence that plaintiff's conduct
was not disruptive may suggest that employer erred in firing her for disruption, not that em-
ployer discriminated against her); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d
1181, 1187 (1 lth Cir. 1984) ("Although WLCY's decision to fire Nix, and its refusal to recon-
sider that decision, might seem unfair or even 'incredible' to outside observers, Nix cannot
prevail in his Title VII action for he has not established discriminatory intent."); Gries v.
Zimmer, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (W.D.N.C. 1990) ("The plaintiff, however, cannot
show simply that the decision-maker made an unwise, incorrect, or unfair business decision.").
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district court opinion in Brieck v. Harbison-Walker Refractories,23 9 for
example, the court asserted that the plaintiff's challenge to the em-
ployer's claim that his replacement's credentials were superior to his own
"edges into the area of judicial scrutiny of business decisions, which is
not part of our function." 24°
One example of how the "pretext-plus" rationale blurs the distinc-
tion between "mistake" and "intentional discrimination" is found in
Judge Easterbrook's dissenting opinion in Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Na-
tional Corp. 241 There, a black employee claimed that she had been fired
in retaliation for filing a discrimination claim against her employer.242
The employer asserted that she had been fired because of an incident in
which she allegedly had disrupted the workplace while complaining
about discriminatory conduct. 243 The district court found that the plain-
tiff had not disrupted the workplace and that one of the defense witnesses
had testified falsely about defendant's conduct. 244 The court thus held
that the plaintiff had proven intentional discrimination. 245 The court of
appeals affirmed, explaining: "[Defendant] was held liable because its
proffered explanations for its treatment of [plaintiff] were found unwor-
thy of credence, and because the district court chose to accept the result-
ing inference that the true, unstated explanations were unlawful ones. ' ' 246
In dissent, Judge Easterbrook claimed that the issue to be deter-
mined was not whether or not the plaintiff actually had disrupted the
workforce, but whether the defendant would have fired a white worker
who behaved in the same manner as the plaintiff.247 By so doing, he
implicitly rejected the district court's express factual finding that the
239. 624 F. Supp. 363 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
240. Id. at 366.
241. 834 F.2d 1373, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part).
242. Id. at 1374-75.
243. Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 649 F. Supp. 647, 651-52 n.12 (N.D. Ind.
1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 1987).
244. Id. at 649 & n.3 (plaintiff's conduct did not disrupt the working environment at any
time; all of plaintiff's coworkers present on the day of her termination testified that she did not
disrupt the workplace). The district court further noted that the employer's affirmative action
coordinator had claimed during the administrative phase of plaintiff's claim that plaintiff's
conduct had been so disruptive that two employees had complained about it. At trial, an
investigator for the state antidiscrimination agency testified that both employees denied that
they had ever complained. The affirmative action coordinator admitted at trial that the state-
ments she made about those complaints were false. Id at 651 n.9.
245. Id at 664.
246. Reeder-Baker, 834 F.2d at 1379-80 ("[Defendant] was not found to have violated
Title VII because of a misallocation of burdens at trial or because of unwarranted scrutiny of
its business decisions.").
247. Id. at 1380-81 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part) (it would be error if the district
court had rested its decision on either of two possible theories: (1) that plaintiff did not actu-
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plaintiff's behavior had not disrupted the workplace. As to the credibil-
ity of the employer's reason, Judge Easterbrook argued that even if the
plaintiff had not in fact disrupted the work force, "an error of fact does
not imply discrimination. '24s Moreover, he did not think that the other
employees' testimony that the plaintiff was not disruptive undercut the
defendant's case, because the employer "is not required to accept or even
listen to line employees' judgment about how much commotion is too
much. ' 249 According to the dissent, the district court erred in treating
the employer's "error" as discrimination and in imposing its own views
of what methods of disciplining employees are appropriate. 250 Judge
Easterbrook's rationale, however, ignores any possibility that the em-
ployer used this incident as an excuse to fire the plaintiff, and that the
employer deliberately exaggerated the extent of the plaintiff's conduct to
lend further credence to its actions. That the district court found no
actual disruption and that workers testified there had been no such dis-
ruption is evidence not only of "mistake," but also of intentional
discrimination.
Under Judge Easterbrook's rationale, in the hypothetical discrimi-
nation case with which this Article began, even if the plaintiff success-
fully shows that he did not make excessive salary demands and that he
was qualified for and willing to perform the job in question, this evidence
would not suffice to raise an inference of discrimination. At best, the
plaintiff would have shown that the accounting firm erroneously believed
that the plaintiff wanted a higher salary than it was willing to pay. This
factual error would not suggest that the firm discriminated against the
plaintiff. Similarly, the firm's determination that the plaintiff was over-
qualified for the entry level job may be erroneous-the plaintiff may well
have had suitable qualifications. Under this theory, the "errors" in as-
sessing the plaintiff's academic record and abilities are simply mistakes
in judgment, and do not raise an inference that the firm was motivated by
racial animus.2 51
ally disrupt the workplace; or (2) that if there was disruption, it was protected conduct under
Title VII's antiretaliation clause).
248. Id. at 1381.
249. Id. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook claimed: "Some of her co-workers testified that they
were able to work through the hubbub, and the judge believed them." Id at 1380. The char-
acterization of the working environment as a "hubbub" appears nowhere in the district court's
opinion, and it is inconsistent with the district court's express findings. See supra note 238.
250. Reeder-Baker, 834 F.2d at 1381 ("At all events, [defendant] is not liable under Title
VII for [the supervisorl's failure to appreciate the full state of affairs.").
251. See Bienkowski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Even if
the trier of fact chose to believe an employee's assessment of his performance rather than the
employer's, that choice alone would not lead to a conclusion that the employer's version is a
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As this example illustrates, this theory about mistakes in business
judgment cannot withstand closer scrutiny. The accounting firm's "mis-
takes" could just as easily be excuses for discrimination against the black
applicant. As the Supreme Court expressly stated in Burdine: "The fact
that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of
an applicant does not in itself expose him to ... liability, [but] this may
be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimi-
nation." 252 Indeed, there is a significant difference between scrutinizing
an employer's justification to determine whether it was a good reason,
and scrutinizing it to determine whether it was the true reason, which is
precisely the purpose of the pretext stage.253 "Everyone can make a mis-
take," explained one court, "but if the mistake is large enough, we may
begin to wonder whether it was a mistake at all."254
The "pretext-plus" rationale ignores the question at the heart of a
discrimination case-whether the employer's actions were mistaken or
deliberate. To suggest that evidence undercutting the defendant's justifi-
pretext for age discrimination."); Cooper v. City of N. Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265, 1271-72 (6th
Cir. 1986) (finding that district court improperly concluded that plaintiff's version of various
disciplinary incidents was more credible than that of defendant, stating that: "The court
should not put itself in a position of judging the correctness of the defendant's action in dis-
charging the plaintiff. Instead, the court should look at whether the actions and the intentions
of the defendant were pretextual or amounted to intentional discrimination.").
252. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259 (emphasis added).
253. For example, in Montana v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 869 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.
1989) the court found that:
[W]here, as here, the plaintiff claims not that her employer used poor business judg-
ment in discharging her but that her employer used the structural reorganization as a
cover for discriminatory action, a federal court, to ensure that the business decision
was not discriminatory, is not forbidden to look behind the employer's claim that it
merely exercised a business decision in good faith .... To hold otherwise would
effectively insulate an employer from the constraints of federal antidiscrimination
law during any structural reorganization or reduction in force.
Id. at 106. See also Dister v. Continental Group, 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir. 1988) ("The
distinction lies between a poor business decision and a reason manufactured to avoid liability.
Thus, facts may exist from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the employer's 'busi-
ness decision' was so lacking in merit as to call into question its genuineness."); Estes v. Dick
Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1101 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1988) ("The fact that an employer explains
a termination in terms of business necessity does not, however, prevent a plaintiff from criti-
cally examining these proffered business reasons to test whether the employer is telling the
truth."); Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 256 (1st Cir. 1988) (must focus
on perceptions of decisionmaker when firing plaintiff to determine if proferred reasons are
pretextual); Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1987) (jury must
decide whether employer fired plaintiff because of reports of poor performance, not whether
the reports were true), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1019 (1988); Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d
202, 207 (5th Cir. 1986) (defendant claimed that it had the right to assign little weight to
plaintiff's excellent sales and profit performance when it decided to fire him, but issue is "what
[defendant's] actual motive was, not what it could have been").
254. Thombrough v. Columbus & G. R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 43
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
cation proves nothing more than "mistake" or merely challenges the em-
ployer's "business judgment" is to avoid the ultimate issue. As one court
explained:
It is undeniably true that the ADEA does not empower courts to
choose which business strategies should be implemented or which em-
ployees hired or fired. The ADEA does, however, require courts to
examine critically employer rationales based on business necessity
when they are presented as explanation for allegedly discriminatory
conduct.25
5
If a plaintiff challenges a defendant's rationale of poor job perform-
ance by introducing evidence that she was performing her job well, this
evidence is relevant not only to whether the employer made an error in
business judgment, but also to whether the defendant's justification is
believable in the first place. If the factfinder concludes that the plaintiff's
job performance was satisfactory despite the employer's claims to the
contrary, the factfinder then must make the additional determination as
to whether this discrepancy reflects an error by the employer or whether
instead it is evidence of intentional discrimination. Distinguishing be-
tween an honest mistake and willful misconduct is not a determination
limited to employment discrimination cases; intent is at the heart of
many civil and criminal cases.256 If the factfinder determines that the
employer was not mistaken, then the court may fairly infer that the de-
fendant lied about the true reasons for its action.257
255. MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 n.4 (8th Cir. 1988). Similarly, the
court in Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled on other
grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, 860 F.2d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1988) asserts:
Had [plaintiffs] simply contended that [defendant] used poor business judgment in
firing them, they would not have alleged a violation of the ADEA. However, [plain-
tiffs argue] that [defendant] merely used the reduction-in-force and dissatisfaction-
with-performance rationales as pretextual covers for age discrimination. In this con-
text, consideration of performance does not amount to second-guessing a mere busi-
ness judgment.
Id. at 21.
256. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), for ex-
ample, states:
The law often obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind. As Lord
Justice Bowen said in treating this problem in an action for misrepresentation nearly
a century ago: "The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at
a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else."
Id. at 716-17 (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885)).
257. Moreover, the possibility that an occasional error may be made by a court or a jury is
insufficient justification for shielding defendant's articulated reasons from careful scrutiny. As
one court has explained: "[A]lthough the ADEA does not hand federal courts a roving com-
mission to review business judgments, the ADEA does create a cause of action against business
actions that merge with age discrimination." Graefenhain, 827 F.2d at 21 n.8; see Hill v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 885 F.2d 804, 811 (1lth Cir. 1989) (defendant's explanation was
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The "pretext-plus" courts err in deferring to an employer's articu-
lated justification even in the face of contrary evidence. It is one thing
for courts to emphasize that a defendant who lacks the requisite intent
may not be held liable for discrimination. It is another matter to prevent
courts from drawing inferences about intent when the factual predicate
for the defendant's justification proves to be untrue or implausible. An
inference of discrimination may fairly be drawn from a defendant's lie,
and the plaintiff is thus entitled to have the factfinder make this impor-
tant credibility determination at trial.
(ii) Concealing an Unarticulated Nondiscriminatory Reason
Despite their protestations about "mistakes," however, the "pretext-
plus" courts ultimately do not believe that discrimination can fairly be
inferred even if the defendant's "mistake" later proves to be a lie. If the
defendant's reason is untrue, they conclude, some other nondiscrimina-
tory reason might underlie the pretextual one, and it is unfair to employ-
ers to presume otherwise. Judge Hunter's dissent in Chipollini
vigorously advanced this commonly held position:
An employer's proffered reason for terminating an employee may be
pretextual without violating the ADEA or any other civil rights stat-
ute. An employer motivated by ill-will, nepotism, or unpublicized fi-
nancial problems in his termination of an employee is just as likely to
use a pretextual explanation for his action as is an employer motivated
by statutorily-prohibited discrimination. Employers may even resort
to pretext for benign reasons, such as the desire to spare the feelings of
a loyal employee whose competence has declined. Under such circum-
stances, we have no power under the ADEA to provide redress.258
Under this theory, proving pretext ultimately proves nothing, because
either discriminatory or nondiscriminatory reasons may lurk beneath the
defendant's pretextual reason. Thus, because the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proof on this issue, the plaintiff must make some affirmative
"plus" showing that the reason concealed by the defendant was a dis-
criminatory one.259 In the absence of this showing, the "pretext-plus"
inconsistent with description of promotion process in general and with specific circumstances
of earlier promotion decisions, and thus unworthy of credence); Dister, 859 F.2d at 1113
("[P]retext can be established by a showing that the 'asserted neutral basis was so ridden with
error' that the employer could not honestly have relied on it.") (quoting Lieberman v. Gant,
630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980)).
258. Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 903 (3d. Cir.) (en banc) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
259. See Veatch v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 730 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Ill. 1990) in
which the court found:
Although the prima facie cases raise an inference of discrimination, the factfinder is
not compelled to award victory to the plaintiff simply because the employer has not
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courts believe it is unwarranted to infer that the concealed reason is dis-
criminatory.26° This theory presents a nearly insurmountable burden for
been candid about the real reason for the firing.... Even if the employer lies about
the real reasons for the firing, other reasons, not impermissible under federal law,
might be suggested by the evidence.
Id. at 819. In Veatch, the hospital asserted that it discharged plaintiff for insubordination. Id
at 811. The court stated:
Although there is evidence that the employer's proffered reason is not the real reason
for the firing, this is not a case where a showing of pretext necessarily eliminates all
lawful explanations. Even if a factfinder did not believe that the alleged insubordina-
tion motivated the firing, the record as a whole suggests explanations other than sex
discrimination. Financial pressure to reduce expenses in the hospital, the efforts of
new management to assert their authority in a department staffed by long-time em-
ployees, an actual and irremediable loss of trust caused by a possibly mistaken but
good-faith conclusion that plaintiff was insubordinate, or even discrimination based
on age ... are alternative explanations with support in the record.
Id. at 819. Of course, of these various explanations generated by the district court, the only
one actually offered by the defendant in its own defense was the plaintiff's insubordination. Id
at 811, 815.
260. See Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 128 (1st Cir.) ("the mere showing
that the employer's articulated reason may shield another (possibly nondiscriminatory) reason
does not create a dispute of material fact."), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Oct. 7 1991);
Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1180 (1st Cir.) (Torres, J., concurring) (employee
does not always prevail by showing pretext "because the pretext may be cloaking a nondiscrim-
inatory purpose that the employer wishes to conceal") (emphasis in original), cert denied, 111
S. Ct. 2828 (1991); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir.
1990) (without "plus" evidence, "[a] factfinder would be left to guess at the reasons behind the
pretext"); Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1341 (1st Cir. 1988) (despite con-
flicting evidence on the level of plaintiff's job performance, "the most attenuated link in the
chain in this case, without doubt, was whether plaintiff had proven that age-as opposed, say,
to . . .animosity, or envy .... or a garden-variety mistake in corporate judgment as to
[plaintiff']s continued utility-was responsible for the ouster."); Keyes v. Secretary of the
Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1027 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Plaintiff, who had the ultimate burden of proving
the claim, did not offer a scintilla of evidence which tended to show that her color or her sex-
as opposed, say, to some informal preferment of veterans or garden-variety cronyism-was a
factor in the decisionmaking process"); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559
(7th Cir.) (employer may be "trying to hide some other offense, such as a violation of a civil
service system or collective bargaining agreement"), cerl. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); Nix v.
WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (1 1th Cir. 1984) ("Although we
find some support for the district court's conclusion that the articulated reason for Nix's firing
was not the true reason, we find no evidence sufficient to sustain the court's conclusion that the
true reason was racial discrimination."); White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042 (1st Cir.)
(district court indicated that record would support finding that reason offered by defendant
was not sole reason for selection, but the court could not find by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant's unarticulated reason was discriminatory animus), cert denied, 469
U.S. 933 (1984); Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I fully acknowledge that the fact of discrimination suggests an intent
to discriminate. But that intent may be based upon an infinite variety of factors [aside from
race]."); Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 243 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Without bene-
fit of the presumption, age simply exists on this evidence as one of any number of possible
reasons-including poor business judgment by the employer-for the demotion.") (citations
omitted); Graham v. Renbrook Sch., 692 F. Supp. 102, 107 n.7 (D. Conn. 1988) ("[I]t would
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plaintiffs, who must negate not only defendants' articulated reasons but
also the secret reasons they failed to advance in court.
Judge Easterbrook articulated this theory in Benzies v. Illinois De-
partment of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.261 In this
case, a female psychologist claimed that her employer had failed to pro-
mote her because of her sex.262 The employer asserted that it did not
promote the plaintiff because her position did not meet the neutral re-
quirements for upgrading psychologist positions.263 The district court
"doubted" this explanation, but nevertheless found that the plaintiff had
failed to prove sex discrimination. 264 The court of appeals agreed and
rejected the plaintiff's contention that merely proving pretext by casting
doubt on the employer's explanation would be sufficient to prove her
case.265 Such proof would be "strong evidence," explained Judge Easter-
brook, but "[t]he judge may conclude after hearing all the evidence that
neither discriminatory intent nor the employer's explanation accounts for
the decision. ' 266 He continued:
A public employer may feel bound to offer explanations that are ac-
ceptable under a civil service system, such as that one employee is
more skilled than another, or that 'we were just following the rules.'
The trier of fact may find, however[,] that some less seemly reason-
personal or political favoritism, a grudge, random conduct, an error in
the administration of neutral rules-actually accounts for the decision.
Title VII does not compel every employer to have a good reason for its
still be an illogical leap in an age discrimination case to infer a discriminatory motive simply
because the employer's own explanation of its conduct is disbelieved."); Harris v. Marsh, 679
F. Supp. 1204, 1286 n.133 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (employer could be concealing some other offense,
such as violation of collective bargaining agreement), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), and cert denied sub
nom. Chambers v. United States Dep't of the Army, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991); Holly v. City of
Naperville, 603 F. Supp. 220, 230-31 n.4 (N.D. IM. 1985) ("While evidence of capable perform-
ance may prove that the employer's proffered reason is false, it does not directly follow that the
employer is attempting to cover up discrimination. He may be covering up something else-
e.g., nepotism or a simple ill will."), aff'd nem., 861 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1988); Askin v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp. 751, 755 (E.D. Ky. 1985) ("[Tlhe 'pretext' must be a
pretext for discrimination, not a pretext of some other ill-advised or unreasonable factor, such
as a personality conflict or unreasonably high but evenly applied standards of performance."),
aff'd mem., 785 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1986); BEARD, supra note 165, at 161 n.262 (The em-
ployer's true reason may be "merely another, possibly less easily articulated - but nonetheless
nondiscriminatory motivation, and the court need not necessarily find that the employer was
in fact motivated by intentional discrimination.").
261. 810 F.2d 146 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987).
262. Id. at 147.
263. Id ("Civil service personnel audited her work, found that she was not supervising
other psychologists, and concluded that she was not eligible for non-competitive promotion.").
264. Id
265. Id. at 148.
266. Id
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deeds; it is not a civil service statute. Unless the employer acted for a
reason prohibited by the statute, the plaintiff loses.
2 6 7
Thus, the district court was free to infer that the reason concealed by the
defendant's justification was a legitimate, although unarticulated, reason,
even though the court of appeals admitted that it "share[d] that court's
doubt about the Department's conduct." 268
Under this rationale, in the hypothetical case, proving that the ac-
counting firm's failure to hire the plaintiff was based on neither his aca-
demic credentials nor his salary demands would not prove intentional
discrimination. The firm instead could be concealing another reason for
failing to hire the plaintiff, such as nepotism or a sudden downturn in the
firm's economic fortunes.269 Under the "pretext-plus" theory, the court
may not assume that the reason underlying these false reasons is discrim-
inatory absent some additional proof of discrimination.270 In fact, these
267. Id. (citation omitted).
268. Id. at 149. To some extent, the court of appeals felt constrained by the fact that
plaintiff apparently had not pursued a theory of discrimination in assignment of supervisory
duties at trial, and thus it could not consider this issue on appeal. The court, however, specifi-
cally acknowledged: "The Department has never had a female supervising psychologist, and
the record could have supported a finding that [plaintiff] got the runaround for reasons relating
to her sex rather than to her talents and accomplishments." Id See also Shager v. Upjohn
Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The lie may be concealing a reason that is shameful or
stupid but not proscribed, in which event there is no liability."). For a criticism of the reason-
ing in Benzies, see Szteinbok, supra note 189, at 1125 ("The requirements of the prima facie
case and response become meaningless when the court substitutes its own explanation for the
spurious account proffered in rebuttal.").
269. Justice Scalia raised this question at oral argument in Brieck:
You can prove that the excuse I give is a pretext without proving that it's a pretext
for discrimination. Why must one conclude that the real reason is discrimination
simply because I come up with a phony reason that you don't believe. Maybe I
didn't have any reason to fire the guy. I don't know. It was an irrational thing. I
run a lousy business, and I fired this fellow. I'm sued. I come up with a reason that
is implausible. It's a pretext. But is it necessarily a pretext for discrimination?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-19, Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck, 47 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1527 (3d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-271), microformed on Oral Arguments of the
Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Fiche 12 (Congressional info. Serv.), cert. dismissed as improvi-
dently granted, 488 U.S. 226 (1988). See also Szteinbok, supra note 189, at 1122 ("[T]he de-
fendant may seek to strengthen its position by articulating a litany of reasons to explain its
conduct, some having a basis in fact and others not.").
270. Cf Miller v. WFLI Radio, 687 F.2d 136, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1982) (even though defend-
ant's reasons were found to be specious, plaintiff not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
where evidence supported alternative reason offered by magistrate of personal favoritism; case
remanded because plaintiff did not have full and fair opportunity to rebut alternative theory
that defendant never advanced); Veatch v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 730 F. Supp. 809,
819 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment although expressing
doubt that plaintiff would prevail, the court reasoned: "[e]ven if a factfinder did not believe
that the alleged insubordination motivated the firing, the record as a whole suggests explana-
tions other than sex discrimination").
November 1991] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
courts do not penalize the defendant for failing to introduce its secret
reason in court. As one court claimed: "It is doubtful that Congress
intended that Title VII require employers to produce, at the risk of a full-
fledged trial and civil liability, their true reasons for firing employees
when those true reasons have nothing to do with race or sex
discrimination. '271
What the "pretext-plus" courts seek to do, in effect, is to infer a
secret but nondiscriminatory reason for the defendant's conduct once the
plaintiff has successfully rebutted the defendant's articulated reason.
This inference is unwarranted under Supreme Court precedent, and it
flies in the face of common sense. Under Burdine, the whole purpose of
having the defendant articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is
to "sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination. '272 The Court specifically stated that the reason must be
established through the introduction of admissible evidence, and "[a]n
articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice."' 273 It makes no
sense for "pretext-plus" courts to require a plaintiff to disprove a reason
never offered into evidence by the defendant in the first place.274 Under
no circumstance should an employer be permitted to prevail in a discrim-
ination case by relying on a reason never proffered in court.275
271. Veatch, 730 F. Supp. at 819.
272. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981); see
Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (district court erroneously substi-
tuted its own theory of defendant's possible justification for firing plaintiff, thus ignoring Bur-
dine's purpose of providing plaintiff with a full and fair opportunity to respond to defendant's
articulated reason: "That purpose is defeated if defendant is allowed to present a moving
target or, as in this case, conceal the target altogether."); cf Miller, 687 F.2d at 138-39 (magis-
trate decided that defendant's reason was implausible but substituted its own theory, so case
must be remanded for trial on alternate theory).
273. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.9.
274. See Lanphear, 703 F.2d at 1317 ("It should not be necessary to add that the defend-
ant cannot meet its burden by means of a justification articulated for the first time in the
district court's opinion."); Miller, 687 F.2d at 139-40 (Churchill, J., dissenting) (once lower
court found defendant's reason pretextual, court of appeals should not have remanded case for
additional hearing on alternative reason offered by lower court but never advanced by
defendant).
275. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("An
employer may not, in other words, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a legitimate and
sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision.");
Sullivan, supra note 146, at 1117 n.42 ("Even if the 'true' reason is not illegal, but only embar-
rassing, it seems odd to allow the defendant to escape liability on a basis not asserted by it.");
Szteinbok, supra note 189, at 1130-31 ("The legislative policy against discrimination takes
precedence over the defendant's interest in keeping its motives from the public eye.... A
spurious explanation subverts the purpose of the litigation and encumbers the court's
analysis.").
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Second, the Supreme Court has stated that once all legitimate rea-
sons have been eliminated for an employer's conduct, it is fair to assume
that the only remaining reason is discrimination.276 It is on this principle
that the entire Burdine analysis is based. Therefore, when the only legiti-
mate reason offered by the defendant turns out to be untrue, it is entirely
consistent with Supreme Court precedent to presume that "it is more
likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with
some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such
as race."
'277
Third, there is no rational reason for giving a defendant who has lied
about the reasons for its actions a presumption that its lie does not con-
ceal illegal conduct. 278 In no other area of the law would a lying defend-
ant be accorded such solicitude. Ordinarily lack of credibility may be
considered as adverse evidence. 279 There is no principled reason why the
same result should not obtain here. To presume that a defendant who
offered a false reason for its actions in court did so for a benign reason is
illogical. Such a presumption can only stem from an unwarranted view
on the part of many judges that employers in employment discrimination
cases are so often victimized by disgruntled plaintiffs that the law must
bend over backwards to protect them, a perception that simply has no
basis in either law or fact.
Having demonstrated the fallacy of the "secret reason" theory, it is
nevertheless necessary to address one final contention: that defendants
resist asserting certain unseemly justifications, even if true, because of
their belief that the factfinder will react negatively to them, and that
therefore the defendant's lie may conceal a nondiscriminatory reason.
This fear may be realistic. Some courts and commentators have ap-
peared willing to impose liability on employers if their articulated reason
276. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("A prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination, only because we presume these acts,
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors.").
277. Id; see also Ibrahim v. New York State Dep't of Health, 904 F.2d 161, 168 (2d Cir.
1990) (district court concluded that defendant's reasons for denying promotion were false but
that real reason was "cronyism"; court of appeals reversed because defendant had never ad-
vanced such a reason, and falsity of the reasons advanced "pointed to discrimination based on
national origin which was not negated").
278. Cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 271 (O'Connor, J., concurring injudg-
ment) ("I do not think that the employer is entitled to the same presumption of good faith
where there is direct evidence that it has placed substantial reliance on factors whose consider-
ation is forbidden by Title VII."); Sullivan, supra note 146, at 1116-17 n.42 ("Indeed, one
could argue that such a reason is especially unlikely to be true precisely because the employer,
whose interest is to assert it, has not put it into evidence.").
279. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
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is "arbitrary" or is not "business-related," regardless of whether or not it
proves to be the true reason for the employment action. For example, in
Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken,280 the District Court for the Western
District of Texas asserted:
An employer cannot come forward with any reason justifying the job
discharge, but must instead come forward with only legitimate rea-
sons. To illustrate the proposition rather starkly, it would seem highly
inappropriate to grant judgment for a defendant who came forward
and argued that the plaintiff was discharged because the defendant ac-
cepted a monetary bribe from an enemy of the plaintiff. When the real
reason for discharge is so patently illegitimate, it is proper for the
courts to resurrect the presumption that unlawful discrimination moti-
vated the job action.281
In the opinion, however, the court does not explain how discharging a
plaintiff because of a bribe violates Title VII. Indeed, if the defendant
claimed bribery as its reason, and the plaintiff failed to disprove it, it is
difficult to understand why judgment should not be awarded to the em-
ployer. Nevertheless, courts and commentators have argued that the de-
fendant's reason must be "lawful" or "rational" before it can rebut the
plaintiff's presumption of discrimination. 282 In light of such attitudes, it
280. 683 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
281. Id. at 634 ("To allow a Title VII defendant to satisfy its rebuttal burden by offering
an illegitimate reason for the job action and shifting the burden back to the plaintiff would be
inconsistent with the evidentiary burdens established by the Supreme Court."); see Harris v.
Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1285 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ("[F]or the employer's reason to be deemed
sufficient to overcome the presumption against him, it must have a rational connection with
the business goal of securing a competent and trustworthy work force."), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990),
and cert. denied sub nom. Chambers v. United States Dep't of the Army, 111 S. Ct. 1580
(1991).
282. See Brown v. Tennessee, 693 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 1982) (refusal to take polygraph
is legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, "at least when polygraph testing is a lawful method for
determining employment-related questions"); Valdez 683 F. Supp. at 634 ("If illegitimate rea-
sons such as nepotism or irrational personal dislike unrelated to job performance were deemed
sufficient to rebut the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff would face an impossible task in demonstrat-
ing pretext."); Grabb v. Bendix Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ("it is not the
court's duty to determine the validity of a defendant's employment decision as long as the
decision was made in good faith"); Hannah A. Furnish, A Path Through the Maze" Disparate
Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer
and Burdine 23 B.C. L. REV. 419, 437 (1982) ("For the employer's reason to be deemed
sufficient to overcome the presumption against him in a disparate treatment case, then, it must
have a connection with the business goal of securing a competent and trustworthy work
force."). See generally Terry Collingsworth, ERISA Section 510-A Further Limitation on
Arbitrary Discharges, 10 INDUs. REL. L.J. 319, 338-40 (1988) (articulated reason must be good
reason, not merely any reason justified under "employment at will" doctrine); Joan Vogel,
Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of
ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1024, 1054-55 n.200 (1987) ("While
employers need the flexibility to make employment decisions, it is not burdensome to require
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is at least conceptually possible that defendants at times advance pretex-
tual reasons to conceal reasons that are somehow "illegitimate," but are
actually nondiscriminatory.
The short answer to this question is that defendants are expected to
be truthful in court regardless of the adverse consequences. But there are
also theoretical problems with limiting a defendant's articulated justifica-
tion to reasons that are somehow business-related. Therefore, a more
practical solution than simply admonishing defendants not to lie is
needed. The appropriate response is for courts to acknowledge that,
under Burdine, a defendant is not liable for intentional discrimination if
it truly acted for a nondiscriminatory, but arguably unseemly, reason.
Thus, in the hypothetical case, if the hiring partner asserts that he did
not hire the plaintiff because he had been instructed to hire instead an
important client's son, and if the plaintiff cannot show that this is untrue,
then the defendant prevails. 2 3 As the final Part of this Article shows,
this rule would remedy one of the principal concerns of the "pretext-
plus" courts and ensure more consistent application of Burdine.
the employer to articulate a job-related reason for a decision .... If the employer cannot
articulate such a reason, then this failure should create an inference that a discriminatory
reason exists."). As one commentator asserted:
If an employer actually makes a decision based on the fact that the applicant is left-
handed, or green-eyed, or is a Democrat, regardless of the irrationality of that rea-
son, the employer will not be engaging in discrimination proscribed by the stat-
ute .... The issue, however, is not whether arbitrary factors are proscribed by the
Act .... In the face of a prima facie case creating an inference of race, sex, or
national origin discrimination, a defendant is obligated to articulate legitimate rea-
sons from which proper motivation can be inferred. Some reasons (such as left-
handedness or green-eyedness) are so weak that they will not allow a reasonable
inference to be drawn that these reasons, rather than the statutorily prescribed [sic]
reasons already inferred, actually motivated the employer.
Mack A. Player, Defining "'Legitimacy" in Disparate Treatment Cases: Motivational Inferences
as a Talisman for Analysis, 36 MERCER L. RaV. 855, 877-78 (1985).
283. See, eg., Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991) (If plain-
tiff was fired for personal disloyalty rather than for business reasons, "[i]t does not show...
that [plaintiff] was fired because of his age. It tends if anything to show the opposite, because if
[plaintiff] was fired because of his disloyalty.., the natural though not inevitable inference is
that he was not fired because of his age."); Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d
556, 567 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Even had the reasons articulated here been frivolous or capricious,
had they been the genuine causes of these discharges they would have defeated liability under
the ADEA."), cerL denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984); Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1285-86 n.130
("Although most employment decisions based on nepotism or friendship still encompass some
rational relationship to bonafide business concerns, a situation may occur where that is not the
case, yet the situation was clearly not racially motivated.").
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III. Acknowledging the Probative Value of the "Illegitimate"
Nondiscriminatory Reason
The federal courts should recognize that an "illegitimate" nondis-
criminatory reason offered by an employer suffices to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case. The benefits of such a rule are obvious. First, it elimi-
nates a principal theoretical justification for the "pretext-plus" rule, be-
cause if the defendant's articulated reason proves to be untrue, then there
is no basis for assuming that the lie concealed some other nondiscrimina-
tory reason. If the defendant truly has a nondiscriminatory reason, then
the defendant must advance it or risk the consequences. Thus, this rule
will also foster truth-telling in employment discrimination cases. A de-
fendant will be insulated from liability only if its true nondiscriminatory
reason for taking adverse action against the plaintiff is openly advanced
in court.
Second, this rule is entirely consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent. Although many courts and commentators have argued that a "le-
gitimate" reason must be a "rational business reason," there is no
analytical justification for this assertion.284 In Furnco Construction
Corp., the Supreme Court distinguished between employers who act in a
"totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons," and employ-
ers who act with "some reason. '285 Once the plaintiff eliminates all "le-
gitimate" reasons, then the Court has held that it is likely that the
employer based its action on "an impermissible consideration such as
race. '"286 In order to infer an illegitimate basis, the Court must have pre-
sumed that all nondiscriminatory reasons, whether or not they accom-
plished some business purpose, have been eliminated.287 Otherwise,
there would be no reason to infer that the employer acted with discrimi-
natory intent. An unsavory reason may merit closer scrutiny, such as the
284. See Sullivan, supra note 146, at 1158-59 (even if employer claims it refused to hire
plaintiff because plaintiff was a Capricorn, such a reason would be a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason since, "[n]o matter how silly this reason, it is not one of those prohibited by Title
VII. Accordingly, it would suffice to carry the defendant's burden of production.").
285. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1984) (first emphasis added).
286. Ia
287. See Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 59, 63-64 (7th Cir.
1986) (plaintiff's claim that defendant's reason was pretextual and that she was fired in retalia-
tion for her son's filing of a lawsuit against employer did not prove discrimination; if that was
the real reason, "[w]hile defendant would not be deserving of praise, this 'bad' reason proffered
by defendant would still constitute a nondiscriminatory reason that satisfies defendant's bur-
den under the indirect method of proof in an age discrimination case"); cf. NLRB v. Eastern
Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 669 (Ist Cir. 1979) ("established principle that an em-
ployer legally may discharge for any cause, whatever others may think of its adequacy, so long
as his motivation is not interference with rights protected under the [NLRA]").
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scrutiny courts routinely apply to purely subjective reasons,2 8 but artic-
ulating such a reason does not necessarily imply that it is either untrue or
discriminatory.28 9 Similarly, in Burdine, the Court noted:
We have stated consistently that the employee's prima facie case of
discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articulates lawful rea-
sons for the action; that is, to satisfy this intermediate burden, the em-
ployer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the
trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had
not been motivated by discriminatory animus.
29°
The Court's equation of the term "lawful" with the phrase "not ...
motivated by discriminatory animus" provides further support for this
rule.
It has been argued that permitting an employer to rebut a plaintiff's
presumption of discrimination with an "illegitimate" reason would allow
the employer to dream up any reason in order to prevail, because "[i]t
will be a rare defendant who cannot dredge up some reason for acting as
it did." 291 This contention, however, ignores the whole purpose of the
pretext stage under Burdine. If the defendant generates an unseemly or
arbitrary reason for its employment action that has no relation to any
legitimate business objective, it should be easier, not more difficult, to
prove that it is pretextual. A claim that the plaintiff was not hired be-
cause he was a vegetarian or a Capricorn, for example, should be at least
288. See Conner v. Fort Gordon Bus Co., 761 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[A]
defendant relying on a purely subjective reason for discharge will face a heavier burden of
production than it otherwise would.").
289. Cf Williams v. Apffels Coffee Co., 792 F.2d 1482, 1486-87 (9th Cir. 1986) (defendant
claimed that selections were based on merit, but fact that several of those hired over plaintiff
were relatives of defendant's other employees casts doubt on defendant's credibility). But see
Player, supra note 283, at 877 ("As rational beings, employers more often than not will use
reasons that have some legitimate relationship to bona fide business concerns. It, therefore,
cannot be infeired with any strength that an employer was motivated by a proffered reason
that is bizarre, irrational, or wholly arbitrary.").
290. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981) (emphasis
added); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) ("The burden
then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection. We need not attempt in the instant case to detail every matter which
fairly could be recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire."); cf Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1984) ("This is not to say, of course, that proof of a
justification which is reasonably related to the achievement of some legitimate goal necessarily
ends the inquiry.").
291. For example, one commentator contends:
If the reason is not scrutinized to determine whether it has sufficient rationality to
carry an inference of legal motivation, the delicate balance will be tipped dramati-
cally in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff will be prematurely deprived of the
inference of illegal discrimination drawn from his prima facie case.
Player, supra note 282, at 866; see also Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, 683 F. Supp. 596,
634 (W.D. Tex. 1988) ("plaintiff would face an impossible task in demonstrating pretext").
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as easy to rebut as a claim that he was not hired because he did not
perform well during an interview.292 Moreover, a reason that appears to
be specious on its face ought to be subject to greater scrutiny, not less, by
the finder of fact, just as more traditional "subjective" reasons are.293
Once the plaintiff successfully rebuts the reason, then the plaintiff has
proven pretext and thereby proven intentional discrimination.
Another argument raised against this rule has been that defendants
may offer a justification that violates another law and thereby attempt to
insulate themselves from liability, or that their fear of admitting liability
for violating another law may encourage fabrication of a business rea-
son.2 94 For example, a defendant may have discharged the plaintiff in
violation of a state "whistleblower" statute, but instead stand accused of
age discrimination. Nevertheless, if the defendant asserts: "I didn't fire
the plaintiff because of his age; I fired him because he squealed on me to
the state authorities," the defendant plainly has met its burden under
Burdine. Moreover, if the plaintiff cannot prove that the employer's rea-
son is untrue, then the plaintiff has not proven age discrimination and
should not prevail. That the employer's admission may incur liability in
a subsequent lawsuit is a fair consequence of the employer's illegal
conduct.
In contrast, if the employer instead falsely asserts: "I fired the plain-
tiff because he was incompetent," the employer has set the stage for a
possible finding of age discrimination should the plaintiff succeed in
proving that reason to be untrue. Nevertheless, the theoretical risk that a
defendant will be punished for discrimination rather than for its actual
illegal conduct does not justify requiring only "lawful" reasons to be of-
fered by defendants, as some "pretext-only" courts might suggest, nor
does it justify permitting defendants to lie their way out of their conduct
and then to be presumed innocent, as "pretext-plus" courts might
suggest.
292. See Sullivan, supra note 146, at 1159 (if employer claims as legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason that plaintiff is a Capricorn, "[t]he trier of fact could believe that the most likely
explanation for those facts was an intent to exclude [plaintiff]; the defendant's explanation,
while theoretically offering an alternative explanation, may not be believed because it is so far
off the 'Richter scale' of everyday conduct.").
293. See supra note 288.
294. See Player, supra note 282, at 870-71 (Permitting an employer to offer a justification
that violates another statute "patently undercuts public policy.... [Other labor laws] consti-
tute a body of law that should be interpreted as an interrelated whole, securing for employees a
broad charter of employment protections."); Vogel, supra note 282, at 1055 n.206 ("Obviously,
the employer is not likely to articulate a reason which will make it liable under other discrimi-
nation laws.").
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To hold defendants liable for discrimination if they acted adversely
to plaintiffs for "bad" but nondiscriminatory reasons would effectively
abrogate the "employment at will" doctrine. 295 Although this traditional
doctrine has fallen into some disfavor in recent years, 296 it nevertheless
would be inappropriate to transform federal antidiscrimination statutes
into statutes requiring discharge only "for cause." Imposing this addi-
tional burden on employers would achieve a result that Congress never
intended.
In short, the term "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" should be
construed to mean "genuine nondiscriminatory reason," and thus it
should include any nondiscriminatory reason upon which the employer
in fact relied.297 Such a definition would focus the pretext stage squarely
on the credibility of the defendant's reason, which is precisely what the
Supreme Court intended in Burdine.298 In the hypothetical case, evi-
dence that the hiring partner engaged in nepotism would be "admissible
evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that
the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory ani-
295. Cf Vogel, supra note 282, at 1054-55 n.200 ("If the employer must articulate a job-
related reason, then § 510 will further erode the employment-at-will doctrine which allows
employers to fire people for any reason or no reason at all.").
296. See generally HENRY H. PERRrIT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE
12-30 (2d ed. 1987) (describing erosion of employment-at-will rule).
297. See I CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCmIMINATION § 5.4.4, at
261 (2d ed. 1988) ("On its face, the term 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' might seem to
limit the employer to reasons validly related to job performance. As long as the reason is not
itself discriminatory, however, any reason will suffice-even if it does not seem 'legitimately'
related to the job."); see also Gray v. University of Ark., 883 F.2d 1394, 1402 (8th Cir. 1989)
("[S]ome of the reasons given ... appeared to be less than weighty, if not almost laughable,"
but were not found to be unworthy of credence.); Gaballah v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 1191, 1201
n.14 (7th Cir. 1980) (preselection of candidates for promotion in violation of agency rules does
not indicate discrimination and remains a nondiscriminatory reason); Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979) ("The employer's stated legitimate reason must be
reasonably articulated and nondiscriminatory, but does not have to be a reason that the judge
or jurors would act on or approve."); Lombard v. School Dist., 463 F. Supp. 566, 571 (W.D.
Pa. 1978) ("Stating that a man was selected over a woman for a job because the man had more
friends in high places constitutes a 'non-discriminatory reason' for the unequal treatment suffi-
cient to avoid liability under Title VII . . ").
298. As explained by one commentator:
The real limit on what will be accepted as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is
credibility. The further removed the reason is from job performance or legitimate
needs of business, the less likely it is that a factfinder will accept the reason as the real
basis for the allegedly discriminatory treatment. For example, an employer who as-
serts that she never hires vegetarians might convince a factfinder that the plaintiff
was in fact a vegetarian, but the factfinder would tend to doubt that the plaintiff's
vegetarianism was the actual reason for defendant's failure to hire him.
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 297, § 5.4.4 at 261.
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mus. '299 But such reasons ordinarily should be accepted in an em-
ployer's defense until the plaintiff proves them to be untrue.30°
Once the courts have acknowledged that a defendant may advance
a truthful but "illegitimate" reason in rebuttal of a discrimination claim,
then it logically follows that a plaintiff who successfully demonstrates
that the defendant's justification is untrue is entitled to judgment in his
favor as a matter of law. If the court has to choose between the reasons
offered by the parties-the claim of discrimination raised by the plaintiff,
and the claim of some other nondiscriminatory reason raised by the de-
fendant-once the plaintiff disproves the defendant's reason, the court
has no other choice but to accept the reason offered by the plaintiff. Be-
cause the court no longer would be permitted to speculate that some se-
cret reason not articulated by either party motivated the employment
decision, the court would be required, as a matter of law, to find that the
plaintiff had proven discrimination by disproving the defendant's articu-
lated reason by a preponderance of the evidence.
IV. Conclusion
As this review of the "pretext-plus" rule indicates, plaintiffs in "pre-
text-plus" jurisdictions are unfairly harmed by a rule that has no basis in
legal doctrine. Not only does the rule itself unduly handicap employees
299. This would not foreclose an argument by a plaintiff at the pretext stage that an em-
ployer's nepotism constituted racial discrimination because, for example, the employer pre-
ferred to hire relatives and all the employer's relatives were white. See Roberts v. Gadsden
Memorial Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 798-99 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant's articulated reason was
that plaintiff had never been considered for job for which he was qualified, and record sug-
gested that promotions were based on nepotism and cronyism: "[These] informal methods
necessarily and intentionally favored those who moved within [the selecting official's] social
circles-i.e., white people. This 'method' of promotion patently failed to afford a black man
the equal treatment which Title VII demands.") (citations omitted); Lewis v. University of
Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1983) (Adams, J., dissenting) ("[N]epotism is... a
nonobjective consideration in hiring or promotional decisions that has the effect of locking in
the racial and ethnic status quo. If a workforce is racially segregated and hiring is based on
kinship to the workforce in place, the pattern of segregation will not be altered."), cerL denied,
469 U.S. 892 (1984).
300. This is not to suggest that any reason offered by the employer will satisfy the burden
of production. "Reasons" that purport to offer no real justification for the action will not
suffice. Asserting, for example, that the reason for an employment decision was that the em-
ployer had no reason, as the defendant ultimately asserted in Tye, would not meet the burden.
See supra notes 200-214 and accompanying text; Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d
88, 96 (6th Cir. 1982) (defendant's proffered reason as to why plaintiff was not hired was that
none of the foremen with authority to hire had selected him: "[This] reason does not tell the
court or the plaintiff whether the employment decision was in fact based upon [plaintifli's prior
work record or whether the decision in fact was based upon impermissible racial
considerations.").
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by requiring "plus" evidence, but application of the rule to reject most of
the common forms of "plus" evidence that plaintiffs produce further
hampers plaintiffs' ability to pursue claims of employment discrimina-
tion. In many ways, the "pretext-plus" rule treats employment discrimi-
nation cases as if they were some uniquely disfavored type of lawsuit that
may not be proven circumstantially.
It may not be surprising that legal doctrines have evolved in recent
years to disadvantage civil rights plaintiffs. Employment discrimination
law became increasingly controversial during the Reagan years, and the
Supreme Court's activist stance in reversing prior precedent in this area
has provoked both widespread comment and various attempts at legisla-
tive response, most recently the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The battle
over proving pretext in disparate treatment cases, however, is far less
visible than the current controversies over "quotas" and affirmative ac-
tion that have garnered most of the attention of scholars and the public.
Nevertheless, it is in this arena that the effort to achieve a workplace free
of unlawful discrimination will be won or lost.
What ultimately underlies the controversy over the "pretext-plus"
rule is a battle over policy, not law. The dominant judicial view in the
early years of employment discrimination litigation-that illegal discrim-
ination is presumed to be prevalent and that plaintiffs must be given am-
ple opportunity to prove their cases-has given way in the current
conservative climate to a notion that illegal discrimination is a thing of
the past and that plaintiffs more frequently wield discrimination claims
as a shield against all adverse employment actions. In acting upon these
beliefs, however, the "pretext-plus" courts have ignored precedent and
have imposed their own views of what employment discrimination means
in today's society. It may be ironic that conservative courts have taken
such an activist role in rewriting the law in this area. Nevertheless, it is
time for a more principled approach to be applied to disparate treatment
cases.
November 1991] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

